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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
COPPER STATE THRIFT & LOAN CO., 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO., and 
COTTONWOOD THRIFT & LOAN CO. 
Defendants/Respondents. 
No. 860340 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Does the absence of reference to a notary public's place 
of residence and commission expiration date from a 
certification of a mechanic's lifen verification or 
acknowledgement invalidate the mechanic's lien? 
2. Does the rule of strict compliance apply to a notary 
certification of a mechanic's lien verification and/or 
acknowledgement or does the rule of substantial compliance 
apply? 
3. Does a notary certification which contains the notary's 
signature, official title and official seal substantially 
comply with the certification requirements of the mechanic's 
lien and recording statutes? 
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4. Do Utah Code Annotated, Sections 38-1-11 and 38-1-13 
(1953) require all parties claiming an interest in real 
property subject to a mechanic's lien foreclosure to be 
named as parties defendant within twelve months after 
completion of the original contract? 
5. Does an amendment of a complaint in a mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action naming additional defendants who have 
knowledge of the action relate back to the original date of 
filing of the complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure? 
6. As a matter of law, is there a unity of interest between 
Valley Bank and Trust Co. and parties named in the original 
complaint such that an amendment of the original complaint 
naming Valley Bank would be deemed to relate back to the 
date of the original complaint? 
7. As a matter of law, is the partial release of lien 
prepared by Defendant Bradshaw and executed by Plaintiff 
ambiguous on its face such as to allow parole evidence to 
determine the extent and coverage of said release? 
8. As a matter of law, does an unambiguous partial release 
of lien allow an assumption by the trial court that 
Cottonwood Thrift & Loan Co. reasonably relied upon said 
partial release of lien without further inquiry as to the 
facts and circumstances surrounding such purported 
reasonable reliance? 
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9. Does a dispute as to a material fact exist as to the 
meaning and intent of the partial release of lien and the 
subsequent purported reliance by Cottonwood Thrift & Loan 
upon said release? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of the construction of a condominium 
project in Salt Lake County, State of Utah known as the Highland 
Orchards Condominium Project. (See Complaint, Record at p.2, and 
Amended Complaint, Record at p.242). Plaintiff Projects 
Unlimited was the general contractor and performed work on the 
project pursuant to two contracts with Defendant Bradshaw 
Development. (See Complaint, Record at p.2, Amended Complaint, 
Record at p.242, Affidavit of David Mast, Record at p.487, 
Affidavit of Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508, and Memorandum, 
Record at p.464). The first contract between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Bradshaw Development was entered into on or about 
September 15, 1982 for the construction of two units and the 
second was entered into on or about April 13, 1983 for the 
construction of six units. (See Affidavit bf David Mast, Record 
at p.487). 
Prior to commencement of construction under these two 
contracts and during construction, Defendant Copper State met 
with Plaintiff and Defendant Bradshaw Development to discuss the 
financing for the project. (See Affidavits of David Mast, Record 
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at p.487, and Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508). Plaintiff 
commenced work on the project on or about October 10, 1982 and 
performed the last work on the project, due to non-payment on or 
about October 7, 1983. (See Affidavits of David Mast, Record at 
p.487, and Phil Hofstetter, Record at p.508). 
Plaintiff faithfully performed its contracts for the 
construction of the project and received certain payments from 
Defendant Copper State as the proceeds of a construction loan to 
Defendant Bradshaw Development for the project. (Record at 
p.490). The construction loan was secured by trust deeds naming 
Defendant Copper State as beneficiary which were recorded in 
December, 1982 for the first two units and by trust deeds naming 
Defendant Copper State as beneficiary which were recorded on June 
6, 1983 for the remaining six units. (Record at p.465). 
Plaintiff received the last of the progress payments during June 
of 1983. After the last payment from Defendant Copper State, 
Plaintiff was told by Defendant Copper State that although there 
was money remaining in the construction loan for the project, 
Defendant Bradshaw Development had exceeded its lending limit and 
no more funds would be disbursed on behalf of Defendant Bradshaw 
Development. (Record at p.490). Defendant Bradshaw Development 
failed to otherwise pay Plaintiff the amounts due and owing under 
said contracts and all changes and additions thereto as agreed. 
(See Affidavits of David Mast, Record at p.487, and Phil 
Hofstetter, Record at p.508). 
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During construction, three of the units were sold. The two 
original units were financed through Defendant Valley Bank with 
trust deeds filed on May 25, 1983. (Record at p.465). Defendant 
Copper State subordinated its interest, to the extent not paid by 
the Valley Bank loans, by way of trust deeds filed on June 23, 
1983. (Record at p.465). The third unit was financed through 
Defendant Western Savings with a trust deed filed on September 7, 
1983. (Record at p.465). After Plaintiff had halted construc-
tion, two additional units were sold and were financed by 
Defendant Cottonwood Thrift with trust deeds being recorded on 
December 12, 1983. (Record at p.465). 
Due to non-payment, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Lien against 
the subject property with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) 
on November 15, 1983. (Record at pp.618-620). Thereafter, 
Defendant Bradshaw Development requested, and Plaintiff and 
Defendant Bradshaw Development negotiated, a partial release of 
lien whereby Plaintiff agreed to release its lien on the two 
units financed by Defendant Cottonwood Thrift to the extent of 
monies received from the proceeds of the loans made for those 
units. (Record at p.538 and un-numbered page between 624 and 
625)(See Partial Release of Lien attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Phil Hofstetter in Response to Affidavit of John 
Bradshaw, Record at p.542). Following payment of $85,000.00 
under the partial release of lien (Record at p.538), Plaintiff 
filed an amended notice of lien with the Salt Lake County 
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Recorder to reflect the amount remaining due and owing after 
crediting the actual amount Plaintiff received from the 
Cottonwood Thrift loans. (Record at p.621-624). 
When no further payments were forthcoming, Plaintiff duly 
filed a lis pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-11 (1953) on March 16, 1984 
(Record at pp.48-50) and commenced the instant action for breach 
of contract and for foreclosure of its mechanic's lien in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah 
by complaint dated March 16, 1984. (Record at p.p.2-47). By way 
of an amended complaint dated May 24, 1985, Plaintiff joined 
Defendant Valley Bank and others, who are not party to this 
appeal, to the foreclosure action. (Record at pp.242-258). The 
default of Defendant Bradshaw was entered and a judgment by 
default was signed by the trial court on December 3, 1985. 
(Record at p.420) 
Defendants Copper State Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood 
Thrift and Loan Company and Valley Bank & Trust Company all moved 
the trial court for summary judgment on their counterclaims 
against Plaintiff. (Record at pp.481-484). Plaintiff also moved 
the trial court for partial summary judgment against Defendant 
Copper State Thrift and Loan Company. (Record at pp.551-554). 
The trial court held that: 
1) Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was invalid due to the 
lack of a statement of the notary's place of residence 
and commission expiration date in the notary 
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certification of the lien verification required by Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 38-1-7 I .1 (»*V:jt as ainerniprl pjioi: 
t ); 
2) Since Plaintiff had cjr ioined Defendant Valley 
Bank £ Trust Compp i 
t h e t w e l v e nu . • perio s*r* : * * - . - Code 
Annotated, Section 38-1 (1953) Plainti* * w barred 
f i nni as'^M'l iiiK-i I". II . Uetenaant Val--jv Bank; 
and 
defendant Cottonwood Thrift and Lorw l> u1 M-»a,sonat; J y 
release of lien regarding one 
condominium unit thus preventing Plaintiff from assert-
ing i t s 1 i en against IV f»< nrlnnt 
I 11a I pai:t icul ar ui\i t. 
(Record at p.698). 
Plainti f i i i mini i y i i I»II ,i NUI. in ml A| i)'n^ei i in bring the 
mattex before this Court Record at p.7 3 2 ) . 
SUMMARY OF
 A R G U M E N T 
appea: laintiff asserts that 
Aim.- notwithstanding the failure: •:•£" 
the notary public to include a statement of the notary's place oi 
residence and commission exp * Pi ai n1 i M «« - "^n 
¥i th respect to the notary issue is that a statement < * 
notary's place of residence and commission expiration <• ' 
not mandatory requirements under Utah mechanic's lien law and the 
Utah recording statutes. In the alternative, Plaintiff asserts 
that a certification of a mechanic's lien verification which does 
not contain a statement of the notary's place of residence and 
commission expiration date substantially complies with the 
mechanic's lien and recording statutes. Therefore, Plaintiff 
holds a valid and enforceable mechanic's lien against the subject 
property. If Plaintiff is successful in these arguments, the 
summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims against Defendant 
Copper State will need to be reversed. 
In this appeal, Plaintiff also asserts that under Utah law 
it is allowed to join additional parties its mechanic's lien 
foreclosure action which was commenced within the prescribed time 
period state in the mechanic's lien laws. If Plaintiff is 
successful in these arguments, the summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Valley Bank will need to be 
reversed. 
Finally, in this appeal, Plaintiff asserts that it is not 
clear on its face whether the partial release of lien is a total 
release of all mechanic's lien claims against the two units 
financed by Defendant Cottonwood Thrift and that there are 
questions with regard to Defendant Cottonwood Thrift's alleged 
reasonable reliance on the partial release of lien in approving 
the financing of two units. If Plaintiff is successful in these 
arguments, the summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims 
against Defendant Cottonwood Thrift will need to be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff is seeking review • '• a"l court" F, graft nf 
Motions for Defendants Copper State, 
Valley Bank and Cottonwood Thrii•:. policy with regard + o 
motions for summary judgment has :-:• * 3 
a versies to he decided MI. merits yjhere 
possible ;uh tr > Utah Supreme Court in Bowen v, Riverton 
Citi - - \ ' mf\? \ 1/ j fo3 1 owi ng standard to 
: eview of summary judgments. The Bowen Court 
stated: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning 
questions of fact, the doubt should be resolved in the 
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must 
evaluate all the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. 
(Citations omitted.) Id. at * addition, as always, an 
error of is subject 
:-*
 r. . ; o - , > i • * errors * * 1 : - - a 
court s holdings and decisioi First, the trial cour~ cummi 
erro: s nterpreting Hn I JIU at. it applies to 
: :ications mechanic*^ v erifications, Second, 
trie trir ommitted error nterpr^ 
mechv :
 i tiling tif lis pendens 
and joindei parties mechanic; fs lien foreclosure 
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action. And thirdly, the trial court committed error in 
interpreting the law of mechanic's lien releases and in its 
factual findings of the circumstances surrounding the partial 
release of lien negotiated by Plaintiff and Defendant Bradshaw 
and executed by Plaintiff. 
I. NOTARY CERTIFICATIONS OF MECHANIC'S LIEN VERIFICATIONS ARE 
VALID WITHOUT STATEMENTS OF THE NOTARY'S PLACE OF 
RESIDENCE AND COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court held that 
mechanic's liens which do not recite the residence of the notary 
public and the expiration date of the notary's commission are 
invalid as not meeting the requirements for a valid lien or that 
they were improperly recorded and therefore ineffective. This is 
the only issue ruled upon by the trial court with regard to 
Defendant Copper State's Motion for Summary Judgment. Such a 
holding by this Court would be a departure from the intention of 
the notary and mechanic's lien statutes and will have a severe 
and widespread impact on the construction industry. 
A. THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 46-1-8 ARE 
NOT MANDATORY. 
Defendant Copper State and the lower court have 
misinterpreted the scope and application of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 46-1-8. Title 46 of Utah Code Annotated contains the 
provisions for the creation, powers and management of notaries 
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public. "" addition, Title I1!1, contains ^formation and 
instructions - notaries- " J \\\ Codn "'!">" I 8 
s - sections setting forth information and 
instructions to notaries IKM* Section states: 
To all acknowledgements, oaths, affirmations and 
Instruments of every kind taken and 
notary public he shall affix to hi| 
official title and his place of residence and the date 
011 which his commission expires. 
certified by a 
s signature his 
There ] egislaturt-T s i^fen-1- that a 
notary certification is to be deemed invalid it *^ notary fails 
: l i *. "istructions set * .on 
• .,.*. * * - notary :>, r \ .*.-. ( affect the 
; taiy s certification - p* «cknowledgem€ 
rejudice innocent 
elied . n-r u: y public to carry out his 
&^idity 
verificatior 
I jr IJIi-* ? d u t y • 
Such 
handed down 
i I in II Iini "In I Ii is supported KT* decisions 
upreme Court, In Stahl v. Utah Transit 
Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980) i I 
this impoildiiii! il< I Jiiluti ry construction as follows: 
We are guided in construing the language of the instant 
statute by the principal that generally a direction in 
a statute is considered "mandatory" wFjten consequences 
are attached for failure to act. Conversely, when a 
statute requires an action to be taken without 
prescribing a penalty for failure 1fo so act, the 
requirement is not often deemed mandatory. (Citations 
omitted) (Emphasis Added). 
m1
 consequences" specified Section 
would ^udioaie ihnHii M m i i i n > i i m tained therein ait 
mandatory, at least with regard to the notary's place of 
residence and commission expiration date. 
This argument is further strengthened by the fact that 
regardless of whether the notary includes his or her place of 
residence and commission expiration date, these two items of 
information can only be verified or proved by consulting the 
master lists established pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
46-1-2. The notary's signature will of necessity be "deemed 
mandatory" even without consequences attaching since that 
information is required by Section 57-2-5 to establish the 
identity and authority of the person certifying a verification or 
acknowledgement and to allow anyone to consult the master lists 
and ascertain that the person making the certification is in fact 
an authorized notary public. 
The lack of a statement of a notary's place of residence and 
commission expiration date does not invalidate the notary's 
certificate. 1 Am.Jur. 2d Acknowledgements, Section 55 states, 
"It is not essential to the validity of the certificate that it 
state the officer's place of residence." After researching the 
issue of residence, Plaintiff is unaware of any case in any 
jurisdiction which invalidates either notary certifications or 
the effect of a recording due to lack of a statement of the 
notary's residence (with the exception of In Re Williamson which 
is discussed in Section B. below). There are, however, numerous 
cases which hold that such an oversight does not invalidate the 
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instrument containing the certification nl tht> acknowledgement• 
See 29 A.L.R. 974 i 
Furthermore Acknowledgements, Section 57 
states :: ommission •-: ^^ officer 1 •> nm acknowledgement 
was - • -iw\ t he fact 
t h a t he d o e s n f t c e r t i f y when h i s t e r m w i l l e x p i r e ik.cs n o t 
d e s t r o y t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e m s t r umcjii I In IAII I I I I h » 
roi h t u " " fl "dTchar..- : \t. - - ^ ^ . o m m i s s i o n e x p i r a t i o n 
d a t e , P l a i n t i f f : anaware ot t y can*: : -: j u r i s d i c t i o n which 
i n v a l i d a t e s n o t a r y c e r t i f i e r I <i s t a t e m e n t 
f I » commiss ion e x p i r a t i o n , da «.- ( w i t h t : - e x c e p t i o n of 
I n Re W i l l i a m s o n which i s d i s c u s s e d :< S e c t i o n u b e l o w ) , A ] i 
howeve r t h e r e »iti nmiii'iiui t asf > w l i n h hul i l t h a t such an 
o v e r s i g h t d o e s no t i n v a l i d a t e t h e i n s t r u m e n t c o n t a i n i n g t h e 
c e r t i f i c a t i o n of t h e acknowledgement . See 29 n 1 V u Mi, n 
A • j j . « . . ' • • < r ' i i i i i \ 1 . 
Based upon the foregoing, ii is cleai that the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1 1f i 1 mlitji) * nice 
ttitjly <u <i ii I mandatory, they do not destroy the effectiveness of 
the instrument for which the notary certifies an acknowledgement 
ox verification. 
B. NEITHER THE UTAH RECORDING STATUTES NOR THE UTAH
 M E C H A N 1 C t S 
LIEN STATUTES REQUIRE THAT A NOTARY PUBLIC INCLUDE HIS OR HER 
RESIDENCE NOR HIS OR HER COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE IN THE 
CERTIFICATION OF EITHER A VERIFICATION OR AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ft 
MECHANICfF LIEN. 
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The Utah mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 38-1-7 (1953 a amended prior to April 29, 1985) required 
that a mechanic's lien must be "verified by the oath" of the lien 
claimant or by someone else having knowledge of the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to the lien claim. There was no 
statutory form specified for a verification. Through the years, 
the Utah courts have developed the requirements for a 
verification by starting with the form of an acknowledgement, 
which is specified in the statutes. (The statutory 
acknowledgement form is quoted hereinafter). To understand the 
requirements of a verification, it is appropriate and necessary 
to review the statutes dealing with acknowledgements. 
1. Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 (1953) Does Not Apply to 
the Recording Statutes. 
Defendant Copper State claims that Plaintiff's notices of 
lien are defective since they do not contain a statement of the 
notary public's residence nor the notary public's commission 
expiration date following the verification. Defendant Copper 
State relied entirely on Section 46-1-8 of Utah Code Annotated 
for this conclusion. However, this reliance is ill founded since 
that section should not apply to the mechanic's lien or recording 
statutes. 
However, notwithstanding the information set forth in 
Section 46-1-8, the recording and mechanic's lien statutes are 
self-contained with regard to the requirements of a notary 
certification of an acknowledgement or verification for recording 
- 14 -
purposes. Utah Code Annotated, Section 57 - J 6 states In 
pertinent part: 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument 
of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any 
real estate or whereby any real estate may be affected, 
to operate as notice to third persons shall be . . 
acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by 
this title and recorded in the office of the recorder 
of the county in which sin-h re*?1 A^ ta^ r* i~ situated... 
(Emphasis added). 
Tit.]*;1' "V" " doe1.-, not require the inclusion of either the notary's 
place of residence or commission expiration date as pai f nl i 1 •; 
prescribed acknowledgers ,ements. 
'Kfah Cudi! Annotated, Section ^; : • . ? ' Secti:- • n\ ,st 
be consulted determine the requirements for c_ 
certification oi i , r recording purposes. l:.a\ 
Section states in pertinent pari: 
Every officer who shall take the...acknowledgement of 
any conveyance affecting any real estate shall make a 
certificate thereof, and cause such certificate to be 
endorsed on or annexed to such conveyance. Si ich 
certificate shall be: 
(1) when made t'w aT vy judge or clerk, under the hand ol 
such judge or c.^ i* and the seal of the court. 
(2) when made Oy any other officer, under the hand and 
official seal of such officer. (Emphases Added). 
Ther^ a~- requirement require "any 
cer% including notaries public - ;ua e i 
residence and commission expiration date u uius t 
order to achieve -ddgemer <"IT verification J r 
i ecording purposes. 
The Utah mechanic ' s J i f«n statutes i i i et.ju i i e ' '»» 
i n * * I in1 11 mi i I H I I , place ^ residence and commission 
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expiration date in the verification or acknowledgement in order 
to achieve a valid notice of lien. As mentioned previously, the 
Utah mechanic's lien statutes (prior to April 29, 1985) required 
that notices of liens be verified. Yet, there are no require-
ments in the mechanic's lien statutes which mandate that such 
verification contain a notary public's residence and commission 
expiration date. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-1 et seq. 
Moreover, there is no Utah statue which specifically 
mandates that a notary public include his or her place of 
residence and commission expiration date for a proper recordation 
of a notice of lien. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 do not apply to the recording 
and mechanic's lien statutes. Since they are not applicable, the 
lack of a statement of the notary's place of residence or 
commission expiration date does not destroy the effectiveness of 
the instrument for which the notary certifies the acknowledgement 
or verification. 
C. THE HOLDING IN IN RE WILLIAMSON, 43 B.R. 813 (BANK. D. UTAH 
1984) IS ERRONEOUS AND IS NOT BINDING ON THIS COURT. 
While Plaintiff is familiar with the case and holding of In 
Re Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (Bank. D. Utah 1984), the sole case 
relied upon by Defendant Copper State with regard to the notary 
issue, that case is not binding on the State courts of Utah. It 
should also be noted that In Re Williamson does not cite a single 
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authority wherein nvalidated by failure x -e 
the notary ssinn expiration date. 
While that case may have some influence on the decisions rendered 
by trie Utah State courts o not nuid any pr Hrnrlnnt i •• I vdilue 
for x ^ rase at bar. This principal 
should be applied greater degree when H fieri si on by ^he 
bankruptcy court erroneously intei j I.I i ii*.il<". ,1 bad 
•' i oiding .^ ^ Williamson case Is one - * at both 
creates bad I  aw and erroneously interprets Utah law as > I'^ PII 
set forth hereinabove. 
THE STANDARD OF STRICT COMPLIANCE DOE$ NOT 
PUBLIC"' CERTIFICATIONS. 
wool i) have this Court apply a iiile ol 
compliance for notary certifications which i s morn strict than 
that required by the Utah Supreme • upreme Court 
I'laR ^ standard * * applied i.;-: determin:na 
compliance with the verification of a mechanic's "I i * 
is one of substantial i bxaii v. Boise Cascade 
Corporation, 660 P.2a Chase v. Dawsor 
295, 215 P. 2d 390 (1950). The standard o 1 eomp 1 i r 
requirement * * ~ i v I ir-ilyenn-; u I Gu one nl substantial 
compl i ai ic- s^ee Deseret National Bank v» Kidman, 71 __ :
 Vw^ai i 
1903). 
However Williamson Court stated ^ ' 
applying the substantial compliance tes t foi tite note 
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certification, it in fact required strict compliance under its 
erroneous interpretation of the requirements for certification of 
the verification. 
The test of substantial compliance involves determining the 
purpose of the statute and an analysis of whether the offered 
compliance adequately fulfills that purpose. See Stahl v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980). The Williamson 
Court did not make the necessary determination and analysis to 
apply the substantial compliance test. It simply looked to see 
what is stated in Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 (the 
statute dealing with the commissioning of notaries public) and 
strictly applied those notary guidelines to the mechanic's lien 
and recording statutes. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-2-1 discusses the manner of 
acknowledging conveyances for recording purposes. That Section 
states, "Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is 
conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged...and certified 
in the manner hereinafter provided." This is a two part process. 
Part one is that the conveyance must be acknowledged (or 
verified) and step two is that the acknowledgement (or 
verification) must be certified. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-2-7 sets forth the form of a 
certificate of acknowledgement. That Section reads: 
A certificate of acknowledgement to any instrument in 
writing affecting the title to any real property in 
this state may be substantially in the following form: 
State of Utah, County of 
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On the day of , %9 , personally 
appeared before me , the signer of 
the above instrument^ who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. 
It is important to note that the notary Certification does not 
appear as part of the acknowledgement. 
It is ciear from the above-quoted Section that the notary 
certification of an acknowledgement is sepatate and distinct from 
the acknowledgement. By analogy, and due to the derivation of 
the verification form from the acknowledgement form, it likewise 
follows that the notary certification q>f a verification is 
separate and distinct from the verification itself. 
In addition, while the Utah Supreme Court has in practice 
held to a high standard of compliance in the verification 
requirement, it would likely not do so in the future. In the 
1985 legislative session, the Utah State legislature was moved to 
do something about the strict technical! requirements being 
imposed on mechanic's lien claimants by the Utah courts. Since 
the verification requirement was being used! by some courts as a 
hypertechnicality to unreasonably deny lien claimants the 
opportunity to recover monies justly due and owing, the 
legislature eliminated the verification requirement altogether 
and sent a strong message to the courts that the legislature did 
not intend that there be such technical requirements which would 
deny recovery to unpaid mechanics and materialmen who had 
improved the property of others. See Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 38-1-7 (1953 as amended in 1985). Thus, this Court 
should follow the legislative directive and not require technical 
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compliance for any portion of the verification or 
acknowledgement, including the notary certification. 
Even if this Court determines that the items stated in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 46-1-8 are necessary for recording and 
the creation of a valid mechanic's lien, it must apply the 
substantial compliance test in determining whether there has been 
compliance. In the endeavor to determine whether there has been 
substantial compliance with any statute, it is helpful and 
necessary to explore the purpose and policy of the statute. 
The purpose of the notary public statute is to provide 
readily available authorized persons who can provide certainty 
and formality to important transaction by placing their signature 
and official seal on documents. Under this purpose, it is easy 
to understand the instruction to notaries in Section 46-1-8. 
That Section reads, "To all acknowledgements, oaths, affirmations 
and instruments of every kind taken and certified by a notary 
public he shall affix to his signature his official title and his 
place of residence and the date on which his commission expires." 
It is well within reason to hold that at the very least, a 
notary must legibly sign an acknowledgement and affix his or her 
official title to that signature. Otherwise, there would be no 
way to independently prove the notary's authority. However, the 
requirements of residence and commission expiration date 
statements should not be deemed mandatory. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 46-1-2 provides: 
Hereafter, whenever a notarial commission is issued to 
any person, the governor and the director of the 
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Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall 
certify to a master list of notaries public. The 
issuance of all commissions shall be certified to each 
of the several clerks of the district courts giving the 
dates of issuance and the expiration of same. . . . 
The purpose of the above-quoted Section is clearly to allow 
for the independent proof of the notary's authority. Obviously, 
if a person had a concern over the validity of the notary's 
power, he could verify that the notary was in fact authorized by 
checking with the master list kept at the Division of 
Corporations or with the district courts. In fact, regardless of 
whether the notary includes his expiration date or his place of 
residence, in order to be certain of the authority of the notary, 
the master list must be consulted. This is true since the 
realities of our society are such that it ^ould be very easy to 
obtain a seal and feign notarial authority. The only sure method 
of determining and relying on the notary's authority is to check 
the master list. 
In the case at bar it is of little consequence to Defendant 
Copper State that the notaries certifying Plaintiff's 
verification of its notices of lien did not include their 
respective places of residence or commission expiration dates. 
Is there anything lost with regard to certainty or protection 
against fraud and the need for formality by not having the 
notary's residence and the expiration of qis or her commission 
appear in a certification of a lien verification or 
acknowledgement? The answer is a resounding no. The notary 
residence and commission expiration date are merely 
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hypertechnicalities which are being used to challenge a 
mechanic's lien claimant's valid claims for monies which were 
rightfully earned. 
E. THE STRICT APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 46-1-
1 ET SEQ. TO THE VALIDITY OF MECHANIC'S LIENS WOULD BE 
DEVASTATING TO THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY SINCE MOST OF THE LIENS 
FILED ARE ON COMMERCIALLY SUPPLIED FORMS WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN 
BLANKS FOR EITHER THE NOTARY'S RESIDENCE OR THE NOTARY'S 
COMMISSION EXPIRATION DATE. 
Another important factor to consider in determining whether 
to apply Section 46-1-1 et seq. to notices of lien is the impact 
of such a rule of law if it were applied by all of the Utah 
courts to all notices of lien. The vast majority of mechanic's 
liens in Utah are prepared on printed forms from commercial 
printers or on forms copied from these commercially prepared 
forms. (See Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County 
Recorder for Salt Lake County, in the Addendum). The two largest 
suppliers of mechanic's lien forms, Kelly Company and Gem 
Printing Company, do not include a line for the notary's 
residence nor commission expiration date. Copies of these forms 
are contained in the Addendum. Gem alone estimates that they 
sell over 4,000 mechanic's lien forms in year. (See Affidavit of 
Frank Nelson of Gem Printing in the Addendum). This figure 
obviously does not reflect the number of photocopies and manual 
copies made of these mechanic's lien forms each year. It is not 
unreasonable to assume that there have been tens of thousands of 
mechanic's liens prepared on or patterned after the printed 
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forms. For many years, these liens have been upheld as valid by 
the courts to the extent that members of) the construction 
industry have come to rely on the accuracy of these forms. It 
would be difficult to estimate the overwhelming impact of a 
ruling that liens prepared on these forms are invalid. It 
should, however, be abundantly clear that the effect would be 
devastating. 
Another important consideration regarding the proper 
emphasis placed on the notary certification ils shown by the Salt 
Lake County Recorder's instructions to mechanic's lien claimants 
following the 1985 amendments which eliminated the verification 
requirement. The Salt Lake County Recorder's current policy with 
regard to mechanic's liens is that they are not required to be 
notarized at all in order to be properly recorded. (See 
Affidavit of Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County Recorder for 
Salt Lake County in the Addendum). In order to have a valid 
mechanic's lien, a lien claimant "must file for record" a notice 
of lien containing the necessary information with the county 
recorder of the county in which the property, or some part 
thereof, is situated. . . . " See Utah Cod£ Annotated, Section 
38-1-7. If the notice of lien is accepted by the county 
recorder, is filed on the correct property and does not contain 
any fatal defects, it has satisfied the requirements of the 
mechanic's lien statutes. 
F. SUMMARY 
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The statutory provisions and the rules of law discussed 
above provide adequate means whereby this Court can and should 
rule that the lack of a statement of the notary's residence and 
commission expiration date does not invalidate the mechanic's 
liens of Plaintiff. The need to so rule becomes compelling when 
the public policy, the legislative intent and the devastating 
impact on the construction industry of a contrary ruling are 
considered. 
II. A MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIMANT MAY JOIN A PARTY WHO CLAIMS 
AN INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY UP TO THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
In order to understand the procedure of commencing a 
mechanic's lien foreclosure action and the joinder of parties 
thereto, two sections in the mechanic's lien law must be 
explored. With regard to the joinder of parties, the Utah 
mechanic's lien statute states that: 
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may 
join as plaintiffs, and when separate causes of action 
are commenced the court may consolidate them and make 
all persons having claims filed parties to the action. 
Those claiming liens who fail or refuse to become 
parties plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and 
any one not made a party may at any time before the 
final hearing intervene. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 38-1-13 (1953). 
The section dealing with the time period for the 
commencement of the action is found in Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 38-1-11 (1953). That Section states in pertinent part: 
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Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for must 
be begun within twelve months after completion of the 
original contract, or the suspension! of the work 
thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within the 
twelve months herein mentioned the lien claimant shall 
file for record with the county recorder of each county 
in which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency 
of the action, in the manner provided in actions 
affecting the title or right to possession of property, 
or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and persons having 
actual knowledge of the commencement of the action. . . 
The trial court was apparently persuad0d by the erroneous 
characterization of Section 38-1-11 by Defendants in their Reply 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's IMotion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' potion for Summary 
Judgment. The case of AAA Fencing Company v. Raintree 
Development and Energy Company, 714 P.2d 289 (Utah Jan. 13, 1986) 
stands for the proposition that when a mechanic's lien which is 
not foreclosed within twelve months after the completion of the 
original contract under which the claim arisps, a court does not 
have jurisdiction to entertain a foreclosure action on the 
mechanic's lien. The AAA Court's reasoning is based upon the 
fact that under Utah law, if the lien foreclosure action is not 
commenced within the time prescribed, the mechanic*s lien expires 
and there is no longer a lien claim which is enforceable under 
the law. The Court stated that Ma mechanics' lien foreclosure 
action must be brought within twelve month$ after the original 
contract between the lienor and the lienee is completed . . . ." 
Id. at 291. 
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However, unlike the AAA case, there is no dispute that 
Plaintiff's mechanic's lien foreclosure action was commenced 
within twelve months after the completion of the original 
contract between the lienor (Plaintiff) and the lienee (Defendant 
Bradshaw Development). Defendant Valley Bank claims only that 
the failure to join it as a party within the same twelve months 
deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear and decide priority 
issues between Plaintiff and Defendant Valley Bank. Defendant 
Valley Bank's challenge is solely to the propriety of the joinder 
of parties which is governed by Section 38-1-13. This is quite a 
different issue than whether a mechanic's lien foreclosure action 
has been commenced in a timely as determined by Section 38-1-11. 
The Court in AAA Fencing stated that " . . . liens . . . 
arising under the statute will be liberally construed to effect 
the desired object . . . ." Id. at 291. The Court stated that 
the "desired object" of the mechanics' lien statute is to 
"provide protection to those who enhance the value of a property 
by supplying labor and materials." Id. 
Defendant Valley Bank argues that Projects Unlimited is 
barred from enforcing its claims against them by the one year 
statute of limitations for enforcement of mechanic's liens, Utah 
Code Annotated. Section 38-1-11. Projects Unlimited's notice of 
lien indicates that it performed its last work in October of 1983 
and although the original complaint and lis pendens were filed in 
March of 1984, Valley Bank was not named as a defendant until May 
of 1985, when an amended complaint was filed. 
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As indicated in its memorandum in opposition to defendant 
Carolyn Nielsen's motion for summary judgment, it is Projects 
Unlimitedfs position that the doctrine of relation back as set 
forth in Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should 
be applied in this case. See Doxey-Layton v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902 
(Utah 1976). The rationale for applying that doctrine to this 
defendant is especially compelling. At the ti[me that Valley Bank 
recorded their trust deeds, Projects Unlimited was still working 
on the project. Copper State, the construction lender, agreed to 
subordinate its trust deeds to those of Valley Bank. Thus, 
Valley Bank simply stepped into Copper State's position as to 
those units. Further , Section 38-1-11 provides an exception to 
the one year limitation for persons having actual knowledge of 
the proceedings to enforce the lien. 
In this case, Projects Unlimited filed and recorded its lis 
pendens in March of 1984. In June of 1984, Valley Bank commenced 
foreclosure proceedings on one of the units <^n which it had made 
a loan. In August of 1984, Valley Bank sent a copy of its notice 
of default and a letter from its attorney to Projects Unlimited. 
The letter mentions a foreclosure report - that report included 
the lis pendens filed by Projects Unlimited. Thus, it is obvious 
that Valley Bank had actual knowledge of the commencement of this 
proceeding in August of 1984. 
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff should not precluded 
from enforcing its lien against Valley Bank. 
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III. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE IS REASONABLE RELIANCE ON 
A LIEN RELEASE IS NOT ONE THAT CAN BE DECIDED THROUGH A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The issue of whether a party has reasonably relied upon a 
partial release of lien presents a unique question to a trial 
court at a motion for summary judgment. It involves both rulings 
of law as well as determining issues of fact. The first question 
which a trial court must address is one of law: Is the lien 
release clear and unambiguous on its face? This question is 
important because generally an owner or a mortgagee cannot 
reasonably rely upon an ambiguous lien release. 
However, even if a trial court finds that the lien release 
is unambiguous and clear on its face, it does not mean that an 
owner or mortgagee is unquestionably deemed to have reasonably 
relied thereon. Whether there was reasonable reliance is a 
determination of law which is based upon all of the facts of the 
case. Such a determination is based upon very difficult factual 
findings since the party asserting reasonable reliance usually is 
the only party who has the knowledge of the factual background 
which may or may not be the basis for a sound finding on the 
legal issue of whether there was reasonable reliance. 
The case at bar is an ideal example of these points in at 
least two respects. First the trial court held that as a matter 
of law that the partial lien release was unambiguous on its face 
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and that it totally released the two uiliits in question. 
Plaintiff assigns error to this finding and asserts that either 
the partial lien release was clearly a release of the two 
properties only to the extent of the amount stated in the partial 
release or that at least the partial lien release is indeed 
ambiguous and parole evidence should be allowed to make a 
determination as to the nature and extent df the partial lien 
release. Since no parole evidence was considered by the trial 
court, its determination that the partial p.ien release was a 
complete release of the two units should be overturned. 
Second, based upon the uncontroverted legal conclusion of 
Charles Brazier in his affidavit (see Record at 674) that 
Defendant Valley Bank had reasonably relied upon the partial 
release of lien, the trial court ruled that ^here was reasonable 
reliance upon the partial release of lien. Defendant did not 
allege facts which would support such a finding by the trial 
court but merely asserted a legal conclusion. Without such 
findings of fact to support such a conclusion by the trial court, 
this ruling must also be overturned by this Cfcurt. 
This is particularly true in this case where the person 
asserting such a conclusion is the only party with the 
information upon which the trial court could make the necessary 
factual determination. There is no possible way for the 
Plaintiff to controvert such a conclusion dn summary judgment. 
This type of factual dispute can only bei settled with full 
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discovery and a complete evidentiary hearing such as would be had 
at trial. 
Plaintiff relies on Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 
P.2d 387 (Utah 1984), in support of its position that when a 
material issue of fact exists, summary judgment is not 
appropriate. In Frisbee, the defendants made a motion for 
summary judgment accompanied by an affidavit of one of the 
parties. Appellants in Frisbee, did not proffer affidavits in 
opposition to the motion. The Court held that it is not always 
required to proffer affidavits in order to avoid judgment. 
The lower court failed to recognize the inherent problem 
with this type of factual determination and incorrectly ruled on 
the issue at summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the summary judgments entered against it 
in favor of Defendant Copper State, Defendant Valley Bank and 
Defendant Cottonwood Thrift and that this Court remand the case 
for trial on the merits. 
DATED this ^ fAy of {J-2^^
 r 1986. 
& BABCOCK 
F. Ba} 
Darrel J. Bos^wick 
Attorneys For Plaintiff/ 
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Appellant Projects Unlimited 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD; 3]$ICIKL DISTRICTp p^J, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAtTE OF UTAH 
»\s 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT, INC., a 
Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-84-1644 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendants Copper State 
Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood Thrift and Loan Company, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, and Westtern Savings and Loan 
Company came before the Court in a spec|ial setting at 11:00 
a.m., on Friday, March 21, 1986, the Honoraple Judith M. Billings 
presiding. Also before the Court was a Motion for Summary Judgment 
by plaintiff Projects Unlimited, Inc. as against defendant Copper 
State Thrift & Loan Co. Plaintiff, Project^ Unlimited, Inc., was 
represented by Ellen Maycock, Esq. Defendants Copper State 
Thrift and Loan Company, Cottonwood Thrift and Loan Company, 
Valley Bank and Trust Company, and Westiern Savings and Loan 
were represented by James A. Boevers, Eisq. The Court heard 
oral argument, and reviewed the Memoranda submitted by counsel 
for all parties involved, and hereby enters its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Lav; as incorporated in this Memorandum 
Decision. 
V , +.J'*s ••-... 
PROJECTS V. BRADSHAW PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
FACTS 
Defendant Copper State moves for Summary Judgment against 
plaintiff's claims arising out of a mechanic's lien for work 
performed on a condominium project. The plaintiff filed a Notice 
of Lien on November 14, 1983, and an Amended Notice of Lien 
on December 27, 1983. Both Notices contained a statement that 
the facts contained in the Notice were true, as was at that 
time required by Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-7 (1953). The 
notarizations on the Notices of Lien filed by the plaintiff, 
however, failed to include a statement as to the notary's residence 
and the date that the notary's commission would expire. Defendants 
contend that these omissions render the required verification 
void and that, therefore, the Notices and lien are also void. 
OPINION 
Utah Code Ann., Section 38-1-7 (1953), as it stood at the 
date of the Notices involved in this action, required that the 
notice of lien set forth the claim of the lienor, and that the 
"claim must be verified by the oath of himself or some other 
person." In First Security Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 
919 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court explained the rationale 
and importance of this requirement stating: 
A lien creates an encumbrance on property 
that deprives the owner of his ability to 
convey clear title and impairs its credit. 
PROJECTS V. BRADSHAW PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The filing of the lien for an! excessive 
amount could be used to force a settlement 
unfairly weighted in favor of the claimant. 
Such abuse is made a misdemeanor by Section 
38-1-25. These serious consequences justify 
the statutory imposition of a requirement 
that one who makes the claim must furnish 
a sworn statement to the truthfulness of 
the facts that give rise to it. Frivolous, 
unfounded, and inflated claims ban thereby 
be minimized, and the prejudgment property 
rights of the individuals reqeive their 
due protection. 
Id. at 922. 
The Court held that a notice of lien lacking the proper verification 
was ineffective, and the lien void even though the notice of 
lien bore the notarized signature of the claimant. 
The question here is whether or not the omission from the 
notarization of the residence of the notary and the date the 
notary's commission expires is fatal to the Notice of Lien filed 
by the plaintiff. If these omissions render the notarization 
ineffective, then the verification is also ineffective, and 
under First Security Mortaacre Co. v. Hansei), 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 
1981) , the Notices of Lien and the lien claimed by the plaintiff 
in this action are void. Although the jresult may be harsh, 
this Court is bound to follow the requirements of the statute. 
. . . A mechanic's lien is statutory and 
not contractual, a lien cannot 
unless the claimant complies with the statutory 
be acquired 
• - ; \> 
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provisions. Where the statute fails, courts 
cannot create rights, and should not do 
so by unnatural and forced construction. 
Id. at 922. 
Utah Code Ann., Section 46-1-8, sets forth certain of the 
requirements for a valid notarization. 
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations 
and instruments of every kind taken and 
certified by a notary public, he shall affix 
to his signature his official title and 
his place of residence, and the date on 
which his commission expires. 
The statute provides that the notarization "shall" contain these 
statements. In determining whether or not omissions of some 
or all of these statements is fatal to the validity of a notariza-
tion, it has been held that similar statutory language that 
a notary must set forth certain information was mandatory, and 
required strict enforcement and construction of the statutory 
requirements. Lee County Savings Bank v. Snodqrass Bros.f 
166 N.W. 680 (Iowa 1918); Crown Cascade, Inc. v. O'Neal, 100 
Wash.2d 256, 668 P.2d 585 (1983). 
Furthermore, this Court must presume that the legislature 
carefully considered the language used in the statute and will 
construe such language so as to give effect to all of the statute's 
provisions. Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah 
19 80) ; Durfey v. Board of Ed. of Wayne County School District, 
604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980); Horman v. Liquor Control Commission, 
21 Utah 2d 294, 445 P.2d 4 (1968). To validate a notarization 
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lacking any of the information required by Section 46-1-8 would 
abrogate the purpose of the statute, and would render it a nullity. 
Such a finding would be contrary to reqognized principles of 
statutory construction. 
This Court is aware of the following statement of the Utah 
Supreme Court regarding the determination of whether statutory 
language is mandatory or permissive. 
We are guided in construing the language 
of the instant statute by the principle 
that generally a direction in a statute 
is considered "mandatory" when consequences 
are attached for failure to act. Conversely, 
when a statute requires an action to be 
taken without prescribing a penalty for 
failure to so act, the requirement is not 
often deemed mandatory. 
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 4^0, 481 (Utah 1980).1 
Although helpful in the construction of I Section 46-1-8, this 
principle is not to be applied to the exclusion of the principles 
of statutory construction discussed above. This Court believes 
that the only construction giving effect to Section 46-1-8 is 
to deem the inclusion of the information called for.in its provisions 
to be essential requirements of a valic^  notarization. Other 
Utah courts have also found the provisions of Section 46-1-8 
to be mandatory requirements of a valid notarization. In Re: 
Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah 1984). 
^It should be pointed out that the Stahl case was decided 
largely upon grounds of substantial compliance rather than the 
determination of whether or not the statutory] 
in nature. 
language was mandatory 
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Although some courts have held that the omission of information 
such as the residence of the notary and the date of expiration 
of the notary's commission does not effect the validity of the 
notarization, these cases are distinguishable from the present 
situation inasmuch as those cases interpreted statutes expressly 
allowing for such omissions or which contain optional or permissive 
language rather than the mandatory language found in Section 
46-1-8. Kelly v. Carter, 216 Ark. 491, 226 S.W.2d 53 (1950); 
Tildesly Coal Co. v. American Fuel Corp., 130 W. Va. 720, 45 
S.E.2d 75 (1947); Sheridan County v. McKinney, 79 Neb. 223, 
115 N.W. 548 (1907). 
This Court finds that the failure to set forth the required 
information regarding the notary's place of residence and the 
date upon which the notary's commission expires renders the 
notarization ineffective under Section 46-1-8, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953). 
Section 38-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), required, at the 
time of the Notices involved here, that valid, notices of lien 
contain a verification of the claims set forth therein. A proper 
verification necessarily requires a proper notarization. Section 
4 6-1-8 requires that a notarization, in order to be effective, 
must set forth the residence of the notary and the date the 
notary's commission expires. Without this information, there 
is no information on the notarization regarding the authority 
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of the notary to acknowledge the verification required in tne 
Notice of Lien. The notary seal, although important to the 
notarization, does not alone state that the notary was authorized, 
inasmuch as it contains no date as to the expiration of the 
notary's commission. Only with a prope^ statement as to the 
expiration of the notaryfs commission, is there sufficient infor-
mation to indicate to interested parties that the notary was 
currently authorized to acknowledge the verification. 
This Court further finds that the ineffective notarization 
renders the verification on the Notices of Lien, as well as 
the Notices themselves ineffective, and t^ iat the liens claimed 
by plaintiff in this action are therefore Void. First Security 
Mortgage Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981); In Re: 
Williamson, 43 B.R. 813 (D. Utah 1984). 
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is, therefore, 
hereby granted and it is further ordered that icounsel for defendants 
prepare an Order in/ conformance with this Memorandum Decision. L 2 Dated this _day of March, 1986. 
jfrtflTH M. BILLINGS 
DISTRICT COUR 
AT 
H. DIXC 
(L, By — 
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assistance of counsel. He does not, how-
ever, point out specifically any conflict ex-
cept to suggest that his co-defendant's plea 
to a lesser charge may have been in ex-
change for a promise "that he would testi-
fy against Barella." There is nothing in 
the record which would even remotely sup-
port such speculation. On the contrary, 
co-defendant Skinner was not called to tes-
tify at Defendant's trial by either side. 
The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed a 
similar contention in the case of State v. 
Jclks, 105 Ariz. 175, 461 P.2d 473 (1969), 
and cited with approval the language in 
United States v. Lugo, 350 F.2d 858 (9th 
Cir.1965), where the court stated: 
[W]hile we cannot indulge in nice calcula-
tions about the amount of prejudice 
which results from a conflict of interest 
. . . neither can we create a conflict of 
interest out of mere conjecture as to 
what might have been shown. 
IdL at 859. 
[2] While we recognize that conflicts of 
interests could arise when office associates 
represent co-defendants and that defense 
counsel should exercise care to avoid con-
flicts, both potential and real, the defend-
ant has not shown and we are unable to 
perceive any conflict under the circum-
stances of this case. We hold therefore 
that defendant received the effective assist-
ance of counsel to which he was entitled. 
Conviction affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
action. The Second 
County, J. Duffy 
ummary judgment 
AAA FENCING COMPANY and Ronald 
L. Kendell, Plaintiffs land Respondents, 
v. 
RAINTREE DEVELOPMENT AND EN-
ERGY COMPANY ahd Galen J. Ross, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 19870. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 13,|1986. 
Mechanics' lien foreclosure action was 
filed against both vendors and purchasers 
of property. Action was consolidated with 
purchaser's quiet title 
District Court, David 
Palmer, J., entered j 
against purchaser in kmount of hen, and 
purchaser appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that untimehness of mechanics' lien 
action affected rights of parties, and thus 
was jurisdictional, foreclosing plaintiffs' 
rights. 
Reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Mechanics' Liens <k=260(6) 
Untimeliness of mechanics' lien action 
affected rights of parties, and thus was 
jurisdiction, foreclosing plaintiffs' rights. 
2. Mechanics' Liens p=*3 
Purpose of mechanics' lien law is to 
provide protection to those who enhance 
value of a property lj>y supplying labor or 
xnaterials. 
3. Mechanics' Liens I0116 
Although liens and pleadings arising 
under mechanics' liei 
3S-1-1 et seq.] will 
to effect desired ol 
statute is required 
statute [U.C.A.1953, 
e liberally construed 
ect, compliance with 
efore a party is enti-
tled to benefits created by statute. 
Brant H. Wall, SAlt Lake City, for de-
fendants and appellants. 
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Darrell G. Renstrom, Ogden, for plain-
tiffs and respondents. 
PER CURIAM: 
This appeal arises out of a mechanics' 
lien foreclosure action. 
Plaintiffs furnished labor and materials 
on premises purchased under contract by 
defendant Raintree Development and Ener-
gy (Raintree) and completed their work on 
January 10, 1982. When Raintree failed to 
pay, plaintiffs placed a timely lien on the 
premises but then sued Raintree for breach 
of oral contract. Plaintiffs obtained a mon-
ey judgment against Raintree on January 
14, 1983. 
On June 29, 1982, the sellers of the prop-
erty here at issue sold the property to 
defendant Galen J. Ross (Ross) when Rain-
tree defaulted under its contract. Ross 
later brought suit to terminate the rights 
of Raintree to the property and to quiet 
title against plaintiffs and Raintree. Rain-
tree was served with process but failed to 
answer or otherwise respond. On May 2, 
1983, Ross obtained judgment against 
Raintree quieting title to the property and 
declaring all of Raintree's rights, title, in-
terest and lien or estate in the land null and 
void. 
Meanwhile, on March 7, 1983, after they 
discovered that Raintree was judgment-
proof against their money judgment, plain-
tiffs instituted their mechanics' lien fore-
closure action against defendants. Ross 
answered, but failed to plead the statutory 
bar as an affirmative defense. Plaintiffs' 
action was consolidated with Ross's quiet 
title action for purposes of trial. Both 
parties moved for summary judgment, and 
Ross for the first time raised the issue that 
1. 38-1-11. Enforcement—Time for—Lis pen-
dens—Action for debt not affected.—Actions to 
enforce the liens herein provided for must be 
begun within twelve months after the comple-
tion of the original contract, or the suspension 
of work thereunder for a period cf thirty days. 
Within the twelve months herein mentioned the 
lien cbimani shall file for record with the coun-
ty recorder of each county in which the lien is 
recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, 
in the manner provided in actions affecting the 
title or right to possession of real property, or 
plaintiffs were barred from bringing the 
foreclosure action as it was not filed in a 
timely manner. The court granted plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment and 
entered judgment against Rcss in the 
amount of the lien, together with costs and 
attorney fees. Ross filed motions for an 
amendment of findings and a new trial 
which were denied. This appeal followed. 
Ross appeals on several grounds, but his 
claim that plaintiffs' foreclosure action was 
barred for failure to institute their claim 
within the time prescribed by section 38-1-
11 of the mechanics' lien statute is disposi-
tive here. That section provides that ac-
tions to enforce liens must be begun within 
twelve months after the completion of the 
original contract.1 Plaintiffs concede that 
they filed their complaint late, but argue 
that Ross has wraived his rights to the 
statutory bar as he failed to plead it as an 
affirmative defense. They also claim that 
filing a lawsuit is only one form of "taking 
action to enforce the lien," and that filing a 
notice of lien is another action which they 
took in time. Moreover, continues their 
response, the foreclosure of a mechanics' 
lien is a matter of equity, and this Court 
should therefore construe the statute lib-
erally in accordance with section 6S-3-2 of 
the Utah Code. 
[1] Properly framed, the issue before 
us is whether an untimely action under our 
mechanics' lien statute affects the rights or 
merely the remedies of the parties. We 
disagree with plaintiffs that it affects 
merely their remedies and is therefore sub-
ject to waiver and estoppel as are procedur-
al statutes of limitations and hold instead 
the lien shall be void, except as to persons who 
have been made parties to the action and per-
sons having actual knowledge of the commence-
ment of the action, and the burden of proof 
shall be upon the lien claimant and those claim-
ing under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
impair or affect the right of any person to 
whom a debt may be due for any work done or 
materials furnished to maintain a personal ac-
tion to recover the same. 
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that it is jurisdictional and forecloses their 
rights. 
[2,3] Mechanics' liens are statutory 
creatures unknown to the common law. 
The purpose of the Utah mechanics' lien 
law is to provide protection to those who 
enhance the value of a property by supply-
ing labor or materials. Interiors Con-
tracting Inc. v. Navalco, Utah, 648 P.2d 
13S2 (19S2). Although liens and pleadings 
arising under the statute will be liberally 
construed to effect the desired object, com-
pliance with the statute is required before 
a party is entitled to the benefits created 
by the statute. First Security Mortgage 
Co. v. Hansen, Utah, 631 P.2d 919 (1981); 
see also Schofield v. Copeland Lumber 
Yards, Inc., New, 692 P.2d 519 (1985); 
Lewis v. Wananiakcr Baptist Church, 10 
Kan.App.2d 99, 692 P.2d 397 (1984). 
The law is clear in this jurisdiction that a 
mechanics' lien foreclosure action must be 
brought wiihin twelve months after the 
original contract between the lienor and the 
lienee is completed, or relief will not lie. 
Motivated Management International v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (1979) (dictum); Rob-
erts v. Hansen, 25 Utah 2d 190, 479 P.2d 
345 (1971); Totorica v. Thomas, 16 Utah 
2d 175, 397 P.2d 984 (1965). That failure to 
enforce a mechanics' lien within the statu-
tory period is a jurisdictional question has 
not heretofore been decided by this Court. 
We therefore look to our sister jurisdic-
tions with similar mechanics' lien statutes. 
The definitive statement of the law on 
this issue was first rendered in Flcshman 
v. Whiteside, 148 Or. 73, 34 P.2d 648 (1934), 
93 A.L.R. 1456. The court in that case 
2. California predicates its construction of the 
statutory limit as procedural statute of limita-
tions upon a constiiutional provision and re-
quires that the statutory limitation be affirma-
tively pleoded. California Constitution article 
XX, section 15 reads as follows: 
Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and labor-
ers of even- class, shall have a lien upon the 
property upon which they have bestowed la-
bor or furnished material for the value of 
such labor done and material furnished; and 
the Legislature shall provide, by law, for the 
?;vedy and efficient enforcement of such 
hens. 
rejected the plaintiffs' identical argument 
that defendants had waived the defense of 
the statutory bar by failing to raise it by 
demurrer or answer and stated in pertinent 
part: 
While the contrary is held! in California,2 
it is the rule in most jurisdictions that 
[the time limit provided lor actions to 
enforce mechanics' liens] is not a statute 
of limitations, which is waived if not 
pleaded, but a statute lim ting the dura-
tion of the lien. The remedy forms a 
part of the right and must be pursued 
within the time prescribed, or else both 
are lost. If an action is not brought 
within the time limited, the court is with-
out jurisdiction to depree a fore-
closure 
34 P.2d at 650, 93 A.L.R. at 1459. 
That rule is still good law-
echoed in Diamond National Corp. v. 
Dwelle, 164 Conn. 540, 325 ^.2d 259 (1973), 
where the court addressed 
and citing Fleshman v. 
nounced the statutory bar! 
jurisdictional rather than procedural or per-
sonal. As the mechanics' lien is a creature 
of statute and fixes the time within which 
the right must be enforced, the court rea-
soned that "it is a limitation of the liabilitv 
the same issue 
Whiteside pro-
substantive or 
itself as created, and not 
alone." Similar results wt 
Well Done Heating & Shdet Metal Co. v. 
Ralph Schwartz & Associates, 112 111. 
of the remedy 
ere reached in 
App.3d 438, 68 Ill.Dec. 3, 
(1983), accord Garbe Iron\ 
Priestcr, 99 111.2d 84, 75 I 
N.E.2d 422 (19S3) (dieturrO; 
|445 N.E.2d 451 
Works, Inc. v. 
ll.Dec. 425, 457 
Regal Wood 
Products, Inc. v. First Wisconsin Nation-
(Emphasis added.) For a historical abstract of 
the California Mechanic Lien Statute, see Robin-
son v.S&SDevelopment, 256 Cal.App.2d 13, 63 
Cal.Rptr. 663 (1967); accord Petersen v. W.T. 
Cram Co., 41 Cal.App.3d 217. 115 Cal.Rptr. £74 
(1974). A procedural statute has been defined 
as one which neither enlarges nor impairs sub-
stantive rights but rather relates to the means 
and procedures for enforcing these rights. 
Bellegarde Custom Kitchens |v. Leavitt, Me., 295 
A.2d>09, 911 (1972). 
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al Bank of Milwaukee, Fla.App., 347 So.2d 
643 (1977); Federal National Bank and 
Trust Co. of Shawnee v. Calsim, Inc., La. 
App., 340 So.2d 611 (1976); Bellegarde 
Custom Kitchens v. Leavitt, Me., 295 A.2d 
909 (1972). 
In Cox v. Bankers Trust Co., 39 Colo. 
App. 303, 570 P.2d 6 (1977) (dealing with 
untimely joinder under the Colorado stat-
ute), the court held that the trial court was 
not vested with jurisdiction after the statu-
tory period. Both in that case and in King 
v. IF./?. Hall Transportation and Storage 
Co., Colo., 641 P.2d 916 (1982) (also barring 
joinder after the statutory period), the 
court stated that the strict application of 
the statutory limit was based on the princi-
ple that extending the lifetime of a perfect-
ed lien would vest a lien creditor with 
greater rights than were granted by the 
statutory provision creating the rights. In 
addition, strictly limiting the time during 
which property is encumbered renders ti-
tles to real property and to interests and 
estates therein more safe, secure, and mar-
ketable. Id. at 920. See also Wood Panel 
Structures, Inc. v, Grangaard, 55 Or.App. 
294, 637 P.2d 1320 (1981). In distinguish-
ing mechanics' lien statutory periods from 
procedural statutes of limitations, the court 
in Bellegarde Custom Kitche?isf supra, 
held that the trial'court had no jurisdiction 
where a lienor filed one day late because 
the last statutory day for enforcing the lien 
fell on a Sunday. 'The Legislature saw fit 
to provide that this right should exist only 
during a limited period, and the Court is 
without jurisdiction to entertain such an 
action as this when the period of its avail-
ability has expired/' Id. at 912. The vitali-
ty of a lien created solely by statute de-
pends on the terms of the statute, and 
parties may not by estoppel enact or en-
large a statute. Boyce v. Knudso7i, 219 
Kan. 357, 548 P.2d 712 (1976).3 
Plaintiffs claim that Ross knew about 
the lien when he purchased the property 
and the lower court therefore did not err in 
enforcing the lien against him. A similar 
claim was made in DM. Foley Co., Inc. v. 
North West Federal Savings & Loan As-
soc, 122 Ill.App.3d 411, 77 Ill.Dec. 877, 461 
N.E.2d 500 (19S4). The court there found 
that a lien foreclosure filed after the statu-
tory period was not valid even against 
those who purchased an interest in the 
property after the filing of the lien and 
who therefore had notice of it, because the 
statutory period "is not merely a statute of 
limitations but a condition of liability itself 
and not just a limitation on the remedy." 
The court held that the potential liability of 
subsequent purchasers perished inchoate 
when plaintiffs failed to bring suit within 
the period allowed after completion of the 
work. 
The same result is mandated here. The 
time for enforcing mechanics* liens set out 
in section 38-1-11, supra, limits a lienor's 
rights to twelve months after his work is 
completed. At that point, both his rights 
and his remedies under the statute are 
extinguished. 
Because we find that plaintiffs were too 
late in bringing their lien foreclosure action 
against Ross, we must also reverse the 
award of their attorney fees. The success-
ful party shall be entitled to recover a 
reasonable attorney fees. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 3&-1-18. Ross successfully defended 
against plaintiffs' action and attorney fees 
should be awarded to him. However, plain-
tiffs resist Ross's claim for attorney fees 
on the ground that it is first raised on 
appeal. An award of attorney fees is prop-
er to the successful party under section 
38-1-18. Palombi v. D. & C. Builders, 22 
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). More-
over, the record indicates that Ross briefed 
the trial court to the effect that the prayer 
of his counterclaim asked for costs in-
curred and for such further relief as would 
be proper in the premises. He also argued 
to the trial court that under section 38-1-
18 attorney fees were to be taxed as costs, 
and his affidavit of attorney fees asked for 
3. It should be noted that Kansas law requires 
the recorder to cancel the lien after the statu-
tory period. 
METROPOLITAN FINANCE CO. v. STATE 
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$2,500 to the date of the summary judg- Commission was 
ment. We hold that Ross is entitled to 
attorney fees as stated above. Petty In-
vestment Co. v. Miller, Utah, 576 P.2d 883 
(1978). 
No appeal has been taken from the mon-
ey judgment plaintiffs obtained against 
Raintree, and that judgment therefore 
stands, though it apparently is of little 
value. The trial court's summary judg-
ment in favor of plaintiffs and against 
Ross is reversed with instructions to enter 
judgment in favor of Ross and remove the 
lien from the land. The case is remanded 
to the trial court for a hearing on a reason-
able amount of attorney fees to Ross, in-
cluding those incurred in this appeal. 
Utah 293 
immune from liability 
with respect to lender's claim. 
Affirmed. 
States 0=>191(1.19) 
State Tax Commissioh was immune 
from liability with respect to claim that 
Commission and its employees had negli-
gently failed to advise lender that duplicate 
automobile certificate of title had been is-
sued and that Commission had improperly 
issued title certificate to borrower on which 
lender relied in making its loan. U.C.A. 
1953, 41-1-56, 60-30-3, G3-30-10(l)ic, f). 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. Boyd M. Fullmer, Salt I Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Mark K. 
Buchi, Salt Lake City, foil defendants and 
respondents. 
METROPOLITAN FINANCE CO., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
The STATE of Utah, The State Tax Com-
mission of Utah, and John Does 1 
through 25, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 19291. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 15, 1986. 
Lender brought action against State 
Tax Commission alleging that Commission 
had erroneously issued borrower an auto-
mobile certificate of title. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Sal: Lake County, Timothy 
Hanson, J., granted Commission's motion 
for summar}' judgment, and lender appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court held that state tax 
1. All statutory references are to U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended (Supp.l9S5), unless otherwise provid-
ed. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg-
ment below dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
against the Utah State Tax Commission. 
The lower court ruled that plaintiffs claims 
were barred by governmental immunity un-
der sections 63-30-3 aijd 63-3O-10(l)tc), 
(f).1 We affirm. 
The Motor Vehicle Division of the State 
Tax Commission issued an automobile cer-
tificate of title to a Mr. Melby in No\ ember 
1974. Later, a duplicate certificate of title 
was issued in 1975 to Melby as the automo-
bile owner. In June 1978, a Mr. Stephen 
Gibbs presented the original title certificate 
and the automobile to plaintiff for the pur-
pose of obtaining a $15000 loan. Gibbs 
purported to give plairniff a lien in the 
automobile as security for the loan's repay-
ment. After Gibbs presented the origin J 
Melby title to the state's Motor Vehicle 
Division and obtained a pew certificate of 
title showing Gibbs as thje owner and plain-
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ber of years of the husband's employment. 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
O | KEY NLM3ER SYSTEM 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Suns Company, Defendants and 
Respor dents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error <£=>430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme CoUrt 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notirv 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment c»181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment c=>185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resohed in fa\or of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment <s=>180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations <s=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
$. Judgment ^181(33) 
Whether city, which was arguably neg-
i.-ent in not conducting immediate inspec-
t"ns of signs where road maintenance work 
*as done, and which after receiving notice 
that stop sign was down sent individual to 
repair sign rather than calling police to 
regulate traffic until sign could be raised, 
fulfilled its duty to maintain city streets in 
safe condition was question of fact to be 
determined by jury, precluding summary 
judgment in action arising from automobile 
collision at intersection. 
9. Municipal Corporations <s=>798 
Municipality has duty to respond in 
reasonable fashion once it is on notice of 
defective sign or signal. 
BOWEN v. RIVERTON CITY Utah 435 
Cite as, Utah, 65G R2d 434 
Prior to the accident, a parsing motorist 
noticed the sign was down and notified 
Riverton City at 12:50 p.m., Approximately 
eighteen minutes before the 
John G. Mulliner, Orem, Gary B. Fergu-
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appel-
lants. 
Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs 
appeal an adverse summary judgment on 
the ground that there are issues of material 
fact which should be tried by a jury. Riv-
erton City, the defendant, seeks affirmance 
of the summary judgment and, in the alter-
native, argues that plaintiffs failed to file a 
timely notice of appeal and that the appeal 
should therefore be dismissed. We reverse 
the summary judgment and remand for a 
trial on the merits. 
At approximately 1:08 p.m. on Saturday, 
April 9,1978, two cars collided at the inter-
section of 12600 South and 2700 West in 
Riverton, Utah. The vehicle driven by 
plaintiff Kristine Bowen was westbound on 
12600 South. The other vehicle, driven by 
Sterling Draper, was travelling north on 
2700 West. Traffic on 2700 West is re-
quired U> stop and yield the right of way to 
traffic on 12600 South. However, on the 
day of the accident, the stop sign regulating 
northbound traffic on 2700 West was lying 
on the ground and the Draper and Bowen 
automobiles collided in the intersection. 
Riverton City employee responded to the 
notice of the fallen sign, but 
the accident. 
accident. A 
the accident. On January 25 
filed suit (Draper suit) against Kristine 
Bowen, Riverton City, and Enoch Smith 
Sons Company. The Bowen suit alleged 
that Riverton City was negligent in main-
taining the stop sign and in responding 
negligently when it received notice of the 
downed stop sign. Crossclaims and coun-
terclaims were subsequently 
arrived after 
Bowens filed On November 29, 1978, thel 
suit (Bowen suit) against Stirling Draper, 
Riverton City, and Enoch Smith Sons Com-
pany, a construction company that had 
worked on the intersection the day prior to 
1979, Draper 
filed by the 
defendants. On motion of Riverton City, 
the trial court ordered the Bowen and 
Draper cases consolidated pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 42(a). 
On January 26, 1981, the trial court 
granted summary judgments for Riverton 
City in both the Draper and the Bowen 
actions. On January 27, 1981, summary 
judgment was granted in favor of Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, a defendant in the 
Draper action, and against all other parties. 
On February 2, 1981, the Bowens, as plain-
tiffs in the Bowen action and as crossdefen-
dants in the Draper action, filed a "notice 
of intent to appeal" the summary judgment 
entered in favor of Riverton City. On 
March 25, 1981, pursuant to stipulation, the 
trial court awarded Bowens a money judg-
ment against Sterling Draper in the BowTen 
action. On April 13, 1981, counsel for Ster-
ling Draper, Florence Draper, Kristine 
Bowen, and Cynthia Bowen stipulated and 
agreed that all claims, counterclaims and 
crossclaims set forth in thi Bowen and 
Draper actions could be dismissed with prej-
udice, except for claims against Riverton 
City, since such claims, counterclaims and 
crossclaims had been fully compromised and 
settled. On the same day tpe parties re-
maining in the Bowen and Ipraper actions 
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moved for an order dismissing the actions 
since all matters but ior the claims against 
Riverton City had been compromised and 
settled. On April 13, 1981, pursuant to the 
motions and stipulations filed by the parties 
in both actions for dismissal with prejudice 
and in an order bearing the heading and 
numbers of both the Bowen and Draper 
actions, the court ordered that all claims, 
counterclaims and crossclaims, except for 
the claim of Kristine Bowen against River-
ton City, be dismissed with prejudice. On 
May 12, 1981, Bowens filed a notice of 
appeal in the Bowen suit. 
Riverton City claims that the final judg-
ment in the Bowen suit was rendered 
March 25, 1981, and since the notice of 
appeal was not filed within the jurisdiction-
al one-month period from that time, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this 
appeal.1 The Bowens, on the other hand, 
argue that the final judgment in these 
cases was not entered until the order dated 
April 13, 1981. Since the Bowens filed their 
notice of appeal within one month from 
that date, they contend the appeal is prop-
erly before this Court. 
[1] Since failure to file a timely notice 
of appeal is jurisdictional, this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice was 
not timely filed. In re RatHff, 19 Utah 2d 
346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967); Anderson v. An-
derson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955). 
[2] Without deciding whether consoli-
dated actions should be treated as a single 
action for purposes of appeal,2 we shall deal 
with the actions in this case as separate and 
distinct for determining the timeliness of 
appeal. Nevertheless, we hold the April 13 
order, entered pursuant to the stipulation of 
counsel in both actions, is the final judg-
ment in each case for the purpose of calcu-
lating the timeliness of the appeal. Calcu-
lating the timeliness of the appeal as of the 
entry of that order dismissing all claims, 
1. Utah R.Civ.P 73(a) provides in part: 4<[T]he 
time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the judg-
ment or order appealed from A party 
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the 
district court a notice of appeal . " 
counterclaims, and crossclaims in both ac 
tions, we hold the Bowens timely filed thi* 
appeal. 
The next issue is whether summary judg-
ment was appropriately awarded to Rker-
ton City in this action. The Bowens as-ert 
that Riverton City was not only negligent 
in maintaining the stop sign but also re-
sponded negligently upon receiving notice 
that the sign was down. 
[3-5] Summary judgment is proper only 
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
admissions show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 
83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960). If there is any 
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions 
of fact, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the 
court must evaluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawTn from the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment. Dur-
ham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332 
(1977); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Although 
summary judgment may on occasion be ap-
propriate in negligence cases, it is appropri-
ate only in the most clear-cut case. FMA 
Acceptance Co: v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979)/ See Preston v. 
Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P 2d 1021 (1968). 
In Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967), this Court 
stated: 
Summary judgments are more fre-
quently given in contract cases . . . . 
However, when it comes to determining 
negligence, contributory negligence, and 
causation, courts are not in such a good 
position to make a total determination for 
here enters a prerogative of the jury to 
make a determination of its own, and 
that is: Did the conduct of a party meas-
2. See generally State ex rel. Pacific Intermoun-
tain Express Inc v Dist Court of Second Judi-
cial Dist, Wyo, 387 P.2d 550 (1963), 9 C. 
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2386 (1971) 
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[6_g] In evaluating the facts of this case 
•- a light most favorable to the Bowens, we 
}\\i that summary judgment in favor of 
p-verton City was improperly awarded. 
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise 
(iuc care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe 
condition for travel, Murray v. Ogden City, 
Utah, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); Sweet v. Salt 
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913); 
Bills V. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 507, 109 P. 
745 (1910), and the city may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). See also 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-22 and 63-30-8. In 
fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities 
to maintain traffic signals in a reasonably 
safe, visible, and working condition. Smith 
\. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d 
£43 (1975). Whether the city fulfilled its 
duty to maintain the city streets in a safe 
condition in the instant case is a question of 
fact to be determined by the jury. See 
Snugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320,159 
P. 530 (1915). 
In Riverton City's answers to the Bow-
ens' interrogatories, it stated that visual 
inspections were made by city personnel of 
all traffic signs within Riverton City on an 
annual basis to insure that the signs were in 
place. It is arguable that Riverton City 
was negligent in not conducting immediate 
inspections of signs where road mainte-
nance work was done. Reasonable persons 
flight differ as to whether the annual in-
spections conducted by Riverton City were 
sufficient under the circumstances. Enoch 
Smith workers present at the intersection 
the day before the accident stated that the 
Sign was loose and blowing in the wind. 
[9] Riverton City argues that the eigh-
teen minutes between its receipt of notice 
and the accident was insufficient time to 
take corrective action. Of course, a jury 
might so find. But clearly, a municipality 
has a duty to respond in a reasonable fash-
ion once it is on notice of a defective sign or 
BQWEN v. RIVERTON CITY 
Cue as, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 
signal. Gaspard 
Utah 437 
v. Stutes, La.App., 3S0 
So.2d 201 (1980); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97 
N.J.Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (1967), app'd 52 
N J . 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1%S). In Lochbaum 
v. Bowman, La.App., 35^ So.2d 379, 381 
(1978), the court stated: 
[T]here was no attempt [by the highway 
department] to notify law enforcement 
personnel to direct traffic until repairs 
could be accomplished. The Depart-
ment's radio operator simply notified the 
service man on call, who got dressed, 
went to the office to pick up tools, and 
finally arrived on the! scene after the 
accident had occurred. 
We conclude that th^ Department was 
negligent both in failing to properly 
maintain the traffic signal at the inter-
section and in failing to take steps when 
notified of the malfunction to alert the 
proper authorities so tnat traffic at the 
intersection could be directed manually 
until repairs could be accomplished. 
After notice was received in the instant 
case, Riverton City responded by sending an 
individual to repair the sign rather than 
calling the police to regulate traffic until 
the sign could be raided, 
should, and if so could) 
more effectively and quickly is a matter for 
trial. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. No 
costs. 
HALL, C.J., and OA^KS, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Whether it 
have responded 
( O I KEYNUM3ERSYSTEM) 
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CHASE v. DAWSON et ux. 
No. 7363. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 2S. 1930. 
Action by John II. Cha^e airalnst Kirlw S. 
Dawson and wife, to foreclose a material-
man's lien. 
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, J. Allan Cnckctt, J., entered 
judgment lor the plaintiff foreclosing the 
lion, and the defendants Appealed. 
Tho Supreme Court, MdD noujrh, J., held 
the notice of the lien substantially complied 
with the statutory requirements. 
Judgment a fanned. 
Mechanics liens O I 3 4 
Where notice of materialman's lien 
showed that building materials were fur-
nished to defendants and used on and about 
house on their realty and realty was fully 
and legally described by lot and subdivision, 
and notice recited that materials were 
furnished to owners, notice of lien sub-
stantially complied with requirements of 
lien s;atute. U.C.A. 1943, 52— 1—7.1 
L. B. Wight, Salt Lake City, for appel-
lants. 
Ray S. McCarty, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
McDOXOUGH, Justice. 
Defendants appeal from a district court 
judgment whereby a materialman's lien was 
foreclosed. There is no dispute as to the 
fact that the materials were actually fur-
nished and were used on the premises in 
construction of a houce, and that defend-
ants are the owners for whom the house 
was built. The sole question for review 
relates to the legal sufficiency of the notice 
of lien. 
Appellants contend that the notice of 
Hen does not comply with section 52—1—7, 
) I I T E K , 2d S I : K U : S 
U.C.A.1°43, and thi t su.h not :cc U *,. .,,. 
deficient for failure to state: fa) Th-
ture and amount n" the mater: il lur.,'",], \ 
by VAQ cteimrnt; ( r ) the i:-e to whit'i th-
materials were a [ ; / c i ; (c) to whom th" 
same were deliver^ i : (d) the terms of fj« 
contract and cor/.it :ons of the CDrtr.ic* 
under wv :ch tb ' y were- furnished; %<,] 
C'w) the status of the one with whom th • 
clrimant made an oial contract, whether 
ag:nt, contractor cr cthenv^c. 
The notice of lien is no nr»del. However 
substantia! comphancc with the statute is 
all that is require i. The particular portions 
of the statute which appellants claim were 
disregarded, in the notice of lien in con-
troversy, read as folljws: " * * *
 a 
claim in writing. containing a notice of 
intention to hold a r i claim a lien, and a 
statement of his demand after denuctir^ 
all just credits and onsets, with the name of 
the owner, if known, and also the name 
of the person by whom he was employed oi 
to wdiom he furnished the material, with 
a statement of the terms, time given and 
conditions of his contract, spec: n nig the 
time when the first and last labor was per-
formed, or the first and last material was 
furnished, and also a description of the 
property to be charged with the lien, suffi-
cient for identification, * * *." 
Odiously, the statute does not require 
that a materialman shall include an itemized 
list of buildincr materials, specifying nails, 
door-knDbs and other items. The instru-
ment here in question clearly shows that 
building materials were fumizhed to the 
owner, the first named defendant, and u-ed 
"on and about the house on said land", 
which land is fulK* and legally described by 
lot and subdivision. The notice recites that 
the materials were furnished to the owner ' 
Kirby S. Dawson, so that it matters not 
whether the nrtteriaN were ordered by the 
general contractor, or as to who signed for 
them on the job. 
This case does not involve a situation 
where the claim of lien does not show that 
the material was delivered for use on or 
about the structure erected on the land to 
which it is claimed that the lien attaches, 
I. Morrison, Merrill & Co. v. Willard ct al., 17 Utah :j00, 33 P. S"2f TO Am.St.K'p. 7S1. 
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., tlic case in iMorr^on, Merrill & 
\ . 'w i i l aw ct r.L, 17 Utah 306, 53 P. 
*. ' ;<• Am St.Rcp. 7S4. The notice rc-
:'iat the owner agreed to pay cash, 
;h"-f ti.ere were no t : rms for deferred 
r..:::s to be stated. Hov\e\er irformal 
•rw- cf t*»e phrases in the notice of Lcn, 
t ^ o was sub^tantirl compliance with the 
cM*»:*.e and no fatal omission. 
The judgment is therefore affirmed. 
<
 v .ts to respondent. 
r ^ A T T , C . ' j . , and WADE, WOLFE, 
a u ] LATIMER, J J , concur. 
BALLEN v. 
No. 
G^SPARAC. 
73"iJ. 
SupiHine Court of Utah. 
Ma a h 2, 30.>». 
Action by M.ir;. B.^len nsain-t Oeor-'e A. 
C pirno. J r . f^r an nt^omitins and di**o-
ti n of a joint enr* r\ rNe entered into l»e-
u eon parties Defendant filed a counter-
< ram for labor and monies expended. 
The P i ^ r i ' t Court of Summit County, J. 
A,Ian Oockolt, J , found that plaintiff bad a 
" > p^r cent interest in property and re=pond-
< «it had a 27 per cent interest in it, oidered 
}';.>',erty Suid, ik-bt< pud, and proceed* dis-
lV^ued accordingly between panics, and 
I' aintiff aj.jifal^d. 
The SnpreiLe Court, Wade, J., held that 
fc .dii.gs were supported by the evidence. 
•"iin'jriDert affirmed. 
Latiiner and Wolfe, J J , d i l u t e d . 
I- Appeal anJ error C=I92(4) 
Where plaintiff did not claim she was 
prejudiced in presentation of case by trial 
court's permitting bill of particulars to be 
filed late by defendant, and plaintiff did not 
£t trial object to filing bill on ground that 
r.D application for relief for failure to file 
m time was made by defendant before of-
fering to file bill, trial court's action in al-
lowing defendant to file bill of particulars respondent. 
and to present e \ idenc: of items in account 
stated therein v*r« r o : an ab ise bf discre-
tion. U.C.A. IS43, 10-^—14—4. 
2. Pleadsng C=>324 
In action for an recounting £nd a dis-
solution of joint enterprise, bill of particu-
lars filed by defendant showing rate cf pay 
and amount sought for sen ices I rendered 
was sufficient. 
3. Trial 0397(1) 
Where plairtiff and defendant, while 
engaged to be married, entered into joint 
venture to construct and operate lbdge, and 
plaintiff subsequently sought an apcount.ng 
and dissolution, evidence showing that 
lodge never operated at a profit e|>:cept for 
a month or so, that both parties advanced 
monies to venture and that there Were debts 
still owing, implied that no partnership 
funds were available for payment] of debts 
or for sums one party advanced, and fail-
ure of trial court to make finding} whetbe r 
there had been any monies available from 
j artnership accounts which could have been 
used to pay partnership debts instead of 
from party's personal funds was not erro-
neous. 
4. Joint adventures 0=5(1) 
In action for an accounting i and dis-
solution of a joint enterprise, wherein 
counterclaim was filed by defendant for 
sen*ices rendered, where no records were 
kept and it was practically impossible to 
get mere specific evidence as to actual time 
defendant worked, finding that defendant 
worked ten and then seven hoars a day at 
SI 50 an hour was proper. 
dis-olu-
valje of 
5. Joint adventures C=5(2) 
In action for accounting and 
tion of jomt enterprise, fixing of 
defendant's services for purposes pf estab-
lishing amount of his counterclaim! at same 
rate of pay laborer whom he siu erfvised re-
ceived was not unreasonable, and was sup-
ported by a preponderance of the Evidence. 
W. D. Eeatie, Salt Lake City, for ap-
pellant. 
Clarence C. Neslen, Salt Lake f i t } , fur 
DESERLT NAT. BANK v KIDMAX. r> —o C I O 
^ ^ executed. After they arr ived a t 
*' * '* / ,,, of the a t torney who prepared the 
r
 t° there was some d:-'*u^sion as to wheth-
^ ' x , plaintiff should dispone of the prop-
C - t v *v>iil or by deed. Plaintiff was in 
" - (f nuk ing a will, bu t the defendants 
* \ * \* w h e n c e any more money to pro-
:
 / * : ' f lv «p<?ity and i m p r t n e i t and help 
' t\ rtilT unless the conveyance was by 
:
 * which they had a perfect r ight to do. 
» '"r r t ter vshat moral obhgi t .ons they were 
, ,r* f"> take c a r e °f plaintiff and protect 
1 -' property, it mus t be conceded tha t they 
n under no legal obligation to do so. 
*•"•» pjMntiff finally, in opposition to the ad-
**a ct her at torney, decided to make a G^ed, 
N cj was done. Defendant Mrs. Moser, 
v :!i the exception of alx>ut five years, had 
T i*. all her life wi+h her mother, and had 
r ., 1 a large family under the same roof, 
1
 had recently c r i ed for and nursed her 
t " \ r c :h a severe spell of sickness. Defend-
5i/> Lad for se \ e ra l years given plaintiff 
n oney to pay the taxes assessed aga ins t the 
p perty The propei ty had been sold for 
a^essments made for the extension of wa-
t r mains, and more taxes , amount ing to 
51150. would soon be due, which plaintiff 
T-ra* unable to pay. In addition to the care, 
arention and assistance thus extended, t h e 
<Kendants, by the provisions of the lease 
were obbgated to contmue to assis t and pro-
vide fcr plaintiff during the res t of her life. 
Pnder these circumstances, coercion and un-
due influence will Lot be infeired. TYmle 
courts of equity will carefully scrutinize 
transactions of this character , when entered 
mfo between paren t and child, ye t when, as 
in this case, as shown by the record, no un-
d'ie influence has been used, such contracts 
will not be disturbed, provided the complain-
ing par ty at the t ime of the t ransact ion had 
if gal and menta l capacity to contract 
We are of the opinion, and so hoi 1, t h a t 
findings Nbs. 9, 10 12, and IS are not sup-
ported by the evidence. The case is reversed, 
with directions to the trial court to set aside 
the decree entered in the case, and to dis-
miss the action. 
BASKIN, C. J., and B A R T C H , J., concur. 
D E S E R E T XAT. BANK OF SALT L A K E 
CITY v. KIDMAN et al. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. March 23, 1903.) 
CHATTEL MORTGAGE — ACKNOWLEDGMENT — 
AFFIDAVIT OF GOOD FAITH—DEFECTS—VA-
LIDITY AS AGAINST MORTGAGOR—BON \ FIDE 
PLRCHASERS — PLEADING — BURDEN OF 
PROOF. 
1. In the absence of statutory provisions, 
the law does not permit an officer to take the 
acknowledgment of a stranger without satisfac-
tory proof of his identity. 
2. A certificate of acknowledgment to an in-
strument made pursuant to Rev. St. Idaho, § 
295S, prescribing the form therefor, should be 
%L See Acknowledgment, vol. 1, Cent. Dig. $ 123. 
T liberally construed; the section evpre^ly re-
quipnc that it be "substantially" in the fonn 
given therein. 
3. Iiev. St. Idaho. § 2£C»S, provides that the 
ceiuh\a.te of a< Luo\\ kd^meiit nuM be suhst i i-
tialh in tin* following foim (omitting the forUiil 
part*!): "On this — day of in the 
p e * r before me * * * ppisonally ap-
p t u e d known to me (or p n n e d to me 
J on the oath of ) to be t.ie person v\hose 
j n ' ine is <=ub«^ibevl to thrt wuhin instrument, 
and ncLnowlfdjr^d to me that he (or they) exe-
cuted u e ^aiiie.'' The a. kuo^ kd-rment to a 
chattel l o i t^a-e recited loiihtting tne formal 
p - r - i - "Ui th s r»th day of September. 100«». 
personally appr i red before r o P.. the dinner of 
the above instrument, w ho f\^r acknowlo Isred to 
me that he executed the «*. . The alhda\i t 
immediately preceding the dow.v,w ledgment, and 
vhiCh v>as subscribed and suorn to "before the 
same notary, lecited that "P . , the moitgacror 
* * * named in the foregoing mor tgage" 
declares that the mortgage is made in good 
faith, etc. Held that, reading the certificate in 
ronnecticn with the affilavit, it clearly ap-
peared that the one who executed the mort-
c ige v>as the same person who acknowledged 
j n* execution, and tht ie was a sufficient com-
I plianre -With the statute 
4 Rev. St. Idaho § 33^>. requires a chattel 
mo^tsraee to be accompanied by an affidavit 
that it is made in good faith, and without any 
desicn to huder , dela\, or defraud ci ed i to r . 
j He d that an affidavit v>ns not bad for merely 
i on^ttinsr the v>ord "defraud." 
5 Under the express provisions of Rev. St. 
Idaho, section 33bt), a chattel mortarasre is only 
v iid as against cieditors and buhsequent pui-
chasers, etc. in good faith, where not accom 
I panicd bj art1 davit that it is n n d e in good tauii 
and net properly acknowledged and filed for 
record. 
G One seeding to defend against a defect-
ivelv executed chat^e1 moitc^^e on the ground 
that hp is a bona fid* purchaser of the prop-
el tv must plead surh defence. 
7. The burden is on him to sustain the de-
fense 
Rolapp, District Judge, dissenting. 
Appeal from Distr ict Court, Cache County; 
C. H. Har t , Judge. 
Action by the Deseret National Bank of 
Salt Lake City, a corporation, a g a m s t Will iam 
Kidman and Ephra im Kidman . Verdict di-
rected for defendants , and plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed. 
Young & Movie, for appellant. Geo Q. 
Rich and F r a n k K. Nebek^r. for respondents. 
BASKIN, C. J . This is an action of re-
I plevin. The answer denies the plaintiff's al-
leged r ight to the possession of about 700 
I head of sneep claimed from d e f e n d a n t s and 
' alleges tha t the defendants are the owners 
| of, and entitled to the possession of, the same. 
A jury being impaneled in the case, the plam-
I tiff placed Orson Rainel upon the Witness 
! s tand, and he testified as follows: " I know 
i the signature of Earnes t A. Purnel l . H a v e 
seen him wri te his name several times. I 
saw him wri te his name to the promissory 
note." And after identifying the note as 
j the one set out in the mortgage, he further 
testified " that a t the time Mr. Purne l l signed 
said note he signed wha t purported to be a 
«f 4. Petrovitzky v. Bngham. 47 Pac. 665. 14 Utah. 
4T2. 
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chattel mortgage. The chattel mortgage was 
g ven to secure the abo\e-inentioued note, 
and Mr. Purnell received ^J.-iuo on tbe n »I • 
and mortgage. No payments have been made 
by Mr. Purnell thereon, either piincipal or 
interest, excepting two Interest payments. 
Mr. Purnell is still owing the bank the note. 
I witnessed the signature of Mr. Fumell to 
the mortgage, and after it was Signed, ac-
knowledged, and sworn to, and the notary's 
signature and seal to the affidavits attached. 
1 took it myself and mailed it, addressed to 
the county recorder of Oneida county, state 
of Idaho." No objection was inte:rosed by 
the defendants to this testimony. 
Tne plaintiff then offered in evidence a 
chattel mortgage of a lot of she?p, in which 
were included the 700 in dispute, executed 
by one Earnest rurnell. of Cache county, 
Utah, in favor of the plaintiff, to secure a 
note for 52,400, dated at Salt Lake City Sep-
tember 5, 11*00, and payal le on<» year after 
date, with interest at the rate of 8 per cent, 
pt-r annum. The sheep at the time said 
mortgage was executed were on the range in 
Oneida county, state of Idaho. Among oth-
er stipulations the mortgage contained tbe 
following: "It is further agreed and stipu-
lated that if said mortgagor shall fail to 
make any payment, as in said promissory 
note provided, or in case said mortgagee shall 
at any time deem its debt insecure, the said 
mortgagee, or its assigns, may, in its option, 
declare the principal of said debt to be due. 
and may take possession of said mortgaged 
property wherever located together with the 
increase thereon, if any, using all necessary 
force for that purpose." 
Attached to the mortgage were the follow-
ing affidavit and certificates of acknowledg-
ment and recordation of mortgage: 
"State of Utah, County of Salt Lake—ss.: 
Earnest A. Purnell, the mo:tgagor, H. S. 
Young, the cashier and agent for the mort-
gagee, named in the foregoing mortgage, be-
ing duly sworn, severally declare, each on 
oath, that this chattel mortgage is made in 
good faith to secure the am »unt and debt 
therein specified, and without any design to 
hinder or delay the creditors of said mort-
gagor. Earnest A. Purnell. H. S. Young. 
"Subscribed and sworn to before me a no-
tary public in and for said county at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of September, 
A. D. 1900. Hyrum J. Young. [Seal.l 
"United Stntt* of Amerka. St. tu of Utah. 
County of Salt Lake—ss.: On this 5tb day 
of September, 1900, personally appeared be-
fore me Earnest A. Purnell. the signer of the 
above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that he executed the same. Hyrum J. 
Young, N. P. My commission expires No-
vember 24, 1900." 
* Indorsed: 
"Chattel Mortgage No. 4S0. Recorded at 
tne request of H. S. Young, September Sth, 
A. D. 1900, at 5 minutes past 9 a. m., in Book 
B, Ch.ittil Mortgages, page 123. JD. j ,, 
olds, Recorder. • % • i
 i 
"State of Idaho, County of Onefda-os . 
D. J. Le\no)(is ucoider of Oneida coJ ' 
Idaho, do hereby certity thj aboife ai..» j '* 
going to he a frll. True, and cbrre>Y \ " 
of the chattel monzc.-e now on rile fa'*** 
ciiiee. VUuu'S^ my Laud and scil of ni\1'* 
lice at Malad City, Idaho, this the lr.t;/ / ' ' 
of SeptomUr, U 01. [S.gned] D. J. i»< >',VV, 
Recoider, by W. II. Richards rJcput^/''''" 
Defendants' attorney oljectcdl to the
 z 
minion of the mortgage in evidence ori » 
following giuunds: U) The mortgage M 
not dated; (2) that tLe affidavit]Uat&it * * 
made in good faith was sworn io by Xj V 
Young in his individual capacity, and \ ' t 
as an officer or agent cf the plaintiff Corp.. 
tion; (3) that said affidavit alleged to 1\.-, 
been svsorn to by H. S. Young £md Lara * 
A. Purnell did not contain, as is required i 
the statute of the state of Idaho, the wc: \ 
"defraud," or any word of similar impr. • 
(4) that the notary's certificate did not rec.tv 
that Earnest A. Purnell was known to Jnm 
to be, or proven on the oath of any one \ 
be, the signer of the instrument, as is re-
quired by the statutes of the state of Ida:.*, 
to wit, sections 2053 and 2953 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Idaho of ISSTJ (5) for V-M 
reason that it was not recorded in the county 
of Cache, state of Utah; <G) that the allcg \\ 
seal of the alleged county reco1 ier of Oneida 
county was not attested as provided in see-
tions 337S. 33S7, subd. 7, Rev. St. Utah IS'JS; 
(7) that the evidence is insufficient to show 
that plaintiff is entitled to any j of the re! ef 
prayed for. The objections were overruled, 
and the mortgage admitted "supject to said 
objections." 
Plaintiff thereupon introduced evidence that 
the 7Ur» sheep claimed were a part of tlie-
band of sheep which was mortgaged by the 
said Earnest A. Purnell, and [of which he 
was the owner; that previous t^ > the instita-
tion of this suit the plaintiff demanded from 
the defendants the sheep in dispute; and 
that the defendant refused to i deliver them 
to the plaintiff. Hyrum J. Young, the no-
tary public before whom the nportgage was 
acknowledged, testified, on behalf of plain-
tiff, in substance, that he was personally ac-
quainted with the said Earnest A. Purnell. 
and that on or about the 5th Of September, 
19U0, the said Purnell appeared before bini, 
the said Hyrum J. Young, and made the af-
fidavit and acknowledgment hereinbefore set 
out. 
Plaintiff also introduced in I evidence tbe 
said William Kidman's statements that be 
bought the sheep in question 4>f Earnest A. 
Purnell some time in November, 1900; that 
at the time of the purchase the sheep trere 
iu Oneida county, state of Idifho; and that 
be brought them into Utah—aid the follow-
ing provisions of the Idaho Statutes: 
"Sec. 33S5. Chattel mortgaged may be made 
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H property, goods or chattels not de-
•'
V
'j t>r statute to be real estate." 
"
 # ^ , X>07. If the mortgagor of any prop-
*' Bioruas^ i n pursuance of the provi-
\.\\ of t I l i s c n nP t e r» w n i te such mmgaire 
^f*^* unsatisfied, in whole or in part, vsill-
r^v'r^nH'Ves from the county or counties 
r ^ r e 
the mortgage is recorded, destroys, 
^,,%lIc, sells, or in any manner disposes 
^ t I j> property mortgaged, or any part there-
% 'without consent of the holder of said 
' ^ • : , i ; \ be is guilty of larceny and such 
^vVr transfer is void." 
*"** See. 29~2. The proof of acknowledgment 
,t an instrtiment may be made without this 
, Vntory, but within the United States, and 
[\\»\ in the jurisdiction of the officer, before 
ti;Ler » * * a notary public," etc. 
"Sec. 2955. The acknowledgment of an in-
ctnnuent must not be taken unless the officer 
fakir? it knows, or has satisfactory evidence, 
on oath or affirmation of a creditable witness, 
tint tbe person making such acknowledg-
ment is the individual who is described in, 
s:id v*ko executed the instrument; or, If 
executed by p. corporation, that the person 
making such acknowledgment is the presi-
dent or secretary of such corporation." 
"Sftc. 295S. The certificate of acknowledg-
ment, unless it is otherwise in this chapter 
provided, must be substantially in the follow-
ing form: Territory of Idaho, County of 
ss.: On this day of in 
— before me (here insert the tbe year — 
nan">e and quality of the officer) personally 
appeared known to me (or proved to 
Lie on the oath of ) to be the person 
Tvhose name is subscribed to the within in-
strument, and acknowledged to me that he 
(cr they) executed the same.' " 
Also Session Laws of Idaho of 1899, p. 
121, as follows: 
"Section 1. That title 12 of chapter 4, sec-
tions 33S6 and 33S7, be amended so as to 
read as follows: 'Sec. 33S6. A mortgage of 
lersonal property is void as against creditors 
of the mortgagor and subsequent purchas-
ers, and incumbrances of the property in 
good faith and for value, unless: First. It 
is accompanied by the affidavit of the mort-
gagor that it is made in good faith and 
without any design to binder, delay or de-
fraud creditors. Second. It is acknowledged 
or proven as grants of real estate and the 
mortgage, or a true copy thereof, is filed for 
record with the county recorder of the coun-
ty where such property is located, and kept.' 
"Sec. 2. Section 33S7 is amended to read as 
follows: 'Sec. 33S7. Upon the receipt of any 
such Instrument, the recorder shall endorse 
upon the back the time of receiving it, and 
shall file the same in his office, to be kept 
there for the inspection of all persons inter-
ested,' " etc. 
"Sec. 3. All acts and parts of acts incon-
sistent with this act are hereby repealed." 
Seme other evidenco, which it is not nec-
essary to set out, was introduced by plain-
tiff; and, when it rested, the defendants' 
attorney moved that the chattel mortgage be 
stricken out on th? grounds of the original 
objections. This motion was denied, where-
upon the "plaintiff then admitted that de-
fendants Lad no ether notice of the mort-
gage, except the notice imparted by the rec-
ord of it in Oneida county, and that it was 
not recorded in Cache county, Utah.'* 
"Thereupon the defendants moved the court 
to instruct the jury, upon the evidence of 
plaintiff, to bring in a verdict in favor of 
| the defendants and against plaintiff, and 
upon the ground* stated above as objections 
I to the introduction of the chattel mortgage." 
' The court, on the grounds that the affidavit 
| and the acknowledgment of the chattel mort-
I gage were not in accordance with the provi-
| slons of the statute of Idaho, and that the 
chattel mortgage v>as not sufficient to charge 
' defendants v>ith notice of its existence, in-
| structed the jury to return a verdict for the 
defendants, which was done, and judgment 
rendered thereon against the plaintiff. 
1. In the absence of statutory provisions 
such as are contained in section 2955 of the 
i Idaho Statutes, the law does not permit an 
officer to take the acknowledgment of a 
strmger without satisfactory proof of his 
idertity. and when so taken it is a flagrant 
!
 violation of official duty. As it is a pre-
sumption that officers perform their duty, 
and only a substantial, and not a strict, 
1
 compliance with the form set out in the 
Idaho statute is required by that statute, 
the acknowledgment in question should not 
be literally, but liberally, construed. In Kel-
ly v. Calhoun. 93 U. S. 713, 24 L. Ed. 5-14, 
Mr. Justice Swayne said: "Instruments like 
this should be construed, If it can be rea-
sonably done, 'Ut res magis, valeat quam 
pereat' It should be the aim of courts in 
cases like this to preserve, and not to de-
stroy. Sir Matthew Hale said they should 
be astute to find means to make acts effec-
tual, according to the honest intent of the 
parties. Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall. 513, 
19 L. Ed. 426." There are many decisions 
which hold that "it is the policy of the law 
to construe acknowledgments liberally, and 
not to allow a conveyance to be defeated by 
unsubstantial and technical objections to the 
certificate of acknowledgment." Wells v. At-
kinson, 24 Minn, 105. Certificates in the 
same form as the one in question, made un-
der statutes which prescribe the form of the 
certificate, and require only a substantial 
compliance therewith, have been sustained 
in the following cases: Warnder v. Henry, 
117 Mo. 530, 23 S. W. 776; Wilson v. Quig-
ley, 107 Mo. 98, 17 S. W. 891; Hiles v. La 
Flirfj, 59 Wis. 765, 18 N. W. 435; Harris v. 
Pratt, 37 Kan. 316, 15 Pac. 216; Burbank v. 
Ellis, 7 Neb. 156. In Northwestern Pac. Hy-
potheek Bank v. Rauch (Idaho) 51 Pac. 764, 
the certificate of acknowledgment was ob-
jected to on the ground that it did not com-
ply with sections 2921, 2922, 2960, Rey. S t 
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Idaho. The statutes in force at the time the 
certificate was made, as appears from the 
opinion, did not "require a literal, but a sub-
stantial, compliance therewith'*; and the 
court held that the certificate objected to, 
and which is as- follow*: *% L. F. Williams. 
a notary public in and for the said county 
and siate, do hereby certify that on this GOih 
day of Jan., 1S03. personally appeared before 
me. A. •Rauch and Margaret E. Pauch, his 
wife, to me known to be the individuals de-
scribed In, and who executed, the within in-
strument and acknowledged that they s ^ e d 
and sealed the same as their free and volun-
tary act and deed, for the uses and purposes 
therein mentioned. And I further certify 
that I did fully apprise the said Margaret 
E. Rauch, wife of the said A. Rauch, of the 
contents of said instrument, and of her rights 
thereto, and the effect of signing the same, 
and that she did then, freely and voluntarily, 
separate and apart from her said husband, 
sign and acknowledge said instrument. Giv- I 
en under my hand and offcial seal this 30th | 
day of Jan., 1S03. L. F. Williams, Notary I 
Public. [Seal.]"—was a substantial eoinpli- j 
ance with the following form pre-cribed by 
section 2900 of said statute: "Territory of 
Idaho, County of ss.: On thi<* j 
day of , in the year of before me j 
(here insert the name and quality of the offi- j 
cer) personally appeared known to me j 
(or proved to me on oath of ) to be the i 
person whose name is subscribed to the with- \ 
in instrument, described as a married worn- | 
an. and, upon an examination without the J 
hearing of her husl and. I made her acquaint- | 
ed with the contents of the instrument, and ! 
thereupon she acknowledged to me that she j 
executed the same, and that she d'»es not | 
wish to retract such execution." This deci- j 
sion is sustained by the same court in the | 
ca«es of Jaeckel v. Pease. 53 Pac. 300; Chris-
tenson T. Hollimrswortb, 53 Pac. 211; Curti9 
et al. v. Bunnell, etc., 55 Pac. C»r»9. In the 
case of Northwestern & P. Hypotheek Bank 
T. Rauch (Idaho) 51 Pac. 7G4, the language 
of the form set out in the territorial statute 
was followed in the certificate, but differed 
therefrom in several particulars, and failed 
to state in the expressed terms of the pre-
scribed form that the wife, without the hear-
ing of her husband, acknowledged that she 
did not wish to retract the execution of the 
instrument The court, in holding that the 
certificate wa*s a substantial compliance with 
the statute, quoted the following from the 
case of Belcher v. Weaver, 40 Tex. 293. 20 
Am. Rep. 2G7: "The general rule upon this 
subject is that there must be a substantial, 
though not a literal, compliance with the 
terms of the statute, and that, although words 
not In the statute are used in place of oth-
ers that are, or words in the statute are 
omitted, yet if the meaning of the words 
used is the same, or they represent the same 
fact, or if the omi*<=ion of a word or word9 
.s immaterial, or can be supplied by a rea-
ie M,..„ 
t « u i , ^ . . 
I1" W . J . T * 
the v.-. 
the v,, 
r? t ap 
e th«.
 ht l,. 
sonable and fair construction of 4j,n 
instrument, the eertucate ^ill be ]».!./' !H4* 
cient." I U t l *«** 
This brings us to the question wi 
certificate in this case suh^tantL 
plies with the pre-jnbod form. T | 
cf the mortgagor and his ackmA 
are the es-erai;.l faits required to[ 
by the ccrtiiicate. If it docs this 
tially complies with the statute 
v. Henry, 117 Mo. o3S. 5G'J. 23 ?. Y\\ 
court said: "The point of the of 
that the acknowledgment omits 
'to me personally kLown,' a fur 
'George W. Warder/ where they fir 
in the acknowledgment Now, talj< 
ute, and it will be seen that the oflfeer shoir 
certify that 'before me appeared George \\ 
Warder, to me personally known.^ The c» -i 
tificate states, 'before me personally
 A v 
peared/ etc. The officer, in miking ti 1 
statement that G.-orcre W. Warderf personal 7 
appeared before him, includes therein tJ-e» 
proposition that Warder was td him pt»r„ 
sonally known; for, unless personally known, 
how could he say Warder personally appear-
ed? The meaning and sense of Ithe certJ-j. 
cate of acknowledgment is the sime as tb* 
statute." In the case of Harris y. Pra t t r,7 
Kan. 310. 15 Pac. 216, there were' two deed . 
the acknowledgments of which were con-
tested. It was held that an acknchvledgmt vr 
of the first, which was made byi register in 
bankruptcy, was not required bjf the bank-
rupt law. In respect to the othejr the court 
said: "The second deed, made jby the a^ 
signee of said estate to George P|. Anderson, 
was acknowledged before a notary public 
The objection to this acknowledgment is that 
the notary in his certificate does not show 
that the a l i enee was personally known to 
him to be the person who signed the con-
veyance. * • • Now, while th|e certificate 
does not say in so many words that the 
grantor was personally known to| him to b* 
the person who signed the conveyance, y *t 
it does state that the assignee personally ap-
peared before him. and that his signature 
is to the conveyance. We think this wa-5 a 
substantial compliance with ouJ* statute" 
In the case of Munroe v. Ea^tmaju, 31 Mich* 
2S5, the form of the acknowledgment was 
not prescribed, but the statute! required a 
deed to be acknowledged by the party or 
parties executing the same. The Certificate of 
acknowledgment was objected tc^  because it 
failed to show that the grantor was kno^ti 
to the officer before whom it wasl made. Mr. 
Justice Cooley, in the opinion, said: "The 
Justice certifies that the signer and seal-
er of the subjoined deed acknowledged i t 
and this implies a knowledge on his part of 
the fact." Under a statute wbteh require* 
the acknowledgment to an instrument, the 
identification by the certificate Of the party 
executing it is as essential as undler the Idaho 
statute. In the case of Carpenter v. Dexter, 
8 Wall. 513-«27, 19 L. Ed, 426, (Mr. Justice 
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.- <•>!!:* "The law of Illinois in force 
1
 ^ - V'»on + 'u ' nianner of taking aeknowl-
." , ' : - . provid. * that no oilicer shall take 
'**
:
*'
 k , l i v j i!-rn.» lit of any person unless 
* ,*?rwo:i vh.k.'l be personally known to 
. , \,* the real person who (executed the 
• ' ,,i.d in vbo-e name such acknowlodg-
'• ]- propo^'d to be made, or shall be 
r 4j
 t 0 bo such by a credible witness.' and 
' » personal knowledge or proof shall bo 
' ..' i iu the certificate Looking now to 
*•'. il-vd itself, we rind that the attestation 
*,» states that.i t was 'signed, sealed, and 
/• \ered' in the presence of the prescribing 
rm>*?es. One of these witnesses was the 
'•vtioe of the peace before whom the ac-
I." .Vledinnent was taken; and he states in 
. i certificate, following immediately after 
t, .^  attestation-clause, that the 'above-named 
William T. Davenport, who has signed, seal-
^\ and delivered the above instrument of 
wr:Kiir. per-om-Ily appeared' before him and 
«. knewiedged the same to be his free act 
«:.d deed. Read thus with the deed, the 
certificate amounts to this: that the gran-
tor personally appeared before the officer, 
and in his'presence signed, sealed, and de-
livered the instrument, and then acknowl-
edged the same before him. An affirmation 
lu the word* of the statute could not more 
clearly expre-s the identity of the grantor 
T\ith the party making the acknowledgment." 
In the case at bar. looking at the affidavit 
attacked to the mortiiaee, immediately pre-
ceding the acknowledgment, we find from the 
jurat fdiat the affidavit was subscribed and 
sworn to before the same notary public who 
took the acknowledgment of the mortgage. 
The certificate, read with this affidavit, clear-
ly shows that the party who executed the 
mortgage was the same person who acknowl-
edged the execution of the same. "An af-
firmation, in the words of the [Idaho] stat-
ute, couid not more clearly express the iden-
tity of the grantor [named in the chattel 
mortgage] with the party making the ac-
knowledgment." 
2. A mortgage of personal property is re-
quired by section 33S6 of the Idaho Statutes 
to be accompanied by the affidavit of the 
mortgagor "that it is made in good faith and 
without any design to hinder, delay or de-
fraud creditors." Section 150 of the Revised 
Statutes of Utah requires a chattel mort-
gage to be accompanied by the affidavit of 
the parties thereto "that the same is made 
in good faith to secure the amount named 
therein and without anv^esign to hinder or 
delay the creditors of^..e mortgagor." The 
mortgage in quest5*^ was executed in Utah, 
and the affidavi^of the parties thereto is 
in strict conformity with the statute of this 
state. The second ground upon which the 
trial court directed a verdict for the de-
fendants was that the certificate did not com-
ply with the statute of Idaho. The specific 
objection urged by defendants' counsel is that 
the words "or defraud creditors" are omit-
ted in the affidavit of the parties to tlK 
mortgage. Notwithstanding the words "or 
defraud creditor*" are not used in the Utah 
statute, we think that its purp >se and legal 
effect are the same as the 1 laho statr.u. 
In the case of Hoffman et al. v. Macknll et 
al., r» Ohio St. 12i-r: . \ -It; Am. Doc. 037. 
Mr. Justice Hartley said: "It is argued that 
an al ignment in tru^t for credit' rs. which 
by its provis'ons tend* to hinder and delay 
creditors, is fraudulent and void. The pro-
\ision of the statute of the 13th Elizal ith, 
^Lich was held to be declaratory of tl/» 
common law in England, and which is said 
to have been followed literally in the statute 
of frauds in New York, declares 'every con-
veyance or assignment,' etc., 'made with in-
tent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,' 
etc., void. The provision in the Ohio statute 
omits the word* 'hinder and delay.' But I 
am not aware that this difference of pi ra*v-
ology is the foundation of any material dis-
tinction, in legal effect, between the English 
statute and that of Ohio. That hinderincr and 
delaying of a creditor which would bring 
an assignment within the operation of the 
statute of England would, I apprehend, con-
stitute a fraud under the statute of Ohio." 
In the case of Petrovity.ky v. Brigham, 14 
Utah, 472, 47 Tac. 066, the appellant omitted 
the word "hinder," but used the words "de-
lay or defraud," and this court held that the 
affidavit substantially complied with the pro-
visions of the statute of Utah before refer-
red to. Mr. Justice Miner, in the opinion, 
said: "The question is raised whether the 
words 'delay or defraud,' as used in the 
affidavit, is a substantial compliance with 
the statute, without the use of the word 
'hinder.' The words 'hinder' and 'delay' are 
used as synonymous terms. * * * The 
Encyclopaedia Dictionary defines the word 
'defraud' as meaning to deprive of a right 
by withholding from another, by indirection 
or device, that which he has a right to claim 
or obtain. The words 'hinder' and 'delay' 
are so practically of the same meaning that 
the omission of the word 'hinder' in the affi-
davit does substantially detract from the 
object of the statute, or lessen the force of 
the words used in the affidavit, so as to make 
it defective, when used in connection with 
the word 'defraud.' A substantial compli-
ance with the statute is all that is required. 
To hinder or delay is to do something with 
an intent to defraud." In 14 Am. & Eng. 
Ei.cy. of Law <2d Ed.) p. 244, it is stated: 
"But in order to render a deed fraudulent, 
it is not necessary that the debtor should 
intend to defeat the creditor in the collec-
tion of his claim. Creditors are entitled not 
only to be paid, but to be paid as their 
claims accrue; and a debtor has no more 
right to postpone payment simply for his 
own advantage, than to defeat it altogether. 
A purpose to hinder and delay a creditor is 
therefore fraudulent, although the debtor 
may honestly intend that all his debts shall 
S7S 71 PACIFIC REPORTER. 
ultimately be paid." The term "creditor." 
in its widest sense, is one who has a right to 
Ormand'-nnd recover of another a sum of 
money on a ' y account whatever. Anderson's 
Law Diet, 2Ca; Winfield's Word* & Finales, 
102; TVaples, Debtor & Creditor, § 8. In 
this sense the term "creditors" was used in 
the Idaho statute. It appears from the evi-
dence that the plaintiff paid to the mortgagor 
£2,400 as a consideration for the note and 
mortgage. The mortgagor had the legal 
right, in good faith, and without any inten-
tion of impairing the legal rights of creditors, 
to execute the mortgage to secure the pay-
ment of the note; and. if made in good faith 
and witr-out any such intention, it was no 
infraction of the legal rights of any creditor. 
There is no legal remedy for fraud unless it 
impairs a legal right. An act which neither 
hinders nor delays the creditor in the at-
tainment of his legal rights cannot in any 
view, defraud him. Therefore the averment 
in the affidavit in question that "the mort-
gage is made in good faith to secure the 
amount and debt therein specified, and with-
out any design to hinder or delay the cred-
itors of said mortgagor," is a negation of any 
design to defraud them. 
3. The execution of the mortgage was 
shown by the testimony of Orson Rumel, 
/who signed the same as a witness, and by 
o*her evidence. The mortgage was therefore 
valid, as against the mortgagor, and only 
vuid under the Idaho statute as against his 
creditors and subsequent purchasers in good 
faith and for value, even if it were conceded 
that the affidavit and certificate of acknowl-
edgment are not sufficient, and that the 
mortgage was not filed for record in Idaho or 
Utah. The purchase of property in good 
faith for value is not available as a defense 
against a mortgage or conveyance which is 
valid as against the mortgagor or grantor, 
unless it is pleaded; and the burden of prov-
ing such a defense is upon the defendant, 
and in his answer he is required, among 
other things, to allege the consideration, and 
that it was bona fide and truly paid by him 
for the property purchased. 3 Estee, PI. § 
3S30; Maxwell. Code PL p. 432 et seq.; 1 
Mod. Eq. Prac. 346. The answer in this case 
fails to allege that defendants were bona ride 
purchasers, or that they purchased the sheep 
from the mortgagor or any other person, and 
the evidence fails to show that they have 
actually paid or agreed to pay any money or 
other consideration for the sheep which the 
evidence shows they claimed to have pur-
chased from the mortgagor. 
Under the facts disclosed by the record, 
the mortgage was properly admitted in evi-
dence, and the court below erred in directing 
tbe Jury to return a verdict for the defend-
ants. 
Prom the views we have expressed, it is 
tmneeessary>to pass upon tbe other question 
raised by c unsel. 
The ju o'Luuiit of the lower court is re-
versed, with costs, and the ca$* 
for a new trial. L- - ... 
BARTCH, J., concurs. 
ROLAPP, District J u d - . I i , 
the views expressed by the l o l rn^ « * 
Ju t^ic.-* as to the sufficiency of L e - \ 
attached to the chattel mortgngo[in <!, *\ r 
I fully agree with the opinion eLpriV^"** 
of Fetrovittky v" v *"* this court in the case 
ham, 14 Utah, 471, 47 Pac. r,«L-;
 t i a , 
word5 "hinder" and "delay" ard pr.j< / 
synor.ymous terms. Under ourlstat'jt» 
use of either word in tbe affidavit
 w r ^ 
make it valid, and the use of an t additl<vL 
words, frucb as "defraud," etc.! \ i 0 r \ j *T 
treated as mere surplusage. Pveo[l v. W-V* 
ington, 9 Bosw. G17. But und-A- a su*-\ 
T\Licb provides that a chattel mortgage***, 
absolutely void as to subsequent bona ftC 
purch~sTs of the mortgaged property unleT 
it is accompanied by the affidavit of the uiori 
gagor that the mortgage is made "wit *.ov 
any design to hinder, delay, or defaud/* * 
think that the omiss.'on of the word **&. 
fraud," or the absence of some wjord of Ai.;< 
ilar import, is fatal to the validity of ih, 
document It does not seem to me that ai*s 
amount of reasoning will make I the worn" 
"hinder or delay*' include the word "de-
fraud." The former words simply mean t:\ 
effort to temporarily impede or int rcej: 
some right, property, or interest, which, bow-
ever, will be ultimately secured; but Ui 
word ''defraud" means an effort by unlaw-
ful mean* to absolutely withhold and de-
prive of such right, property, or i n t e r s . 
While I concede that the word "defraii«l" 
may include the words "delay" or "hinder.** 
I cannot concur that th? latter words indud • 
the former. In the absence of statutory pre 
visions to the contrary, tbe word* "delay* 
and "hinder" involve no criminal intent, 
while the v>ord "defraud" does. It is tru** 
that under certain circumstances an effort to 
hinder and delay might be evidence of an In-
tent to defraud. As was said by the conn 
in the case of Hoffman et al. v. Mtckall t*: 
ah, 5 Ohio St. 124, 46 Am. Dec. 637, quoted 
by the Chief Justice in the majority opinion. 
"that certain kind of hindering and delaying 
of a creditor which would bring an assign-
ment within the operation of the statute of 
England would, I apprehend, constitute a 
fraud under the statute of Ohio/ To em-
phasize the view of that court that [the worrt* 
"hinder and delay" are not, in ana of t b ^ ; 
selves, synonymous with the word rdefraud, 
the court further on in the sanje opinion 
states: "By a reasonable construction, SUCH 
hindrance and delay only as would opcrat^ 
as a fraud, and are designed as a frAtHj 
come within the operation of the * t a t u t t v 
And it was held in that very opinion that tfl* 
hindrance and delay disclosed by the facts U| 
that case did not come within the definition 
"defraud," under the Ohio statute. | So 1 »D a 
w /*> 
NOBLE v. AMORETTL 879 
,
 c a s e s that hold proven intent to hin-
« ^ fai\y conclusively shows intent to de-
J
"
r
 °\ Nn*l olson v. Leavitt 6 X. Y. 150, 57 
fr ll
 vec. 4W- I ' u t a I1 t n e s e cases simply ad-
'
Ktl!' •» the doctrine that, as matter of evi-
**'j?\ it s*iall be cons dered prima facie or 
^.""jtL-h el} shown that pn established pur-
4%lu
,
 t^ inoder or delay a creditor -v^  111 have 1
 * fleet to defraud such creditor. 14 Am. 
f ' p . - . Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 244. I have 
f ,« u'n.ible, however, to find any case in 
*\oli the statute requires the word "de-
fl.ul" i° De contained in an affidavit or ac-
..\wU dement which has held that the use 
,f jjjjt word might be obviated by the use of 
!*e Voids "hinder or delay." On the con-
•Vrv, .in a well-considu-ed opinion by the 
«Vi>reme Court of Wisconsin, we are warned 
! V -the distinction between a mere intent 
I'J hinder and delay creditors and the intent 
to defraud them must not be confounded. 
Tr-e statute clearly recognizes this distmc-
r..n, and makes void all conveyances made 
v 1th intent to hinder, delay, or defraud cred-
jfors. This language implies that the intent 
to defraud is something distinct from the 
meie intent to delaj, and it is frequently the 
case that debtors, with an honest intention 
to pay their creditors in the end, make some 
sLift or transfer merely to gain time " Pill-
ing v. Otis, 13 Wis. 405; Crow v. Beardsley, 
CS Mo. 439. 
For these reasons, I think the lower court 
properly held that the chattel mortgage in-
troduced by plaintiff below as the only basis 
of its title was fatally defective, and void as 
arainst the defendants, who were admittedly 
bona fide purchasers, without actual notice. 
NOBLE et al. T. AMORETTI, County Treas-
urer. 
(Supreme Court of Wyoming. March 19, 
1903.) 
TAXATION—STOCK OF INDIAN TRADER—DE-
LINQUENT LIST—DISTRESS 
1. A state tax on the stock of goods of a 
licenced Indian trader, located on the reserva-
tion, is not a tax on an agency of the general 
government, or on a regulation of commerce 
vwth the Indians. 
2. Under Rev. St. 1899. § 1S75, authorizing 
the collector to collect delinquent taxes by dis-
tress, and providing that the delinquent tax 
libt alone shall be a sufhaent warrant for such 
distress, there can be no distress therefor with-
out such list. 
3. Under Rev. St. 1899, §§ 1871. 18S2, pro-
viding that at a certain time each year the 
county collector of taxes shall from the tax 
list make out a conipl te Ii^t of delinquent tax-
es for that and preceding years, attach his cer-
tificate thereto, and file it in the office of the 
county treasurer, which shall be at all times a 
sufhefent warrant and authority for the col-
lector of taxes upon "vs hi^h to proceed to col-
lect delinquent taxes, the keeping of a book, in 
which at the end of the year each collector en-
teis merely the delinquent taxes for that year, 
Without any certificate, is insufficient. 
Reserved Case from District Court, Fre-
mont County; Charles W. Bianiel, Judge. 
| Suit by Warden P. Noble and others 
against Eugene Amoietti, Jr., troisjrer and 
collector of taxes of Fremont county. The 
trial court reserved certain questions for the 
Supreme Court. Quesuuns ans^eied. 
Clark & Breckons. for plaintiffs. W. E. 
Hardin and 2s. E Curthell, for defendant 
POTTER, J. From 1S03 to 1809 the plain-
tilts were 1-censed Indian traders doing busi-
ness wnhm the bhoshone Indnn reservation 
1
 in this state; said reseivation being located 
within the boundaries of Fremont couuty. 
They are the owneis of improvements locat-
ed upon land within the reservation, and a 
stock of goods, wares, and merchandise also 
located on said reseivation. Such improve-
ments and merchandise were owned and used 
by them in connection with their occupation 
or business as licensed traders with the In-
dians. It is agieed that their stock of goods 
v\as kept and employed in trade with the 
Indians, and also with white people, residents 
on and off the reservation, and that without 
said stock of goods and improvements the 
business of plaintiffs as Indian tt iders could 
not have been carried on. During each of the 
years mentioned the authorities of the coun-
ty of Fremont assessed said impro\ements 
and stock of goods for taxation, and levied 
against the same certain taxes. There is no 
contention that the property was assessed or 
the taxes levied except in the same manner 
as all other property in the county of like 
character was taxed during the same peiiod 
of time, nor is there any showing of dis-
crimination in respect to this property. On 
or about the 1st day of January, 1001, the 
county treasurer, as tax collector, seized the 
stock of goods of the plaintiffs located on 
said reservation for the unpaid and delin-
quent taxes for .the years named, and adver-
tised the same for sale. Thereupon plain-
tiffs instituted these proceedings to have the 
sale restrained. The cause wTas submitted to 
the district court upon an agreed statement 
of facts, and that court reserved ceitam 
quest, »ns, deemed to be important^and diul-
cult, lor the decision of this court. The t<ix 
collector for the several years in question 
had not made out and certified, and caused 
to be filed in the office of the county treas-
urer, a list of all delinquent taxes, as re-
quired by law, but an uncertified list was 
kept in a book in the office of the treasurer, 
who was also collector of taxes, ex officio. 
The character of that book and the entries 
therein made will be more specifically refer-
red to when we come to a consideration of 
the questions relating to the authority of the 
taxing officer to collect the taxes by distress 
of personal property. The reserved questions 
are as follows: 
First Under the laws of the state of Wyo-
ming, is personal property located upon and 
within the limits of the Shoshone Indian 
resenation in Fremont county, Wyo., which 
pergonal property is used by the plamtiiis 
FRISHEE v. K & K C^NST. CO. 
Cite as 676 P.2d 387 (Utali 1984) 
board of review as to the facts if supported 
by evidence, shall be conclusive and the 
jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to 
questions of law." Therefore, under § 35-
4-l0(i) the role of this Court is to sustain 
the findings of the Board of Review unless 
the record clearly and persuasively shows 
the Board's decision to be arbitrary, capri-
cious and unreasonable.6 If there is sub-
stantial evidence that supports the Board's 
determination, it must be affirmed.7 
[3,4] Further, there does not have to be 
an admission or direct proof of an intent to 
defraud by knowingly failing to report a 
material fact on an unemployment claim. 
As we said in Mineer i\ Board of Review:8 
The intention to defraud is shown by the 
claims themselves which contain false 
statements and fail to set forth material 
facts required by statute. The filing of 
such claims evidences a purpose or will-
ingness to present a false claim in order 
to obtain unlawful benefits and hence are 
manifestations of intent to defraud.9 
(Citations omitted.) 
[5] The Board found that plaintiff was 
self-employed during the weeks in question 
since she was substantially involved in the 
operation of the restaurant as evidenced by 
her title interest in the restaurant and ex-
tensive time contributed to daily manage-
ment. Her testimony that, although she 
received no direct wages, she expected to 
build the restaurant into a paying venture 
in the future for both herself and her moth-
er and felt entitled to compensation from 
her mother for her share of the business 
further bolstered this finding. The Board 
also concluded that plaintiff received 
wages since she "received" tip^, even 
though she might not have used them. 
The record clearly supports these findings. 
Therefore, we hold that the Board of 
Review did not err in finding that plaintiff 
knowingly withheld material information 
6. Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of In-
dus. Comm'n, Uah, 568 P.2d 727 (1977). 
7. Aluieer v. Board of Re\te\v of Indus Comm'n, 
I'tah, 572 P2d 1364 (1977). See afro Taylor v 
Department of Emplo\ment Sec, Utah, 647 P.2d 
1 (1982). 
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concerning her self-employment and the in-
come from gratuities in order to obtain 
unemployment benefits to which she was 
not entitled. Decision affirmed. 
STEWART, OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., 
concuf. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
WhJMBnTsYrtM/ 
David E. FRISBEE and Lois I. Fnsbee, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
K & IK CONSTRUCTION CO. (a Utah 
Corporation), Kenneth H. Anderson, an 
indi idual, and Ke\en Finnert}, De-
fendants and Respondents. 
and 
Kenneth H. ANDERSON, Third-Part} 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FRISBEE ENTERPRISES, a Partnership, 
Contractors Realt> and Development. 
Inc..|a Utah Corporation, and Alton D. 
Fristyee, an individual. Third-Part) De-
fendants and Appellant. 
No. 18394. 
Supreme Couit of Utal-
Jan 11 1984. 
Vehdors of real property brougn: ac-
tion against purchasers to foreclose two 
trust deeds executed by the purchasers in 
exchange for the detds to the property, 
8. Supra n. 7. 
9. Id. at 1366. 
676PJd—10 
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alleging that the purchasers had defaulted 
on the payments. One purchaser, as third-
party plaintiff, claimed that third-party de-
fendants should indemnify them for any 
judgment against them on behalf of ven-
dors, and asked that title to lots be quieted 
in purchasers. The Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, J. Robert Bullock, J., entered 
summary judgment for purchasers, and 
vendors and third-party defendant appeal-
ed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held 
that genuine issues of material fact existed 
as to meaning of hold harmless and indem-
nity agreement and as to third-party de-
fendant's alleged agency to act for ven-
dors, precluding summary judgment for 
purchasers. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgment ®=>181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only 
where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and moving party is entitled 
to judgment as matter of law, and should 
be granted only when it clearly appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that 
party moved against could prevail. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Judgment <3^181(2, 3), 185(2), 186 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and ad-
missions show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that moving par-
ty is entitled to judgment as matter of law; 
if there is any doubt or uncertainty con-
cerning questions of fact, doubt should be 
resolved in favor of opposing party, and 
thus court must evaluate all evidence and 
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from 
evidence in light most favorable to party 
opposing summary judgment. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(c). 
3. Judgment <S=>185.2(1, 4, 9) 
It is not always required that party 
opposing summary judgment proffer affi-
davits in order to avoid judgment against 
him; response in opposition to motion must 
be supported by affidavits or other docu-
ments only in order to demonstrate that 
there is genuine issue of facts for trial, but 
where party opposed to motion submits n 
documents in opposition, moving party ma; 
be granted summary judgment only if aj 
propriate, that is, if he is entitled to judg 
ment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc 
Rule 56(c). 
4. Judgment e=*185.2(9) 
Where moving affidavit shows on it 
face that there is material issue of fac 
summary judgment may not be entere< 
even if responsive affidavits are not file* 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
5. Judgment <S=>185.3(15) 
In action by vendor of land to foreclos 
twro trust deeds executed by purchaser 
purchaser's affidavit in support of motic 
for summary judgment and supporting do 
uments presented conclusions with no su 
porting facts, and showed unresolved i 
sues of fact concerning meaning of allegi 
hold harmless and indemnity agreemei 
third-party defendant's alleged agency 
act for vendors, and third-party defer 
ant's alleged agency for company named 
seller of property at suit, which compa 
was not party to suit, precluding summa 
judgment for purchasers, notwithstandi. 
vendors' failure to proffer affidavits in < 
position to motion. Rules Civ.Proc, Ri 
56(c, e). 
6. Judgment ®=»181(8) 
Ambiguity in written instrument 
and of itself may make summary judgm< 
inappropriate. Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 56 
7. Judgment G=*1S5.2(5) 
Conclusions alone are not enough 
support summary judgment; nor do bi 
contentions, unsupported by any facts, 
solve genuine issues of fact crucial to re 
lution of case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56 
Dwight L. King, Salt Lake City, 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Bruce A. Embry, Salt Lake City, for 
fendants and respondents. 
[1, 
Civil 
FRISBEE v. K & K OONST 
Cite as 676 P^d 387 (t 'tah 1984) 
HALL, Chief Justice: nied 
Plaintiffs David E. Frisbee and Lois I. 
Frisbee brought this action to foreclose 
two trust deeds executed by defendants K 
& K Construction Co., Kenneth H. Ander-
son and Keven Finnerty, alleging that de-
fendants had defaulted on the agreed-upon 
payments. 
Defendant Kenneth Anderson counter-
claimed and, as a third-party plaintiff, filed 
a complaint against Alton D. Frisbee, Fris-
bee Enterprises and Contractors Realty & 
Development, Inc. (Contractors). Plaintiffs 
and third-party defendants appeal from a 
summary judgment entered against them 
on Anderson's counterclaim and third-party 
claim. We reverse. 
On August 29, 1978, K & K Construction 
Co., Kenneth Anderson and Keven Finner-
ty purchased certain real property from 
plaintiffs, including lots 8 and 17 in the Tri 
City Park Subdivision, the subject of plain-
tiffs' foreclosure action. Defendants exe-
cuted trust deeds and promissory notes in 
exchange for the deeds to the property. 
Plaintiffs brought this action, alleging that 
defendants had defaulted on their pay-
ments. Kenneth Anderson, respondent 
here, denied there was default and alleged 
that plaintiffs' interest in lots 8 and 17 had 
been released due to performance of an 
agreement, signed bv Alton D. Frisbee, to 
hold harmless and indemnify Kenneth An-
derson. Anderson counterclaimed for the 
value of a mobile phone, Husky credit card 
purchases, a semitractor and trailer and a 
dump truck, all of which he alleged were 
due and owing him from Contractors. Fi-
nally, Anderson, as third-party plaintiff, 
claimed that the third-party defendants 
should indemnify defendants for any judg-
ment against them on behalf of plaintiffs 
and asked that title to lots 8 and 17 be 
quieted in defendants. 
On December 14, 1981, defendants made 
a motion for summary judgment accompa-
CO. Utah 389 
by an affidavit of Kenneth Anderson 
and a memorandum of points and authori-
ties. Appellants failed to respond, and on 
January 18, 1982, the judge granted de-
fendants' motion. The summary judgment 
was entered on February 11, 1982. It was 
only I after entry of judgment that appel-
lants! responded to the motion for summary 
judgment in any way: appellants made a 
motion to amend the judgment, which mo-
tion the court denied. On appeal, appel-
lants seek a reversal of the summary judg-
ment and an opportunity to present their 
case kt trial. 
|2] Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Procedure provides that summary 
judgment is proper only where there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.1 It should be granted 
only when it clearly appears that there is 
no reasonable probability that the party 
moved 
Court 
As this against could prevail.-
explained the standard: 
^ummary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and 
adrhissions shov% that there is no genuine 
issik of material fact and that the mov-
party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. If there is any doubt or 
uncertainty concerning questions of fact, 
doubt should be resolved in favor of 
opposing party. Thus, the court 
mu^t e\aluate all the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from 
evidence in a light most favorable to 
party opposing summary judgment.3 
the 
the 
the 
the 
the 
(Citations omitted.) 
In ^his case, the motion for summary 
judgment was supported by an affidavit of 
Kenneth Anderson setting forth a prima 
facie tase for .summary judgment. Appel-
lants did not proffer affidavits in opposi-
tion t0 the motion. 
[3] We have said that an opponent of a 
motioh for summary judgment must timely 
1. Bangerter v. 
(1983). 
Poulton, Utah, 663 P.2d 100 
2. Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co., Utah, 646 P.2d 
715 (1982). 
3. BoM en v. Riverton City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434, 
436 (1982). See also Lockhart Co. v. Equitable 
Real\y Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 1333 (19S3). 
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file responsive affidavits raising factual is-
sues or risk the trial court's conclusion that 
there are no factual issues.4 However, it is 
not always required that the opposing par-
ty proffer affidavits in order to avoid judg-
ment against him.5 As this Court said in 
Olwell v. Clark:6 
Rule 56(e) states specifically that a re-
sponse in opposition to a motion must be 
supported by affidavits or other docu-
ments only in order to demonstrate that 
there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. 
Where the party opposed to the motion 
submits no documents in opposition, the 
moving party may be granted summary 
judgment only "if appropriate," that is, if 
he is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.7 
(Citation omitted.) 
[4,5] Where the moving affidavit 
shows on its face that there is a material 
issue of fact, summary judgment may not 
be entered, even if responsive affidavits 
are not filed.8 In this case, Anderson is not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
His affidavit and supporting documents 
presented conclusions with no supporting 
facts and show unresolved issues of fact. 
The hold harmless and indemnity agree-
ment alone constitutes a basis for the con-
clusion that summary judgment was inap-
propriate. The hold harmless agreement 
represents a dissolution of the relationship 
existing between Alton Frisbee and Ken-
neth Anderson, as evidenced by Contrac-
tors, a corporation formed by Kenneth An-
derson, Alton Frisbee and Keven Finnerty. 
The typewritten agreement provides that 
Alton Frisbee will indemnify Anderson for 
any liabilities arising against Contractors. 
In exchange, in a handwritten addendum to 
the face of the agreement, Anderson 
agrees to sign over stock and all right, title 
and interest in Contractors. This handwrit-
ten addendum is signed by Kenneth Ander-
4. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e); Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Dew Co., Utah, 659 P.2d 1040 (1983). 
5. Olwell v. Clark, Utah, 658 P.2d 585 (1982). 
6. Id. 
son. In a further handwritten addend 
signed by no one, Alton Frisbee "agrees 
assume existing loan on lot 18 TCP ; 
cancel all debts owed on all lots in TCP 
Ken Anderson." 
[6] In his affidavit, which relies on 
agreement for support, Anderson sta 
that this clause means that he, Anders 
was to receive clear title to all lots in 
City Park Subdivision that had not pr< 
ously been sold, except lot 18, free \ 
clear of any obligation to Frisbee Eni 
prises. Anderson's interpretation of 
agreement points up the ambiguities app 
ent on the face of the agreement, clea 
raising genuine material issues of fact, 
we said in Amjacs Intenvest, Inc. v. i 
sign Associates:9 "[AJmbiguity in a w 
ten instrument in and of itself may mi 
summary judgment inappropriate." 10 1 
determine that to be the case here. 
[7] Further, Anderson makes bare c 
tentions and conclusions in his affida 
unsupported by any facts, such as tl 
Alton Frisbee is the agent of Frisbee 
vestment Co. and can thus bind the com 
ny. Conclusions alone are not enough 
support summanr judgment. Anders 
also claims that the investment companj 
the seller of the property in question in t 
case. As far as we can determine, Frist 
Investment Co., if it exists at all, is no1 
party to this suit. Further, the conclus; 
that Frisbee is its agent is just that-
conclusion supported by no facts. B< 
contentions, unsupported by any facts, 
not resolve genuine issues of fact crucial 
resolution of the case. Alton Frisbee's 
leged agency to act for his parents, L 
and David Frisbee, is a genuine issue 
fact upon which much of the outcome 
this case depends. His alleged agency i 
a company named as the seller of the pr< 
erty at suit, which company is not a pai 
8. See Franklin, supra n. 4. 
9. Utah. 635 P.2d 53 (1981). 
10. Id. at 55. 
7. Id. at 586. 
Cite as 676 P.2d 391 
to the suit, raises genuine material qu£S- n| 
tions. Therefore, summary judgment was 
not appropriate in this case. 
The summary judgment is therefore re-
versed, and the case is remanded for tri&h 
STEWART, OAKS, 
HAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWr and DUR-
( O |KEYMfHEfRSYST?T> 
Ronald P. JENKINS, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Ronald L. BAILEY, Defendant, Third-
Party Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
ZION REALTY, Dixie Realtors, and 
David Limbacher, Third-Party Defend-
ants, Counter-Claimants and Respon-
dents, 
v. 
Mike EAGER and Ronald P. Jenkins, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
No. 18536. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 12, 19S4. 
Original service station owner brought 
action against vendor after he was unable 
to return signposts. Vendor admitted lia-
bility and joined as third-party defendants 
broker and purchaser, who counterclaimed 
for conversion of cross-beam and sign pan-
el. The Fifth District Court, Washington 
County, J. Harlan Burns, J., granted judg-
ment to original owner and also granted 
judgment to vendor against third-party de-
fendants but refused to award attorney 
fees, and granted judgment to third-party 
defendants on counterclaim and awarded 
them attorney fees, and vendor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: 
(1) vendor was entitled to award of attor-
uuui jyi 
(Uah 1984) 
ey fees under earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase, which provided for attor-
ney fees, and (2) fees awarded against ven-
dor should be reduced to conform to the 
evidence. 
Remanded with directions. 
l.| Costs 0 1 7 2 
It was not proper to award attorney 
febs for services on counterclaim for con-
version of sign panel by vendor and then to 
retuse to award vendor any fees for 
services on his breach of contract claim, 
and thus vendor was entitled to reasonable 
aukrd of attorney fees against purchaser 
anp broker, who together with vendor exe-
cuted earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchaser in which they expressly agreed 
to pay all expenses of enforcing agree-
ment, including reasonable attorney fee. 
2. Costs O207 
While amount of award of attorney 
feds rests within sound discretion of the 
tri^l court, amount must nonetheless, ju*t 
as any other judicial determination, be sup-
ported by the evidence. 
3. Costs <s>207 
Even allowing that estimate made by 
attorney for broker and purchaser was a 
''very* conservative" one, nothing supported 
substantial deviation from attorne\ 's testi-
mony as to $178 value of his services, and 
thus award of $600, or over three times 
amount supported by the evidence, in con-
nection with purchaser and broker's coun-
terclaim against original vendor constituted 
an abuse of discretion. 
4. Costs <s=*252 
Vendor, who was entitled to reasona-
ble attorney fee against purchaser and bro-
ker) based on earnest money receipt and 
offelr to purchase in which they expressly 
agreed t(f pay all expenses of enforcing 
agreement, including reasonable attorney 
fee, was also entitled to reasonable fee for 
bringing appeal. 
GRAFF v. BOISE 
Cite as. 660 P.2d 
, e n the warrant is issued. § 77-23-4(1). 
* ,'i the earlier Code and the current provi-
k
 * contain an express direction that a 
/^mal departure from the prescribed proce-
1 »Ve shall not render a pleading or proceed-
V* invalid unless it shall have actually 
^judiced the defendant in respect to a 
fktantial right. U.G.A., 1953, § 77-53-2 
Repealed 1980);. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23-12 
,nacted 19S2).6 We therefore decline to 
4.,n]v the 3-2 Jasso decision to the facts of 
• ••
;
* case, and reject the argument that the 
I
 no warrant was invalid because it was not 
tv.>ed on a signed writing. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., 
and CALVIN GOULD, District Judge, con-
cur. 
DURHAM, J., having disqualified herself, 
does not participate herein; GOULD, Dis-
trict Judge, sat. 
Kelly GRAFF and Keri Graff, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 18062. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 9, 1983. 
In action by equitable owners of prop-
erty to invalidate mechanic's lien claimed 
against the property, the Fourth District 
6. In addition, the record shows that apart from 
the contested oral deposition of the oificer the 
t'no warrant was also based on a written affi-
davit the officer signed before the magistrate. 
That affidavit is not in the record. Since we 
CASCADE CORP. Utah 721 
721 (Utah 1983) 
Court, Utah County, David Sam, J., granted 
summary judgment against owners, and 
they appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that notice of claim of mechanic's 
lien was invalid where the notice failed to 
designate persons to whom the materials 
were furnished and where notice lacked 
proper verification due to absence of a 
name appearing to identify the person veri-
fying the claim and absence of signature of 
person who purportedly swore under oath 
as to veracity of the claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Mechanics' Liens &=> 157(1) 
Doctrine of substantial compliance with 
statutory requirements for giving notice of 
claim of mechanic's lien has validity and has 
application in an appropriate case. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-7. 
2. Mechanics' Liens <s=>135, 154(2) 
Notice of claim of mechanic's lien was 
invalid where the notice failed to designate 
person to whom the materials were fur-
nished and where notice lacked proper veri-
fication due to absence of a name appearing 
to identify the person verifying the claim 
and absence of signature of the person who 
purportedly swore under oath as to veracity 
of the claim. U.C.A.1953, 38-1-7. 
Earl D. Tanner, Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs and appellant. 
Robert D. Maack, Vincent C. Rampton, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and re-
spondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs brought this action for the pur-
pose of invalidating a mechanic's lien 
claimed against their property. Both sides 
moved for summary judgment and the trial 
court ruled in favor of defendant, conclud-
ing that the notice of intention to claim a 
assume regularity in the absence of record evi-
dence to the contrary, State v. Jones, (1982), 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1263 p. 1267, we are entitled 
to assume that the affidavit provided an inde-
pendently sufficient basis for the warrant. 
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Hen which was recorded by defendant was 
in substantial compliance with statutory re-
quirements. 
The facts are not in dispute. At the time 
defendant filed the notice of lien, Roncor, 
Inc., was the record owner of the property. 
However, plaintiffs were the equitable 
owners as evidenced by an agreement that 
was subsequently made of record in the 
office of the Utah County Recorder. 
The notice of lien reflects that the mate-
rials were requested by and furnished to 
defendant Boise Cascade Corporation. 
However, that is patently erroneous. 
The signature block on the notice of lien 
reflects that it was signed by one Berk 
Buttars, as agent of Boise Cascade Corpora-
tion. The verification block which follows 
contains a line for insertion of the name of 
the person to be sworn, followed by a line 
for the signature of the person sworn. 
However, both of these lines were left 
blank. Those portions of the notice appear 
as follows: 
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION. 
Bv /s / Berl Buttars 
Agent 
State of Utah County of Utah 
Being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and 
says: that he is an agent of BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION, a corporation, the claimant 
herein and makes this verification for and on its 
behalf; that he has read the foregoing notice and 
claim of hen and knows the contents thereof and 
believes the same to be true and just. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th 
day of November . 1979. 
/s/ Michael H Spokman 
Notary Public 
Residing at Orem, Utah 
My Commission expires 3-21-83 
Plaintiffs' sole contention on appeal is 
that the notice of lien is invalid as a matter 
1. Chase v. Dawson, 117 Utah 295, 215 P.2d 390 
(1950). 
2. Utah, 631 P.2d 919 (1981) 
of law inasmuch as it does not set! forth tV 
name of the person that requested the ma 
tenals and because it was not properly veH 
fied Defendant's rejoinder is that the 
omissions on the face of the ikotice are 
simply inconsequential shortcomings and 
that the trial court appropriately app];C(j 
the doctrine of substantial compliance in 
ruling in its favor. 
[1] The doctrine of substantial comph. 
ance has validity and it has application in 
an appropriate case.1 However, the partic-
ular facts of this case preclude its applica-
tion. 
[2] UC.A., 1953, §38-1-7 specifically 
requires, inter alia, that the notic^ of inten-
tion to claim a lien contain the name of the 
person to whom the material was [furnished, 
and that the claim be verified under oath. 
In the recent case of First Security Mort-
gage O. v. Hansen,2 we construbd the re-
quirement of verification as set forth in the 
foregoing statute and concluded that the 
lack of verification is not a hyperjtechnicali-
ty that the Court is free to discount, but 
that verification is a mandatory condition 
precedent to the very creation knd exist-
ence of a lien 3 
Defendant makes an effort to distinguish 
Hansen by contending that in that case the 
only fact sworn to was the identity and 
authority of the person signing the notice 
of claim, whereas in the instant case the 
verification was complete except for the 
fact that the lien claimant's signature ap-
pears on the wrong line. We &re not so 
persuaded. 
In order to adopt defendant's contention, 
it must be assumed that the name and the 
signature of Berk Buttars were ijitended to 
be affixed on the blank line prbvided for 
verification of the notice of clairn. We are 
not free to make those assumptions. 
In the absence of a name appearing to 
identify the person verifying the claim, and 
3. HA.M.S Co v. Electrical Contractors of 
Alaska, Inc, Alaska, 563 P.2d 258 (1977). 
v f r,vber absenc* 
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STEWART, OAKS, 
HAM, JJ., concur. 
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v. 
Val MONTOYA, e1 
and App 
Nos. 17671 
Supreme Cou 
March 11 
Action was institi 
kjredly sustained by pi 
tlcn with defendants. 
c
°urt, Salt Lake Coun 
Son> J., entered judgm* 
,n£ damages against 
directed a verdict in U 
CRUZ v. MONTOYA 
Cite as, 660 P 2d 723 (Utah 1983) 
Utah 723 
the further absence of the signature of 
!. person who purportedly swore undo* 
*h a* to the veracity of the claim, we 
.elude as we did in Hansen, supra, that 
r e notice of claim of hen clearly lacked 
M.nfication and that the statutory require-
ments have not been substantially complied 
* th Having so concluded, we need not 
address whether the failure to designate in 
p e notice of hen the person to whom the 
r aerials were furnished constitutes sub-
stantial compliance. Suffice it to say that 
$ueh failure, when coupled with a lack of 
verification, renders the notice of lien inval-
i< 
Re\ersed and remanded for the purpose 
o* entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs, 
t ->gether w ith costs. 
STEWART, OAKS, 
HAM, JJ., concur. 
HOWE and DUR-
ant, and appeaK were taken. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, J , held that: (1) award of 
$9,000 in general damages in favor of plain-
tiff was not a product of passion, prejudice 
or corruption by jury and, hence, was not 
excessive, but awrard of $12,000 in punitive 
damages was excessive under evidence and 
w as subject to being reduced to $6,000, and 
(2) a question for jury was presented as to 
whether second defendant participated in 
altercation which resulted in injuries to 
plaintiff which were subject of action and, 
hence, trial court committed error in direct-
ing verdict as to that defendant, but since 
jury was allowed to consider all of the 
evidence concerning the defendant, there 
was no necessity for a new trial, and it was 
only necessary to set aside the directed ver-
dict and to remand case with instructions to 
enter a judgment on the verdict against the 
second defendant. 
Modified and affirmed in part, and set 
aside and remanded writh instructions in 
part. 
Santos CRUZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Val MONTOYA, Mike Montoya, et a!., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Santos CRUZ, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Val MONTOYA, et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
Nos. 17670, 17646. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 15, 1983. 
Action was instituted for injuries al-
legedly sustained by plaintiff in an alterca-
tion with defendants. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
s
°n, J., entered judgment on verdict award-
lng damages against one defendant, but 
Greeted a verdict in favor of other defend-
1. Damages <s=>95 
There is no set formula to compute 
amount of damages where personal injuries 
involve a loss of employment, personal in-
convenience, and pain and suffering. 
2. Appeal and Error <@=*1004.1(4) 
A reviewing court will defer to the 
damage verdict of a jury unless it is so 
excessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science and to clearly indicate passion, prej-
udice or corruption on the part of the jury. 
3. Assault and Battery <s=>40 
Award of $9,000 in general damages to 
individual wTho, in the result of altercation 
which was subject of suit, underwent the 
pain and suffering of a bruised and bat-
tered body and head as well as puffed and 
bleeding lips and loss of a patch of hair 
from his scalp wras not a result of passion, 
prejudice or corruption by jury and was not 
excessive. 
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Jolene STAHL, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a public 
agency, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16419. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 12, 19S0. 
Motorist brought action against public 
transit authority to recover damages sus-
tained in automobile accident involving a 
bus owned by the authority and driven by 
one of its employees. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Dur-
ham, J., entered judgment of default due to 
plaintiff's failure to comply with statutory 
notice provision, and plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
motorist substantially complied with the 
statute by furnishing signed accident report 
and medical release to defendant's insur-
ance adjuster, who acted as defendant's 
agent. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Statutes <s=>223.1 
Statutory provision must be construed 
so as to make it harmonious with other 
statutes relevant to the subject matter. 
2. Statutes c=>227 
Generally, a direction in a statute to do 
an act is considered "mandatory" when con-
sequences are attached to the failure to act; 
conversely, when a statute requires an ac-
tion to be taken without prescribing a pen-
alty for failure to so act, the requirement is 
not often deemed mandatory. 
3. Statutes <e=*184 
A statute is to be construed in light of 
its intended purpose. 
4. Automobiles *=»230 
Motorist, who was involved in automo-
bile accident allegedly caused by bus owned 
by public transit authority, substantially 
complied with statutory notice provision by 
supplying signed accident form and medical 
release to authority's insurance adjuster 
who was authorized by law to handle ap-
proval or denial of victim's claim and thus 
acted as agent of the authority. U.C.A. 
1953, 11-20-56. 
Wendall E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Rex J. Hanson, David H. Epperson, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
On September 9,1976, in Salt ^ake City a 
bus owned by the Utah Transit Authority 
("UTA") and driven by a UTA emplo/ee 
collided with the rear end of an automobile 
which in turn collided head-qn with an 
automobile driven by the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff was taken to the Valley West Hos-
pital for examination. Upon returning to 
work that same day plaintiff was contacted 
by Thomas Vance, an insurance adjuster for 
Brown Brothers Insurance, wfiich repre-
sents UTA's insurer, Transit Casualty. He 
obtained a statement from heri concerning 
the accident and wrote a two-page report 
based on her answers to his inquiries. 
Vance also had plaintiff sign a statement 
and a medical information release allowing 
her personal physician to discldse informa-
tion to him. 
On December 28, 1976, after 3Vz months 
had elapsed with no action by the insurance 
company or UTA, plaintiff retained counsel. 
The following day counsel ser^ t a written 
notice of claim to the Utah Transit Authori-
ty and to the Utah Attorney General. Suit 
was filed in district court July 14, 1977. 
On motion the case was dismissed with-
out prejudice. Plaintiff thein filed an 
amended complaint, along with depositions 
of herself and the insurance adjuster, 
Vance. UTA moved for summary judg-
ment for failure to comply with § 11-20-56 
U.C.A., as amended, a part pf the Utah 
Public Transit District Act. That section 
provides: 
Claims against district-Recjuirements.-
Every claim against the district for 
STAHL v. UTAH TR 
Cite as, Utah, 
death, injury or damage alleged to have 
been caused b} the negligent act or omis-
sion of the district shall be presented to 
the board of directors in writing within 
thirty days after the death, injury, or 
damage, signed and verified by the claim-
ant or his duly authorized agent, stating 
the time and place where the injury or 
damage occurred and a general statement 
of the cause and circumstances of the 
death, injury or damages. No action un-
der this section shall be commenced until 
sixty days after presentation, or unless 
the board of directors shall sooner deny 
claim. [Emphasis added.] 
On the basis of that statute a judgment 
of dismissal was entered, and this appeal 
ensued. For the purpose of this appeal we 
state the facts developed in discovery in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that the provision 
above cited was not intended to be a statute 
of limitations and that § 63-30-12 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act provides the 
relevant statute of limitation in this case. 
Plaintiff also contends that UTA is es-
topped from relying on § 11-20-56 as a 
result of the actions of the insurance adjus-
tor. 
[1] Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 
Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), held that 
it is for the judiciary to assume that each 
term of a statute was advisedly adopted by 
the Legislature. It is also our duty to con-
strue a statutory provision so as to make it 
harmonious with other statutes relevant to 
the subject matter. The language in the 
Utah Public Transit District Act stands in 
direct contrast to the general notice of 
claim provision found in the Governmental 
Immunity Act enacted in 1965, four years 
prior to the Public Transit Act. The Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act makes clear that a 
failure to comply with the notice provision 
results in a bar to prosecution of the action. 
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended, provides that: 
Claim against state or agency-Notice 
to attorney general and agency-Time for 
fihng.-A claim against the state or any 
agency thereof as defined herein shall be 
ANSIT AUTHORITY Utah 481 
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fore\er barred unless notice thereof is 
filed with the attorney general of the 
state of Utah and the agency concerned 
within one year after the cause of action 
arises. [Emphasis added ] 
Section 63-30-13 includes the same man-
datory language in prescribing the penalty 
for noncompliance with the notice require-
ment regarding claims against political sub-
divisions. 
[2] We are guided in construing the lan-
guage of the instant statute by the princi-
ple that generally a direction in a statute to 
do an act is considered "mandatory" when 
consequences are attached to the failure to 
act. Conversely, when a statute requires 
an action to be taken without prescribing a 
penalty for failure to so act, the require-
ment is not often deemed mandatory. 
Whitley v. Superior Ct, 18 Cal.2d 75, 113 
P2d 449 (1941). See Barton v. Atkinson, 
228 Ga. 733, 187 S.E.2d 835 (1972); Paul v. 
City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381, 511 P.2d 
244 (1973), State ex rel Ferro v. Oeller-
mann, Mo., 458 S.W.2d 583 (1970); Dunker 
v. Brown County Bd. of Ed., 80 S.D. 193, 
121 N.W.2d 10 (1963), Chisholm v. Bewley 
Mills, 155 Tex. 400, 287 SW.2d 943 (1956); 
State e,\ rel. Werlein v. Elamore, 33 Wis.2d 
288, 147 N.W.2d 252 (1967). 
Further assistance in this case is provided 
by viewing the pertinent language in light 
of our Legislature's choice of language con-
struction in similar provisions. The differ-
ence thus uncovered signifies a purposeful 
selection and indicates the intended mean-
ing. See Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah 
450, 85 P.2d 831 (1939); Canada Dry Bot-
tling Co. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 619, 
223 P.2d 586 (1950); Ballou v. Kemp, 92 
F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Commonwealth v. 
Reick Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 213 
A.2d 277 (1965). 
The express bar against maintaining an 
action for noncompliance with the notice 
provision in the Governmental Immunity 
Act, when compared with the Utah Public 
Transit District Act, which contains no such 
language, indicates an intent on the part of 
the Legislature not to impose a bar for 
6/8 P2d—U 
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noncompliance with the notice provision of 
the latter act. It is not for the Court to 
read into the statute an intention to estab-
lish a statute of limitations which is not 
expressly stated in the statute. 
The cases cited by defendant which hold 
a statutory notice requirement mandatory 
and a bar to filing an action without strict 
compliance with the time limitation involve 
statutory language which unequivocally 
designates a legislathe intent to have the 
failure to comply stand as a bar to further 
action. These cases therefore are not con-
trolling in the instant case. See Crowder v. 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 552 P.2d 646 
(1976); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 
2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Peterson v. 
Salt Lake City, 118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 591 
(1950). 
Moreover, there was substantial compli-
ance with the 30-day notice provision and 
defendant was in no way prejudiced by 
plaintiffs failure to comply with the for-
mality of filing a claim. 
[3] A statute is, of course, to be con-
strued in light of its intended purpose. 
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah, 538 
P.2d 184 (1975). It is necessary to consider 
the policy of the notice requirement so that 
in any particular case the facts can be eval-
uated to determine if the intent of the 
statute has been accomplished by substan-
tial compliance with the statutory directive. 
Smith v. State, Ala., 364 So.2d 1 (1978). 
This Court has previously stated that the 
primary purpose of a notice of claim re-
quirement is to afford the responsible pub-
lic authorities an opportunity to pursue a 
proper and timely investigation of the mer-
its of a claim and to arrive at a timely 
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding 
the expenditure of public revenue for costly 
and unnecessary litigation. Sears v. South-
worth, Utah, 563 P.2d 192 (1977); Ga//egos 
v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 
1335 (1972). 
We view plaintiff's contention that the 
notice given to the insurance adjuster in 
this case constituted compliance with the 
statute in light of these policy considera-
tions. First, we note that § 63-30-14 of 
the Governmental Immunity ^ct equates 
the authority of the insurance cjarrier with 
that of the governmental entity [concerning 
the notice to claimant of the Approval or 
denial of a claim for injury. Thus the 
insurance agent is authorized by law to 
handle the approval or denial of plaintiff's 
claim, representing the interests of the 
government. Rice v. Granite School Dis-
trict, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). 
Further, Vance testified in this case that all 
claims against UTA are handled directly by 
his office and specifically by himself. The 
record also reveals that UTA informed 
Vance of the accident shortly after its oc-
currence. He immediately contacted plain-
tiff on the same day as the accident, obtain-
ed a signed statement of her version of the 
incident, and received a medical release 
form from her. In light of tpese facts, 
Vance's actions in obtaining a signed state-
ment of plaintiffs version of the accident 
were for all practical purposes the acts of 
UTA. 
[4] Clearly there was substantial com-
pliance with the notice provision. No un-
due hardship resulted from the njotice being 
given to an agent of the party named in the 
statute. Considering the duties delegated 
to the insurance agent, it appears that the 
person entrusted with the investigation and 
settlement procedures received tne requisite 
information in a timely fashion and within 
the time constraints imposed by the statute. 
Furthermore, conceding there is some valid-
ity to the necessity of having a notice in 
writing to guard against the unreliability of 
memory, the information given was com-
mitted to writing in a two-page report and 
signed by plaintiff, thus recording plain-
tiff's account of the accident. 
A case closely in point with the case at 
bar is Badger v. Upper Darby 
348 Pa. 551, 36 A.2d 507 (1944). 
counsel, within the prescribed period, gave 
written notice to the insurance carrier for 
the defendant township rather than the 
clerk or secretary of such municipality, as 
required by statute. The court, in allowing 
plaintiff to maintain an action for damages, 
declared: 
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In determining, in its discretion, whether 
a failure to file the notice prescribed by 
the act should be excused, a weighty cir-
c jnistance to be considered by the court 
JN whether or not the municipality has 
sjffered any undue hardship. Here there 
!> nothing to indicate that it did so suffer. 
Of controlling importance is the fact that 
v ithin the prescribed period the insur-
ance company was notified that claim 
uas being made, was furnished with the 
essential facts in regard to the accident, 
and, by designating a physician to exam-
ine plaintiff, apparently admitted its re-
sponsibility to investigate the claim. If, 
as uou/d appear, the insurance company 
is the real party in interest, a decision 
denying plaintiff the right to prosecute 
her claim because of failure to give writ-
ten notice to the township would be one 
of sheer literalism, for, had such notice 
been given, the township wculd undoubt-
edly, in due course, have turned it oxer to 
the company to which plaintiffs counsel 
had sent it m the first instance. It is not 
unusual for lawyers representing claim-
ants in accident cases to communicate 
with insurance companies directly rather 
than with defendants, since the former 
control the negotiations for settlement 
and prepare the defense in case of litiga-
tion. [Emphasis added] [36 A.2d at 
508-09 ] 
The instant case is clearly distinguishable 
from Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407, 
173 P. 702 (1918). In that case a notice was 
presented to a party other than the recipi-
ent prescribed by statute. The Court conse-
quently found the notice to be inadequate. 
The Court in Moran specifically found that 
the board to whom notice had been gi\en 
lacked authority to consider or settle dam-
age claims against the city for any acts of 
negligence. In the instant case, as pointed 
above, the insurance carrier through its 
agent has specific authority to consider and 
settle damage claims. 
The cases cited by defendant in support 
of the contention that notice to the insur-
ance agent does not comply with the notice 
requirement are distinguishable from the 
instant case. In those cases, the applicable 
statutes contained words of absolute prohi-
bition as a consequence of noncompliance, 
thus suggesting a stricter standard of ad-
herence Sears \. Southworth, Utah, 563 
P.2d 192 (1977); Scarborough v. Granite 
School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 4^0 (1975), 
Yaroz \. Sever, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 
435 (1973); Roo^endaal Construction and 
Mining Corp. \ Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 
503 P.2d 446 (1972) Furthermore, it should 
be noted in the instant case that plaintiff 
met the strict requirements placed on the 
cause of action by (1) the statute of limita-
tion found in § 63-30-12 of the Go\ernmen-
tal Immunity Act and (2) the prohibition 
against any action being brought until sixty 
da}s after presentation of notice found in 
§ 11-20-56 of the Utah Public Transit Dis-
trict Act. 
Other courts have also construed similar 
statutory notice requirements to hold that 
substantial compliance meets the statutory 
requirements e\en in the face of mandatory 
language. Ra) v. City of Council Bluffs, 
193 Iowa 620, 187 N.W* 447 (1922); Brichell 
\. Kansas City, 364 Mo. 679, 265 S.W.2d 342 
(1954), Peterson v. Kansas City, 324 Mo 
454, 23 S W.2d 1045 (1930); Shaw v. City of 
New York, 83 A D. 212, 82 N.Y S. 44 (1903). 
In sum, the purpose of the notice require-
ment was satisfied. 
Plaintiffs second contention is that UTA 
is estopped from relying on the notice of 
claim requirement in light of the insurance 
adjuster's conduct. Whether the facts in 
this case support an estoppel or waiver the-
ory need not be decided in light of the 
foregoing. 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a 
trial on the merits. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAU-
GHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
any public building, structure or improvement. 19S3 
3S-1-2. "Contractors* and "subcontractors" 
defined. 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by 
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as in 
this chapter provided, shall be deemed an original 
contractor, and al! other persons doing work or 
furnishing materials shall be deemed subcontractors. 
1953 
3S-1 3. Those entitled to lien - What may be 
at icbed • Lien on ores mined. 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons per-
forming any services or furnishing or renting any 
materials or equipment used in the construction, 
alteration, or improvement of any building or stru-
cture or improvement to any premises in any 
manner; all persons who shall do work or furnish 
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matcHals for the prospecting, development, preser-
vation or working of any mining claim, mine, 
quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and licensed 
architects and engineers and artisans who have fur-
nished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, 
drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superinten-
dence, or who have rendered other like professional 
service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien upon 
the property upon or concerning which they have 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished or 
rented materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other 
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor 
or otherwise. Such hens shall attach only to such 
interest as the owner may have iri the property, but 
the interest of a lessee of a mining claim, mine or 
deposit, whether working under bond or otherwise, 
shall for the purposes of this chapter include prod-
ucts mined and excavated while the same remain 
upon the premises included within the lease. mi 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected - Lots a&i 
subdivisions - Mines - Franchises, fixtures and 
appurtenances. 
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to 
and cover so much of the land whereon such buil-
ding* structure or improvement shall be made as 
may be necessary for the convenient use and occu-
pation thereo\ and in case any such building shall 
occupy two or more lots or other subdivision of 
land< such lots or subdivisions shall be deemed one 
for the purposes of this chapter; and when two or 
more mining claims, mines or valuable deposits, 
whether owned by the same person or not, shall, 
with the consent of all, be worked through a 
common shaft, tunnel, incline, drift or other exca-
vation, then all the mining claims, mines or valuable 
deposits so worked shall for the purposes of this 
chapiter be deemed one; and the liens in this chapter 
provided for shall attach to all franchises, privileges, 
appurtenances, and to aU machinery and fixtures, 
pertaining to or used in connection with any such 
lands, buildings, structures or improvements, mining 
clainiis, mines or valuable deposits. 1953 
38-1*5. Priority - Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and jtake effect as of, the time of the commi nce-
ment to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement, and shall have 
priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbr-
ance which may have attached subsequently to the 
time when the building, improvement or structure 
was commenced, *ork begun, or first material fur-
nished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage 
or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had 
no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the 
building, structure or improvement was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the 
groujnd. i*$3 
38-lj4>. Priority over claims of creditors of 
original contractor or subcontractor. 
No attachment, garnishment or levy under an 
execution upon any money due to an original cont-
ractor from the owner of any property subject to 
lien 'under this chapter shall be valid as against any 
lien pf a subcontractor or materialman, and no such 
attachment, garnishment or levy upon any money 
due i to a subcontractor or materialman from the 
contractor shall be valid as against any Irn of a 
laborer employed by the day c piece. m3 
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38-1-7. Notice of claim - Contents - Recording 
- Service on owner of property. 
(1) Every original contractor within 100 days after 
the completion of his contract, and except as prov-
ided in this section, every person other than the 
original contractor who claims the benefit of this 
chapter within 80 days after furnishing the last 
material or performing the last labor for or on any 
land, building, improvement, or structure, or for 
any alteration, addition to, repair of, performance 
of any labor in, or furnishing any materials for, any 
mine or mining claim, shall file for record with the 
county recorder of the county in which the property, 
or some part of the property, is situated, a written 
notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if 
known or, if not known, the name of the record 
owner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he 
was employed or to whom he furnished the mate-
rial; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor 
was performed, or the first and last material was 
furnished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient 
for identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
author ized agent , and the date signed. 
(3) Wi th in 30 days after filing the notice of lien, 
the lien c la imant shall deliver or m a i l ' b y certified 
mail t o either the reputed owner or record owner of 
the real p roper ty a copy of the notice of lien. If the 
record owner ' s current address is not readily avail-
able , the copy of the claim m a y be mailed to the last 
known address of the record owner , using the names 
and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
p roper ty assessment rolls of the county where the 
affected proper ty is located. Failure t o deliver or 
mail the not ice of lien t o the reputed owner or 
record owner precludes the lien claimant from an 
award of costs and a t torneys ' fees against the 
reputed owner or record owner in an act ion t o 
enforce the lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furni-
shes labor or material as stated in Subsections (1) 
through (3) at the request of an original contractor, 
then the final date for the filing of a notice of int-
ention to hold and claim a lien for a subcontractor 
or a person furnishing labor or material at the 
request of an original contractor is 80 days after 
completion of the original contract of the original 
contractor. ins 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in 
one claim. 
Liens against two or more buildings, mining 
claims or other improvements owned by the same 
person or persons may be included in one claim; but 
in such case the person filing the claim must desig-
nate therein the amount claimed to be due to him 
on each of such buildings, mining claims or other 
improvements. 1V53 
38-1-9. Not ice imparted by record . 
The recorder must record the claim in a b o o k 
kept by h i m for that purpose , and from the t ime of 
the filing thereof for record all persons shall be 
deemed to have notice thereof. 1953 
38-1-10. L a b o r e r s ' and mater ia lmen ' s lien on 
equal foot ing regardless of time of filing. 
The liens for work and labor done or material 
~ 38-1-17. 
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon 
an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the 
notice and claim of lien and regardless of the t ime 
of performing such work a n d labor or furnishing 
such mater ia l . 19^3 
38-1-11. Enforcement - T ime for - Lis pendens 
- Act ion for debt not affected. 
Act ions to enforce the liens herein provided for 
mus t be begun within twelve mon ths after the 
comple t ion of the original cont rac t , or the suspen-
sion of work thereunder for a period of thirty day^. 
Within the twelve m o n t h s herein ment ioned the lien 
c la imant shall file for record with the county reco-
rder of each county in which the lien is recorded a 
notice of the pendency of the ac t ion , in the manner 
provided in act ions affecting the title or right to 
possession of real proper ty , or the hen shall be void, 
except as to persons who have been made parties to 
the action and persons having actual knowledge of 
the commencement of the ac t ion , and the burden of 
p roof shall be upon the lien c la imant and those 
claiming under him to show such actual knowledge. 
Noth ing herein contained shall be construed t o 
impair or affect the right of any person to whom a 
debt may be due for any work done or materials 
furnished to mainta in a personal action to recover 
the same. iw3 
38-1-12. Repealed. im 
38-1-13. Parties - Joinder - Intervention. 
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other 
may join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions aje 
commenced the court may consolidate them and 
make all persons having claims filed parties to the 
action. Those claiming liens who fail or refuse to 
beccne parties plaintiff may be made parties defe-
nda: ., and any one not made a party may at any 
time before the final hearing intervene. 1953 
38-1-14. Decree - Order of sat isfaction. 
In every case in which liens are claimed against 
t h e same proper ty the decree shall provide for their 
satisfaction in the following order : 
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or mecha-
nics working by the day or piece, but without fur-
nishing materials therefor; 
(2) All other subcontractors and all materia-
lmen; 
(3) The original contract or s. 1953 
38-1-15. Sale - Redempt ion - Disposit ion of 
proceeds . 
T h e court shall cause the proper ty t o be sold in 
satisfaction of the liens and costs as in tK* case of 
foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the saui? right 
of redempt ion . If the proceeds of sale after the 
payment of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy 
the whole amoun t of liens included in the decree, 
then such proceeds shall be paid in the ordei above 
designated, and p ro rata to the persons claiming in 
each class where the sum reaLzed is insufficient to 
pay the persons of such class in full. An> excess 
shall be paid to the owner. 1953 
38-1-16. Deficiency judgment . 
Every' person whose claim is not satisfied as 
herein provided may have judgment docketed for 
the balai ce unpaid , and execution therefor against 
the part> personally liable. 1953 
38-1-17. Cos ts - Appor t ionment - Cos ts and 
attorneys' fee to subcontractor. 
As between the owner and the contractor the 
court shall apportion the costs according to the right 
of the case, but in all cases each subcontractor 
exhibiting a lien shall have his costs awarded to him, 
Code •Co 
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including the costs of preparing and recording the 
notice of claim of lien and such reasonable atto-
rney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and 
recording said notice of claim of lien. IMI 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any lien under 
this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by 
the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. m i 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor -
Subcontractor's hen not affected. 
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun 
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled 
to a lien no payment to the original contractor shall 
impair or defeat such lien; and no alteration of any 
contract shall affect any lien acquired under the 
provisions of this chapter. 1953 
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash 
- Notice. 
A s to all liens, except that of the contractor, the 
whole contract price shall be payable in money, 
except as herein provided, and shall not be dimini-
shed by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset 
or counterclaim in favor of the owner and against 
the contractor, except when the owner has contra-
cted to pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the 
owner shall post in a conspicuous place on the pre-
mises a statement of the terms and conditions of the 
contract before materials are furnished or labor is 
performed, which notice must be kept posted, and 
when so posted shall give notice to all parties inter-
ested of the terms and conditions of the contract. 
Any person willfully tearing down or defacing such 
notice is guilty of a misdemeanor. 1953 
38-1-21. Advance payments - Effect on 
subcontractor's lien. 
N o payment made prior to the time when the 
same is due under the terms and conditions of the 
contract shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, 
diminishing or discharging any lien in favor of any 
person except the contractor; but as to any such lien 
such payment shall be deemed as if not made, not-
withstanding that the contractor to whom it was 
paid may thereafter abandon his contract or be or 
become indebted to the owner for damages for 
nonperformance of his contract or otherwise. 1953 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of 
contract - Effect on liens. 
The subcontractors' liens provided for in this 
chapter shall extend to the full contract price, but if 
at the time of the commencement to do work or 
furnish materials the owner has paid upon the con-
tract, in accordance with the terms thereof, any 
portion of the contract price, either in money or 
property, the lien of the contractor shall extend only 
to such unpaid balance, and the lien of any subco-
ntractor who has notice o f such payment shall be 
limited to the unpaid balance of the contract price. 
N o part of the contract price shall by the terms of 
any contract be made payable, nor shall the same or 
any part thereof be paid in advance of the comme-
ncement of the work, for the purpose of evading or 
defeating the provisions of this chapter. 1953 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials 
furnished, except for purchase price. 
Whenever materials have been furnished for use 
in the construction, alteration or repair of any bui-
Idinr, work or other improvement mentioned in 
section 38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject 
to attachment, execution or other legal process to 
enforce any debt due by the purchaser of such 
materials, other than a debt due for the purchase 
money thereof, so long as in good faith the same 
are about to be applied to the construction, altera-
tion or repair of such building or improvement. 1953 
38-1-24. Cancellation of record - Penalty. 
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, 
on the payment of the amount thereof together with 
the costsj incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall 
at the request of any person interested in the prop-
erty charged therewith cause said lien to be canceled 
of rccorjd within ten days from the request, and 
upon fajlure to so cancel his lien within the time 
aforcsaicj shall forfeit and pay to the person making 
the request the sum of $20 per day unii! the same 
shall be canceled, to be recovered in the same 
manner as other debts. 1953 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right - Penalty. 
Any person who knowingly causes tc be filed for 
record a claim of lien against any property, which 
contains 1 a greater demand than the sum due him, 
with the J intent to cloud the title, or to exact from 
the owne|r or person liable by means of such exces-
sive clairn of lien more than is due him, or to 
procure ^ny advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. 1953 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
All lierps under this chapter shall be assignable as 
other choses in action, and the assignee may com-
mence and prosecute actions thereon in his own 
n a m e i n t n e manner herein provided. 1953 
Chapter 2. Miscellaneous Liens 
38-2-1. Uejn 00 livestock - For feed and care. 
3S-2-2. Litns of hotels and boardinghouse keepers. 
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal propert) - Lien 
subject to rights of secured parties. 
38-2-3.1. Special lien on personal property for services 
rendered) - General lien of dry cleaning establishments, 
laundries, and shoe repair shops. 
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property. 
38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder - Procedure. 
38-2-5. Actjion for deficiency. 
38-2-1. l i e n on livestock For feed and care. 
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of caule, 
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any 
domestic ^nimals shall be entrusted for the purpose 
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien 
upon sucrj animals for the amount that may be due 
him for sjuch feeding, herding or pasturing, and is 
?uthorizec^ to retain possession of such animals until 
such amoijint is paid. 1953 
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse 
keepers. 
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse or 
lodginghouse keeper'shall have a lien on the baggage 
and other! property in and about such inn belonging 
to or und^r control of his guests or boarders for the 
proper charges due him for their accommodation, 
board and lodging, for money paid for or advanced 
to them, And for such other extras as are furnished 
at their rejquest. The innkeeper, hotel keeper, boar-
dinghousej or lodginghouse keeper may detain such 
baggage and other property until the amount of 
such charge is paid, and the baggage and other 
property shall not be exempt from attachment or 
execution until the hotel or boardinghouse keeper's 
lien and the costs of enforcing it are satisfied. 1953 
38-2-3. Repairman's lieo on personal property -
Lien subject to rights of secured parties. 
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_ , r~.-w.. "«•« a*j«"i maice, alter or repair, or 
bestow labor upon, any articie of personal property 
at the request of the owner or other person entitled 
t o possession thereof shall have a hen upon such 
article for the reasonable value o f the labor perfo-
rmed and materials furnished and used in making 
such article or in altering or repairing the same, and 
may retain possession thereof until the amo int so 
due is paid; provided such hen and right to posses-
sion shall be subject and subordinate to the rights 
and interests of any secured parties in such personal 
property unless such secured party has requested 
such person to make, alter or repair or bestow labor 
upon such property. - 1977 
38-2-3.1 . Special lien on personal property for 
services rendered - General lien of dry cleaning 
establishments, laundries, and shoe repair shops. 
Every person w h o , while lawfully in possession of 
an article of personal property, renders any service 
to the owner or owners thereof, by labor or skill 
performed upon said personal property at the 
request or order of said owner, has a special hen 
thereon, dependent on possession, for the compen-
sation, if any, which is due to him from the owner 
or owners for such service; and every laundry pro-
prietor, person conducting a laundry business, dry 
cleaning establishment, proprietor and person con-
ducting a dry cleaning establishment, shoe repair 
establishment proprietor and person conducting a 
shoe repair establishment has a general lien, depen-
dent on possession, upon all personal property in his 
hands belonging to a customer, for the balance due 
him from such customer for laundry work, and for 
the balance due him for dry cleaning work, and for 
the balance due him for shoe repair work; but 
nothing in this section shall be construed to confer a 
lien in favor of a wholesale dry cleaner on material* 
received from a dry cleaning establishment propri-
etor or a person conducting a dry cleaning establis-
hment. The terms "person" and "proprietor* as used 
in this section shall include an individual, firm, 
partnership, association, corporation and company. 
38-2-3.2 . Sale of unclaimed persona! property. 
(A) A n y garments, clothing, shoes , wearing 
apparel or househe d goods , remaining in the poss-
ession of a person, on which cleaning, pressing, 
glazing, laundry or washing or repair work has been 
done or upon which alteration or repairs ha e been 
made or on which materials c r supplies have been 
used or furnished by said person holding possession 
thereof, for a period of 90 days or more after the 
completion of such services or labors, may be sold 
by said person holding p o s s e s i o n , to pa> the unpaid 
reasonable or agreed charges therefor and the costs 
of notifying the owner or owners as hereinafter 
provided; provided, however, that the person to 
whom such charges are payable and owing shall first 
notify the owner or owners of such property of the 
time and place o f such sale; and provided farther, 
that property that is to be placed in storage after 
an> of the services or labors mentioned herein shall 
not be affected by the provisions o f this subsection. 
(B) All garments, clothing, shoes , wearing 
apparel on which any of these services or labors 
mentioned in the preceding subsection have been 
performed and then placed in storage by agreement, 
and remaining in the possession o f a person without 
the reasonable or agreed charges having been paid 
for a period of 12 months may be sold to pay such 
charges and costs o f notifying the owner or owners 
as hereinafter provided, provided, however, that the 
<-ode*Co 
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person to whom the charges are payable and owing 
shall first notify the owner or owners of such pro-
perty o f the time and the place o f sale, and prov-
ided, further, that persons operating as warehouses 
or warehousemen shall not be affected by this sub-
section. 
(C) 1. The mailing o f a properly stamped and 
registered letter, with a return address marked 
thereon, addressed to the owner or owners of the 
property as aforesaid, at their address given at the 
tune of delivery of the property to such person to 
render any of the services or labors set out in this 
article, or if no address was so given, at their 
address if otherwise known, stating the time and 
place o f sale, shall constitute notice as required in 
this article. Said notice shall be mailed at least 20 
da>< before the date of sale. The cost of mailing 
said letter shall be added to the charges. 
2 . If no address was given at the time of 
delivery o f the property as aforesaid, or if the 
address o f the owner or owners is not otherwise 
known, such person w h o has performed the services 
or labors as aforesaid shall cause to be published at 
least once in a daily or weekly newspaper in the city, 
town, city and county, wherein such property was 
delivered to such person, a notice of the time and 
place of sale and such notice shall be published at 
least twenty days before the date o f sale. Such 
notice constitutes notice as required in this article 1.' 
notice cannot be mailed as aforesaid. The costs of 
one such publication shall be added to the charges. 
(D) The person to whom the charges are 
payable and owing shall from the proceeds of the 
sale, deduct the charges due plus the costs of notif-
ying the owner or owners and shall immediately 
thereafter mail to the owner or owners thereof at 
their address, if known, a notice of the holding of 
such sale and the amount of the overplus, if any, 
due the owner or owners, and at any time within 12 
months after such notice, such person shall upon 
demand by the owner or owners, pay to the owner 
or owners such overplus in his hands. If no such 
demand is made within such 12 month period, or, if 
the address of the owner or owners is unknown and 
no demand is made by the owner or owners within 
12 months after the date of sale, then such overplus 
shall become the property of persons who have 
performed the services or labors as aforesaid. 
(E) Eacl person taking advantage of this article 
must keep posted in a prominent place in his recei-
ving office or offices at all t imes two notices which 
shall read as fol lows: 
"All articles, cleaned, pressed, glazed, laund-
ered, washed, altered or repaired, and not called for 
in 90 days will be sold to pay c h a r g e s / 
"All articles stored by agreement and charges 
not having been paid for 12 months will be sold to 
pay charges." 
The rights and benefits provided for in this 
section shall be and are in addition t o the rights and 
benefits provided for in section 38-2-4. I9S3 
38-2-4. Disposal of property b> lienholdei -
Procedure. 
(1) Any party holding a lien upon personal prop-
erty as provided in this chapter may dispose of such 
property in the manner provided in subsection (2) of 
this section. 
(2) The lienor shall give notice to the owner of 
the property, to the customer as indicated on the 
work order, and to all other persons claiming an 
interest in or lien thereon, as disclosed by the 
records of the department o f motor vehicles, lieut-
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cnani governor s 01 nee, or oi corresponding agen-
cies of any other state in which the property appears 
registered or an interest in or lien thereof is evide-
nced if known by the lienor. The notice shall be sent 
by certified mail at least 30 days before the prop-
osed or scheduled date of any sale and shall contain: 
(a) A description of the property and its 
location; 
(b) The name and address o f the owner of 
the property, the customer as indicated on the work 
order, and any person claiming an interest in or lien 
thereon; 
(c) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the lienor; -
(d) Notice that the lienor claims a lien on 
the property for labor and services performed and 
interest and storage fees charged, if any, and the 
cash sum which, if paid to the lienor, would be 
sufficient to redeem the property from the lien 
claimed by the lienor; 
(e) Notice that the lien claimed by the 
lienor is subject to enforcement under this section 
and that the property may be sold to satisfy the lien; 
( 0 The date, time, and location of any 
proposed or scheduled sale o f the property and 
-whether such sale shall be private or public; no 
property may be sold earlier than 45 days after 
completion of the repair work; and 
(g) Notice that the owner of the property 
has a right to recover possession of the property 
without instituting judicial proceedings by posting 
bond. 
(3) If the owner of the property is unknown or 
his whereabouts cannot be determined, or if the 
owner or any person notified under subsection (2) 
fails to acknowledge receipt of the notice, the lienor, 
at least 20 days before the proposed or scheduled 
date of sale of the property, shall publish the notice 
required by this section once in a newspaper circul-
ated in the county where the vehick* is held. 
(4) A lienee may have his property released 
from any lien claimed thereon under this chapter by 
filing with the clerk of a small claims, circuit, or 
district court a cash or surety bond, payable to the 
person claiming the lien, and conditioned for the 
payment of any judgment which may be recovered 
on said lien, with costs, interest and storage fees. 
(5) The lienor shall have 60 days after receiving 
notice that the lienee has filed the bond provided in 
paragraph (4) to file suit to foreclose his lien; if the 
lienor fails to file such action timely, the clerk of 
the court shall release the bond. 
(6) Property subject to lien enforcement under 
this section may be sold by the lienor at public or 
private sale; however, in the case of a private sale, 
every aspect of the sale, including the meihod, 
manner, time, place, and terms, shall be commerc-
ially reasonable. 
(7) Nothing contained in this section shall be 
'construed as affecting an owner's right to redeem 
his property from the lien at any time prior to sale 
by paying the amount claimed by the lienor for 
work done, interest and storage fees charged, and 
any costs incurred by the repair shop for utilizing 
enforcement procedures under this section. mi 
38-2-5. Action for deficiency. 
Nothing in this chapter shall take away the right 
of action of the party to whom such lien is given for 
•his charges, or for any residue thereof, after such 
sale of the property. if53 
Chapter 3, Lessors' Liens 
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38-3-1. Lien for rent due. 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have 
a lien for rent due upon all nonexernpt property of 
the lessee broughi or kept upon the leased premises 
so long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and 
for thirty days thereafter. 1953 
38-342. Priority of lessor's lien. « 
The lien provided for in this chapter shall be 
preferred to all other liens or claims except claims 
for taxes and liens of mechanics under chapter 1 of 
this title, perfected security interests, and claims c»r 
employees for wages which are preferred by law; 
pro\ ded, that when a lessee shall be adjudicated a 
bankrupt, or shall make an assignment for the 
benefit of creditors, or when his property shall be 
put into the possession of a receiver, the lien herein 
provided for shall be limited to the rent for ninety 
days prior thereto, 1S07 
38-3-3. Attachment in aid of lien. 
Whenever any rent shall be due and unpaid under 
a lease, or the lessee shall be about to remove his 
property from the leased premises, the lessor may 
have the personal property of the lessee which is 
upon the leased premises and subject to such hen 
attached without other ground for such attachment. 
38-3-4. Attachment - Affidavit and bond. 
The lessor shall before the issue of such writ of 
attachment file a complaint, and an affidavit duly 
sworJi to setting forth the amount of rent due over 
and above all offsets and counterclaims and a brief 
description of the leased premises, and shall further 
state, under oath that such writ of attachment is not 
sued put for the purpose of vexing or harassing the 
lessee; and the person applying for such writ of 
attachment shall execute and file a bond as in other 
cases o f attachment. i*53 
38-3-5. When attachment will issue • 
Determination of priorities. 
Upon the filing of such complaint, affidavit ar.d 
bond it shall be the duty of the court wherein the 
same are filed to issue a writ of attachment to the 
proper officer, commanding him to seize the prop-
erty ^f the defendant subject to such lien, or so 
muchl thereof as will satisfy the demand, and to 
make a determination of the priorities of the claims, 
liens, and security interests in such property. i^71 
38-3-6. Execution of writ of attachment. 
It sliall be the duty of the officer to whom the 
writ o f attachment is directed to seize the property 
o f s u p lessee subject to such lien, or as much 
therebf as shall be necessary to satisfy such debt and 
costs, and to keep the same until the determination 
o f the action, unless the property is sooner released 
by bond or the attachment is discharged. i*3 
38-3-7. Release of attachment - Bond. 
A bond for the release of the attached property 
may be given, and motion to discharge the attach-
ment may be made, as provided in the Code of Civil 
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Procedure in cases of attachment. .1953 
38-3-8. When chapter not applicable. 
This chapter shall not be applicable to a written 
lease for a term of years in which, as part of the 
consideration thereof, the lessee or assigns sftall 
erect a building or improvements upon the leased 
premises. i*53 
Chapter 4. Common Carriers' Liens 
38-4-1 through 38-4-3. Repealed. 
38-4-4. Unclaimed shipments - Delivery to 
warehouseman. 
38-4-5. Repealed. 
38-4-1 through 38-4-3. Repealed. tm 
38-4-4. Unclaimed shipments - Delivery to 
warehouseman. 
Whenever any railroad c o m p a n y or other 
common carrier, except an express company, s M l 
have transported any baggage or freight to the place 
of consignment within this state, and the owrier, 
consignee or person entitled to receive the same shall 
omit, for the period of sixty da>s after the arrival of 
the baggage or freight at the place of consignment. 
to accept and remove the same and pay the charges 
thereon, it shall be lawful for such earner to dehver 
such freight for storage to some person or company 
conducting the business of storing goods , subject to 
the charges thereon for transportation, storage by 
the carrier and conveyance and drayage to the p l a c e 
of storage, accompanied by a copy of the bill of 
lading in case of freight, or, in case of baggage, by 
a statement of the. place, (torn which , aud the place 
to which, such baggage was transported, together 
with the check n u m b e s ; and any carrier whose 
route reaches into this state may collect and store as 
aforesaid at any station in this state the unclaimed 
freight from all or any points or stations on its line 
within this state. i*5* 
38-4-5. Repealed. 1977 
Chapter 5. Judgment Lien - United 
Stales Courts 
38-5-1. Docketing with clerk of district court -
Effect. 
Transcripts of judgments or decrees rendered in 
the district court of the United States within the 
state of Utah may be filed and docketed in the 
office of the clerk of the state district court of any 
county in this state, and when so filed and dock-
eted, such judgments oi decrees shall have the s ^ e 
force and effect as a lien as judgments rendered #nd 
docketed in a district court of this state in and for 
such county. *971 
Chapter 6. Federal Tax Liens 
38-6-1. Notice b> Tiling with county recorder. 
38-6-2. Recorder's duties. 
38-6-3. When certificate of discharge is filed. 
38-6-4. County to furnkh indexes and files. 
38-6-1. Notice by filing with county recorder. 
Notices of liens for taxes payable to the United 
States of America, and certificates discharging such 
liens, shall be filed in the office o f the county rec-
order of the county within which any property 
subject to such Hen is situated. 1953 
38-6-2. Recorder's duties. 
When a notice of such lien is filed the county 
recorder shall forthwith enter the same in an alph-
abetical federal tax hen index, showing, on one line, 
the name and residence of the taxpayer named in 
such notice, the collector's serial number of such 
notice, the date and hour of filing and the amount 
of tax with interest, penalties and costs. He shall file 
and keep all original notices so filed in numerical 
order in a file designated "Federal Tax Lien 
Notices." 1953 
38-6-3. When certificate of discharge is filed. 
When a certificate of discharge of any tax lien 
issued by the collector of internal revenue, or other 
proper officer, is filed in the office of the county 
recorder where the notice of lien is filed, such rec-
order shall enter the same with date of filing in the 
federal tax hen index on the line where notice of the 
lien so discharged is entered, and shall permanently 
attach the certificate of discharge to the notice of 
hen. 1953 
38-6-4. County to furnish indexes and files. 
The federal tax hen index arid file for federal tax 
lien notices shall be furnished to the county recor-
ders in the manner provided by law for the furnis-
hing of books in which deeds are recorded. 1953 
Chapter 7. Hospital Lien Law 
38-7-1. Lien of hospital on judgment, settlement or 
compromise in certain accident cases authorized. 
38-7-2. Notice of hen required - Filing wit* count} 
clerk - Mailing to injured person, hei^s or legal 
representative and insurance carrier. 
38-7-3. Parties or insurance carrier making payment 
liable for satisfaction of lien - Enforcement of Hen. 
38-7-4. Hospital lieo docket provided b> couiitv clerk -
Contents. 
38-7-5. Release of lien by hospital - Execution and 
filing. 
38-7-6. Fees and charges of county clerk for filing lien or 
certifying lien claim. 
38-7-7. Interest of hospital in claim settlement limited. 
38-7-8. Short title. 
38-7-1. Lien of hospital on judgment, settlement 
or compromise in certain accident cases 
authorized. 
(1) Every hospital located within the state that 
furnishes emergency, medical or other service to a 
pattern injured by reason of an accident not covered 
by workmen's compensation is entitled to assert a 
lien upon that portion of the judgment, settlement 
or compromise going or belonging to such patient, 
or, in the case of death, to such patient's heirs or 
personal representatives, less the amount paid b> the 
patient or on behalf of such patient by heirs or 
personal representatives for attorney's fees, court 
costs and other necessary expenses incidental to 
obtaining the judgment, settlement or compromise; 
provided, that no reduction of the asserted hen 
amount other than the amount paid by the patient 
or such patient's heirs or personal representatives 
for attorney's fees, couit costs and other necessary 
expenses incidental to litigation is allowed, unless 
otherwise agreed to in writing by the lien claimant. 
The hospital hen, however, shall not apply to any 
judgment, settlement or compromise where the 
amount is $100 or less. This subsection shall apply 
to any lien on f\k in the office o f the county clerk 
on the effective date of this act. 
(2) A hospital lien may be filed upon damages 
recovered, or to be recovered, either as a result of a 
Code o Co 
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judgment, or upon a contract of settlement or 
compromise, for the amount of the reasonable, 
usual and necessary hospital charges for treatment, 
care and maintenance of the injured party in the 
hospital up to the date of payment of the damages. 
38-7-2. Notice of lien required - Filing with 
county clerk - Mailing to injured person, heirs 
or legal representative and insurance carrier. 
N o hospital lien upon damages recovered or to be 
recovered for personal injuries or death shall be 
effective unless: 
(1) A written notice is filed in the office of the 
county clerk of the county in which the hospital 
asserting the lien is located containing the following 
information: 
a. an itemized statement of all claims cer-
tified as correct by an agent of such hospital; 
b. the date and place of the accident; 
c. the name and location of the hospital; 
and 
d. the name of the person, firm or corpo-
ration alleged to be liable to the injured party for 
the injuries and damages sustained; and 
(2) The hospital sends by certified mail with 
return receipt requested, prior to the payment of 
any money to the injured person or his attorney or 
heirs or legal representatives as compensation for 
the injuries and/or damages sustained, a copy of 
the written notice, together with a statement of the 
date of filing, to the person, firm or corporation 
alleged to be liable to the injured party for the inj-
uries and/or damages sustained; and 
(3) The hospital mails a copy of the written 
notice by certified mail with return receipt requested 
to the home office of any insurance carrier that has 
insured the person, firm or corporation against lia-
bility, if the name and address is known. 1*65 
38-7-3. Parties or insurance carrier making 
payment liable for satisfaction of lien -
Enforcement of lien. 
(1) Ajiy person, firm or corporation, including an 
insurance carrier, making any payment to a patient 
or to his attorney, heirs or legal representative as 
compensation for the injuries and/or damages 
sustained, after the filing and, if applicable, receipt 
of written notice of the lien, as aforesaid, and 
without paying the hospital asserting the lien the 
amount of its lien or that portion of the lien which 
can be satisfied out of the money due under any 
final judgment or contract of compromise or settl-
ement, less payment of the amount of any prior 
liens, shall be liable to the hospital for the amount 
that the hospital was entitled to receive. 
(2) Liability of the person, firm or corporation 
for the satisfaction of the hospital lien shall cont-
inue for a period of one year from and after the 
date of any payment of any money to the patient, 
his heirs or legal representatives as damages or 
under a contract of compromise or settlement. Any 
hospital may enforce its lien by a suit at law against 
the person, firm or corporation making the 
payment. In the event of a suit to enforce a lien the 
hospital may recover a reasonable attorney's fee 
and the costs of filing and recording the lien. 1965 
38-7-4. Hospital lien docket provided by county 
clerk • Contents. 
Every county clerk shall, at the expense of the 
county, provide and maintain a suitable bound book 
to be called the hospital lien docket, and in which 
shall be entered any hosj ital lien claim filed. The 
county clerk shall enter the name of the injured 
person, the name of the person, firm or corporation 
alliged to be liable for the injuries and damages, the 
dale and place of the accident, and the name of the 
hoipital or other institution making the claim. The 
clerk shall also maintain a proper index of the hos-
pital lien docket under the name of the injured 
person. ms 
38-7-5. Release of lien by hospital • Execution 
and filing. 
The hospital shall, upon receipt of payment of the 
lien or the portion recoverable under. the lien, 
execute and file, at the expense of the hospital, a 
release of lien. i%5 
38-p-6. Fees and charges of county clerk for 
filing Hen or certifying lien claim. 
County clerks shall be entitled to charge for their 
services for entering and filing a lien statement 
under the provisions of this act, a fee of $1.00, and, 
when requested to do so, a fee of $1.10 per hour for 
searching and certifying as to a lien claim. ms 
38-7-7. Interest of hospital in claim settlement 
limited. 
Nothing in this act shall be* construed to permit 
any hospital to be a party to or to have any interest 
in the amount or manner of any settlement of any 
claim on which a lien has been filed other than the 
lien rights as provided in this act. i%s 
38-7-8. Short title. 
This act may be known as the Hospital Lien Law. 
1965 
Chapter 8. Self-service Storage Facilities 
38-&1. Definitions. 
3$-»>2. Uen against stored property - Attachment and 
duration • Search for financing statement prerequisite to 
enforcement of lien. 
38 S[3. Enforcement of lien - Notice requirements -
Sale procedure and effect, 
38-SM. Posting of notice. 
3S-S-5. Other liens unaficcted. 
38-8-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Default" means the failure to perform in a 
timely manner any obligation or duty set forth in 
this chaptt. or the rental agreement. 
(2^ "Last known address* means that address 
provided by the occupant in the latest rental agree-
ment or the address provided by the occupant in a 
subsequent written notice of a change of address. 
(3) "Occupant" means a person, or his suble-
ssee! successor, or assign, entitled to the use of the 
storage space at a self-service storage facility under 
a rental agreement, to the exclusion of others. 
(4) "Owner" means the owner, operator, lessor, 
or sublessor of a self-service storage facility, his 
agent, or any other person authorized by him to 
manage the facility or to receive rent from an occ-
upant under a rental agreement. 
(5) "Personal property" means movable prop-
erty not affixed to land and includes, but is not 
limned to, goods, merchandise,and household items. 
(6) "Rental agreement" means any written agr-
eement or lease which establishes or modifies the 
terms, conditions, rules, or any other provisions 
concerning the use and occupancy at a self-service 
storage facility and which contains a notice stating 
that all articles stored under the terms of the agre-
ement will be sold or otherwise disposed of if no 
payment has been received for a continuous 30-day 
peri id. The agreement shall contain a provision 
directing the occupant to disclose any lienholders 
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with an interest in property that is or will be stored 
in the self-service storage facility. 
(7) "Self-service storage facility" means any 
real property designed and used for the purpose of 
renting or leasing individual storage space to occu-
pants who are to have access to the facility for the 
purpose of storing and removing personal property, 
jsio occupant may use a self-service storage facility 
for residential purposes. The owner of a self-
service storage facility is not a warehouseman as 
used in subsection 7DA-7-102(l)(h). If an owner 
issues any warehouse receipt, bill of lading, or other 
document of title for the personal property stored, 
the owner and the occupant are subject to the pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the 
provisions of this chapter do not apply. mi 
38-8-2. Lien against stored property -
Attachment and duration - Search for financing 
statement prerequisite to enforcement of lien. 
Where a rental agreement, as defined in Subsec-
tion 38-8-1(6), is entered into between the owner 
and the occupant, the owner of the self-service 
storage facility and his heirs, executors, administr-
ators, successors, and assigns have a lien upon all 
personal property located at the self-service storage 
facility for rent, labor, or other charges, present or 
future, in relation to the personal property and for 
expenses necessary for its preservation or expenses 
reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition 
under this chapter. The lien attaches as of the date 
the personal property is brought to the self-service 
storage facility and continues so long as the owner 
retains possession and until any default is corrected, 
or a sale pursuant to a default is conducted, or the 
property is otherwise disposed of to satisfy the lien. 
Before taking enforcement action under Section 38-
8-3, the owner shall determine if a financing stat-
ement filed in accordance with Section 70A-9-
401, et seq. has been filed with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code concerning the 
property to be sold or otherwise disposed of. 1984 
38-8-3. Enforcement of lien - Notice 
requirements - Sale procedure and effect. 
A claim of an owner which has become due 
against an occupant and which is secured by the 
owner's lien may be satisfied as follows: 
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the 
owner until the occupant has been in default conti-
nuously for a period of 30 days. 
(2) After the occupant has been in default 
continuously for a period of 30 days, the owner may 
begin enforcement action if the occupant has been 
given notice in writing. The notice shall be delivered 
in person or sent by certified mail to the last known 
address of the occupant, and a copy of the notice 
shall, at the same time, be sent to the sheriff of the 
county where the self-service storage facility is 
located. Any lienholder with an interest in the pro-
perty to be sold or otherwise disposed of, of whom 
the owner has knowledge either through the disclo-
sure provision on the rental agreement or through 
!he existence of a validly filed and perfected UCC-
1 financing statement with the Division of Corpor-
ations and Commercial Code, or through other 
v#fiUen notification, shall be included in the notice 
Process as set forth in this section. 
(3) This notice shall include: 
(a) an itemized statement of1 the owner's 
cfcu'm showing the sum due at the time of the notice 
*nd the date when the sum became due; 
(b) a brief and general description of the 
{^rsonal property subject to the lien, which descri-
38-8-3. 
ption shall be reasonably adequate to permit the 
person notified to identify the property; except that 
any container including, but not limited to, a trunk, 
valise, or box that is locked, fastened, sealed, or 
tied in a manner which deters immediate access to 
its contents may be described as such without desc-
ribing its contents; 
(c) a notification of denial of access to the 
personal property, if such denial is permitted under 
the terms of the rental agreement, which notification 
shall provide the name, street address, and telep-
hone number of the owner or his designated agent 
whom the occupant may contact to respond to the 
notification; 
(d) a demand for payment within a speci-
fied lime not less than 15 days after delivery of the 
notice; and 
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the 
claim is paid within the time stated in the notice, the 
personal property will be advertised for sale or other 
disposition and will be sold or otherwise disposed of 
at a specified time and place. 
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be 
presumed deli\ered when it is deposited with the 
United States postal service and properly addressed 
with postage prepaid. 
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in 
the notice, an advertisement of the sale or othei 
disposition shall be published once a week for tv,o 
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of gei.eral circul-
ation in the county where the self-service storage 
facility is located. The advertisement shall include: 
(i) a brief and general description of 
the personal property reasonably adequate to permit 
its identification as provided for in Subsection 
(3)(b); the address of the self-service storage faci-
lity and the number, if any, of the space where the 
personal property is located; and the name of the 
occupant and his last known address; and 
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the 
sale or other disposition, which sale or other disp-
osition shall take place not sooner than 15 days 
after the first publication. 
(b) If there is no newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where the self-service 
storage facility is located, the advertisement shall be 
posted at least ten days before the date of the sale 
or other disposition in not less than six conspicuous 
places in the neighborhood where the self-service 
storage facility is located. 
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal 
property shall conform to the terms of the notice 
provided for in this section. 
(7) Any sale or other disposition of the personal 
property shall be held at the self-service storage 
facility or at the nearest suitable place to where the 
personal property is held or stored. 
(8) Before any sale or other disposition of per-
sonal property under this section, the occupant may 
pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the 
reasonable expenses incurred under this section and 
thereby redeem the personal property; upon receipt 
of this payment, the ownei shall return the personal 
property, and thereafter the owner shall have no 
liability to any person with respect to that personal 
property. 
(9) A purchaser in good faith of the personal 
property sold to satisfy a lien as provided for in this 
chapter takes the property free of any rights of 
persons against whom the lien was valid and free of 
any rights of a secured creditor, despite noncompl-
iance by the owner with the requirements of this 
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(10) In the event of a sale under this section, 
the owner may satisfy his lien for the proceeds of 
the sale, subject to the rights of any prior lienho-
Ider; the lien rights of the prior lienholder are aut-
omatically transferred to the proceeds of the sale; if 
the sale is made in good faith and is conducted in a 
reasonable manner, the owner shall not be subject 
to any surcharge for a deficiency in the amount of a 
prior secured lien, but shall hold the balance, if any, 
for delivery to the occupant, lienholder, or other 
person in interest; if the occupant, lienholder, or 
other person in interest does not claim the balance 
of the proceeds within one year of the date of sale, 
it shall become the property of the Utah state trea-
surer as unclaimed property with no further claim 
against the owner. 
(11) If the requirements of this chapter are not 
satisfied, if the sale of the personal property is not 
in conformity with the notice of sale, or if there is a 
willful violation of this chapter, nothing in this 
section affects the rights and liabiliJtties of the 
owner, occupant, or any other person. i9W 
38-8-4. Posting of notice. 
Each owner acting under this chapter shal. keep 
posted in a prominent place in his office at all times 
a notice which reads as follows: 
'All articles stored by a rental agreement, and 
charges not having been paid for 30 days, will be 
sold or otherwise disposed of to pay charges." m i 
38-8-5. Other liens unaffected. 
Nothing in this section shall be construed as in 
any manner impairing or affecting the right of 
parties to create liens by special contract or agree-
ment, nor shall it in any manner affect or impair 
other liens arising at common law or in equity, or 
by any statute of this state. mi 
Chapter 9. Penalty for Wrongful Lien. 
38-9-1. Liabilil) of person filing wrongful Hen. 
38-9-2. Claim of lien not authorized is invalid. 
38-9-3. Liability of person refusing to correct document 
containing wrongful lien - Penalty - Misdemeanor. 
38-9-4. Action may be brought in district court - Costs 
and attorney fees. 
38-9-1, Liability of person filing wrongful lien. 
A person who claims an interest in, or a lien or 
encumbrance against, real properly, who causes or 
has caused a document asserting that claim to be 
recorded or filed in the office of the county reco-
rder, who knows or has reason to know that the 
document is forged, groundless, or contains a mat-
erial misstatement or false claim, is liable to the 
owner or title holder for SI,000 or for treble actual 
damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable 
attorney fees, and costs as provided in this chapter, 
if he willfully refuses to release or correct such 
document of record within 20 days from the date of 
written request from the owner or beneficial title 
holder of the real property. This chapter is not int-
ended to be applicable to mechanics* or materia-
lmen's liens. 1985 
38-9-2. Claim of lien not authorized is invalid. 
A document purporting to claim an interest in, or 
a lien or encumbrance against, real property not 
authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific 
legal authority is presumed to be groundless and 
invalid. ms 
38-9-3. Liability of person refusing lo correct 
document containing wrongful lien • Penalty -
Misdemeanor. 
A person described in Section 38-9-1, who 
willfully refuses to release or correct the document 
of record within 20 days from the date of written 
request from the owner or beneficial title holder of 
the real property: 
(1) is liable to the owner or beneficial title 
holder of the real property for the sum of not less 
than SI,000, or for treble the actual damages caused 
by the recording or filing, whichever is greater, and 
for reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action; 
and 
(2) is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. i9es 
38-9-4. Action may be brought in district court 
- Costs and attorney fees. 
The owner or beneficial title holder of the real 
property may bring an action under this chapter in 
trie district court of the county in which the real 
property is located for such relief as is required to 
immediately clear title t o the real property or may 
join that action with an action for damages as des-
cribed in this chapter, after giving the notice requ-
ired in Section 38-9-1.- In either case, the owner 
or beneficial title holder may recover reasonable 
attorney fees atid costs of the action if he prevails. 
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TITLE 46. NOTARIES PUBLIC 
AND COMMISSIONERS OF 
DEEDS 
Chapter 1. Not trie* Public. 
Chapter 2. Commissioners of Deeds. 
Chapter 1. Notaries Public 
46-1-1. Qualifications - Appointment - Term -
Removal. 
46-1-2. Master list of notaries public - Commissions 
certified to clerks of district courts - Names of governor 
and division director printed on certificate. 
46-1-3. Oath and bond. 
46-1-4. Action on bond - Parties - Limitation of 
action. 
46-1-5. Powers. 
46-1-6. Record of protests - Evidence. 
46-1-7. Seal. 
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of residence and date 
commission expires. 
46-1-9. Acting after commission expires - Penalty. 
46-1-10. Disqualification because of interest. 
46*1-1. Qualifications - Appointment - Term 
- Removal, 
A notary public shall be 18 years of age or older 
and be a resident of this state 30 days immediately 
preceding the filing for a notary public appoint-
ment. The governor may appoint and commission as 
many notaries public as he considers necessary. 
Each notary public shall hold office for the term of 
four years from and after the date of their commi-
ssion, but the governor may remove any notary 
public from his appointed term of office. Each 
commission shall be filed and recorded with the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. 19*5 
46-1-2. Master list of notaries public -
Commissions certified to clerks of district courts 
- Names of governor and division director 
printed on certificate. 
Hereafter, whenever a notarial commission is 
issued to any person, the governor and the director 
of the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code shall certify to a master list of notaries public. 
• The issuance of all commissions shall be certified to 
each of the several clerks of the district courts giving 
the dates of issuance and expiration of same. All 
notary certificates shall have printed thereon the 
names o f the governor and the director o f the Div-
ision of Corporations and Commercial Code. WM 
46-1-3. Oath and bond. 
Each notary public before entering upon his off-
icial duties shall take the constitutional oath and 
post a bond naming the state as obligee in the penal 
sum of $5,000, conditioned for the faithful perfor-
. mance of the duties of his office. Such bonds shall 
be approved by the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code and filed in its office. 19M 
46-1-4. Action on bond - Parlies - Limitation 
of action. 
The bond of a notary' public may be sued on by 
any person injured through official delinquencies 
against which it is intended to provide; provided, 
that such action shall be instituted within three years 
from the time such cause of action shall have 
accrued. 1953 
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46-1-5. Powers. 
Notaries public may exercise the following p 
within this state: Administer ail oaths provid* 
law, acknowledge powers of attorney and all 
instruments of writing conveying or affecting 
erty in any part of this state, or elsewhere as m 
lawful; take affidavits and depositions; make 
arations and protests; and do all other acts m 
done by notaries public. 
46-1-6. Record of protests - Evidence. 
Each notary' public shall keep a fair record < 
notices of protest made by him, noting the tim< 
manner in which they were served, the names < 
parties to whom they were directed and a de$ 
tion and the amount of the instrument protc 
Such record shall be competent evidence to f 
such notices. When required and the fees the 
are paid each notary public shall give a cerl 
copy of any official record of paper in his office, 
46-1-7. Seal. 
Each notary public shall have an official 
with which he shall authenticate all of his ofl 
acts. It must contain the words "State of Utah," 
"Notary Public* or 'Notarial Seal," with 
surname and at least the initials of his Chri 
name. 
46-1-8. Affix to signature place of residence and 
date commissi* n expires. 
To all acknowjedgments, oaths, affirmations 
instruments of even' kind taken and certified I 
notary public he shall affix to his signature his 
icial title and his place of residence and the dat< 
which his commission expires. 
46-1-9. Acting after commission expires -
Penalty. 
Any person who willfully affixes his signature 
seal as notary public to any instrument after 
expiration of his commission as such notary pu 
is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
46-1-10. Disqualification because of interest. 
Any notary public who is a stockholder, direc 
officer or employee of a bank or other corporal 
may take the acknowledgment of any party to 
written instrument executed to or by such corp< 
tion, and may administer an oath to any other s 
ckholder, director, officer, employee or agent 
such corporation, and may protest for nonacc* 
ance or nonpayment bills of exchange, dra 
checks, notes and other negotiable instrume 
which may be owned, or held for collection, by si 
corporation; but it shall be unlawful for any not 
public to take the acknowledgment of any person 
an instrument executed by or to a bank or oti 
corporation of which he is a stockholder, direct 
officer or employee where he is a party to si 
instrument, either individually or as a representat 
of such corporation, or to protest any negotial 
instrument owned or held for collection by su 
corporation where he is individually a party to su 
instrument. i 
Chapter 2. Commissioners of Deeds 
46-2-1. Appointment - Term - Removal. 
46-2-2. Powers. 
46-2-3. Affix to signature place of residence aad date 
commission expires. 
46-2-4. Force and effect of official acts. 
46-2-5. Official oath. 
46-2-6. Oaths and seals of commissioners to be Tiled. • 
46-2-7. Fees. 
46-2-8. Copy of laws to accompany commission. 
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M-2-9- Commissioners or other states and countries 
ytstding here. 
jfrlA. Appointment - Term - Removal. 
The governor may appoint and commission in 
^ c h state and territory of the United States, except 
t n i s state, and in any foreign country, one or moie 
commissioners of deeds, to hold office for the term 
of four years from and after the date of their com-
missions, but the governor may remove from office 
ftny commissioner during the term for which he was 
appointed. The commission shall be filed and reco-
rded with the Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code. W4 
46-2-2. Powers. 
Every commissioner of deeds has power within 
the state or country for which he was appointed: 
(1) T o administer and certify oaths. 
(2) To take and certify depositions and affida-
vits. ' 
(3) T o take and certify the acknowledgment or 
proof of powers of attorney, mortgages, transfers, 
grants, deeds or other instruments for record. 
(4) To provide and keep an official seal, upon 
which must be engraved his name, the words 
•Commissioner of Deeds for the State of Utah," 
and the name of the state or country' for which he is 
commissioned. 
(5) To authenticate with his official seal all of 
his official acts. iv$3 
46*2-3. Affix to signature place of residence and 
date commission expires. 
To all acknowledgments, oaths, affirmations and 
instruments of every kind taken and certified by a 
commissioner of deeds he shall affix to his signature 
his official title and his place of residence and the 
date on which his commission expires. 1953 
46-2-4. Force and effect of official acts. 
All oaths administered, depositions and affidavits 
taken, and all acknowledgments and proofs certi-
fied, by commissioners of deeds have the same force 
and effect, to all intents and purposes, as if done 
and certified in this state by any officer authorized 
by law to perform such acts. 1953 
46-2-5. Official oath. 
Before a commissioner of deeds can perform any 
of the duties of his office, he shall take and subsc-
ribe an oath that he will faithfully perform his 
duties, which oath shall be taken and subscribed 
before some judge or clerk of a court of record in 
the state, territory or foreign country in which the 
commissioner is to exercise his functions, and shall 
be certified under the hand of the person taking it 
and the seal of his court. 1953 
46-2-6. Oaths and seals of commissioners to be 
filed. 
The official oaths of commissioners of deeds and 
impressions of their official seals must be filed uith 
the Division of Archives within six months after 
they are taken and adopted. 19»4 
46-2-7. Fees. 
The fees of commissioners of deeds are the same 
as those prescribed for notaries public. 1953 
46-2-8. Copy of laws to accompany commission. 
The Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code must transmit with the commission to the 
appointee a certified copy of this chapter and of the 
laws prescribing the fees of notaries public. 19*4 
46-2-9. Commissioners of other states and 
countries residing here. 
Commissioner of deeds for other states or coun-
tries residind in this state shall file with the Division 
of Archives a certified copy of their commissions, 
together witji a statement of their places of resid-
ence. 
Code • Co 
Piovo. tuh For ANNOTATIONS, consult the UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS £ 5S9 
f\cai jejune i nr% K.KJUC 1986-1987 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
Chapter 1. Conveyances. 
Chapter 2. Acknowledgements. 
Chapter 3. Recording Conveyances. 
Chapter 4. Validating Certain Conveyances. 
Chapter 5. Plats and Subdivisions. 
Chapter 6. Occupying Claimants. 
Chapter 7. Townsiles. 
Chapter 8. Condominium Ownership Act. 
Chapter 9. Marketable Record Title. 
Chapter 10. Utah Co-ordinate System. 
Chapter 11. Land Sales Practices. 
Chapter 12. Relocation Assistance. 
Chapter 13. Solar Easements. 
Chapter 14. Limitation of Landowner Liability - Public 
Recreation. 
Chapter 15. Assumption of Indebtedness on Residential 
tUz't Property. 
Chapter 16. Mobile Home Park Residency. 
Chapter 17. Residential Renters' Deposits. 
Chapter 18. Conservation Easement Act. 
Chapter 1. Conveyances 
57-1-1. •Conveyance* defined. 
57-1-2. Words of inheritance not required to pass fee. 
57-1-3. Grant of fee simple presumed. 
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than grantor 
owns - Effect. 
57-1-5 Grant to two or more - Tenancy in common 
presumed - Joint tenancy - Creation of joint tenancy 
in owner and others - Interest of joint tenants. 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice -
Operation und effect - Interest of person not named in 
instrument. 
57-1-7. Applicability of section. 
57-1-8. Powers of attorney • To be recorded. 
57-1-9, Revocation to be recorded. 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes. 
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey. 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed - Effect. 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim detd - Effect. 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect. 
57-1-15. Revocation or termination of power executed by 
persons in armed forces - Merchant seamen - Effect of 
actual notice or knowledge. 
. 57-1-16. Affidavit of lack of notice or knowledge -
Effect of - Recordation of. 
57-1-17. Report of "missing" - Effect of as notice. 
57-1-18. Effect of provisions in power. 
57-1-19. Trust deeds - Definitions of terms. 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property - Purposes 
- Effect. 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications. 
57-1-22. Successor trustee - Appointment by beneficiary 
- Effect - Substitution of trustee - Notice -
Recording - Form. 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property - Power of trustee -
Foreclosure of trrst deed. 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee - Notice of 
default. 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale - Description of 
propert v • Time and place of sale. 
57-1-26. Requests for copies of notice of default and 
notice of sale - Mailing by trustee or beneficiary -
Publication of notice of default. 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property b> trustee - Public 
auction - Conduct by attorney for trustee - Trustor 
may direct order in which trust property sold - Bids -
Postponement of sale. 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee - Payment of 
bid - Trustee's deed delivered to purchaser - Recitals 
- Effect. 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale - Disposition. 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property bv trustee - Corporate 
slock evidencing water rights given to secure trust deed. 
57-1-31. Trust deeds - Default in performance of 
obligations secured • Reinstatement - Cancellation of 
recorded notice of default. 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee - Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust deed 
was given as security • Collection of costs and 
attorney's fees. 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed 
- Reconveyance of trust property. 
57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee - Foreclosure 
of trust deed • Limitation of actions. 
57-1-35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured by -
Transfer of security. 
57-1-36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be 
recorded - Assignment of a beneficial interest. 
57-1-1. "Conveyance* defined. 
, The term "conveyance* as used in this title shall 
be construed to embrace every instrument in writing 
by which any real estate, or interest in real estate, is 
created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assi-
gned, except wills, and leases for a term not excee-
ding one year. 1953 
57-1-2. Words of inheritance not required to pass 
fee. 
The term 'heirs," or other technical words of 
inheritance or succession, are not requisite to tran-
sfer a fee in real estate. 1953 
57-1-3. Grunt of fee simple presumed. 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to 
pass by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears 
from the conveyance that a lesser estate was inte-
nded. * l 1953 
57-1-4. Attempted conveyance of more than 
grantor owns - Effect. 
A conveyance made by an owner of an estate for 
life or years, purporting to convey a greater estate 
than he could lawfully transfer, does not work a 
forfeiture of his estate, but passes to the grantee all 
the estate which the grantor could lawfully transfer. _ 
57-1-5. Grant to two or more - Tenancy in 
common presumed - Joint tenancy - Creation 
of joint tenancy in owner and others - Interest 
of joint tenants. 
Every interest in real estate granted to two or 
more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in 
common, unless expressly declared in the grant to be 
otherwise. Use of words "joint tenancy* or "with 
rights of survivorship* or "and to the survivor of 
them" or words of similar import shall declare a 
joint tenancy. A sole owner of real property shall 
create a joint tenancy it; himself and another or 
others by making a transfer to himself and such 
other or others as joint tenants by use of such words 
as herein provided or by conveying to another 
person or persons an interest in land in which an 
interest is retained by the grantor and by declaring 
the creation of a joint tenancy by use of such words 
as herein provided. In all cases the interest of joint 
tenants must be equal and undivided. 1953 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice -
Operation and effect - Interest of person not 
named in instrument. 
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instr-
ument of writing setting forth an agreement to 
convey any real estate or whereby any real estate 
may be affected, to operate as notice to third 
persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certi-
fied in the manner prescribed by this title and rec-
orded in the office of the recorder of the county in 
which such real estate is situated, but shall be valid 
1953 
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a nd binding between the parties thereto without 
such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or 
record, and as to all other persons who have had 
actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, 
recorded as herein provided, recites only a nominal 
consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such 
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the con-
veyance otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms of the 
trust, shall operate to charge any third person with 
notice of the interest of any person or persons not 
named in such instrument or of the grantor or gra-
ntors, but the grantee may convey the fee or such 
lesser interest as was conveyed to him by such inst-
rument free and clear of all claims not disclosed by 
the instrument or by an instrument recorded as 
herein provided setting forth the names of the ben-
eficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and descr-
ibing the property charged with such interest. 1953 
57-1-7. Applicability of section. 
This act shall app!\ to all instruments, whether 
recorded prior to or subsequent to the effective date 
hereof, but as to instruments which have been rec-
orded prior thereto, ii shall not apply until one year 
from its effectiv e date. 1953 
57-1-8. Powers of attorney - To be recorded. 
Every power of attorney, or other instrument in 
writing, containing a power to convey any real 
estate as agent or attorney for the owner thereof, or 
to execute as agerj or attorney for another any 
conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed or 
may be affected, shall be acknowledged or proved, 
and certified and recorded, as conveyances whereby 
real estate is conveyed or affec: d are required to be 
acV;<\<y*\t<A%,td o\- proved &wd cwufvtd wvd itco^d^d-
57-1-9. Revocation to be recorded. 
N o such power of attorney or other instrument 
shall be deemed to be revoked by any act of the 
person by whom it was executed until the instrument 
containing such revocation shall be filed for record 
in the same office in which the instrument contai-
ning the power is recorded, or until it is canceled of 
record as provided by law. 1953 
57-1-10. After-acquired title passes. 
If any person shall hereafter convey any real 
estate by conveyance purporting to convey the same 
in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the time of 
such conveyance have the legal estate in such real 
estate, but shall afterwards acquire the same, the 
legal estate subsequenth acquired shall immediately 
pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors or assigns, 
and such conveyance shall be as valid as if such 
legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of 
the conveyance. 1953 
57-1-11. Claimant out of possession may convey. 
Any person claiming title to any real estate may, 
notwithstanding there may be an adverse possession 
thereof, sell and convey his interest therein in the 
same manner and with the same effect as if he were 
in the actual possession thereof. i*s3 
57-1-12. Form of warranty deed - Effect. 
Conveyances of land may be substantially in the 
following form: 
W A R R A N T Y DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby conveys and 
warrants to (insert name), grantee, of , 
(insert place of residence), for the sum of 
dollars, the following described tract of land 
*n County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this dav 
of ' 19 
^uch deed when executed as required by law shall 
havie the effect of a conveyance in fee simple to the 
gtahtee, his heirs and assigns, of the premises 
therein named, together with all the appurtenances, 
rights and privileges thereunto belonging, with cov-
enants from the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives, that he is lawfully seised of the 
premises; that he has good right to convey the same; 
thai he guarantees the grantee, his heirs and assigns 
in the quiet possession thereof; that the premies are 
frei from alt encumbrances; and that the grantor, 
his I heirs and personal representatives will forevrr 
warrant and defend the title thereof in the grantee, 
his heirs and assigns against all lawful claims what-
soever. Any exceptions to such covenant! may be 
briefly inserted in such deed following the descrip-
tion of the land. 1953 
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim dteC - Effect. 
Conveyances of land may also b. substantially in 
the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
_ (here insert name), grantor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby quitclaims to 
_ ^ _ _ (insert name), grantee, of (here insert 
place of residence), for the sum of dollars, 
the following described tract of land in 
' County, Utah, to wit: (here describe the 
premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day 
of 19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall 
havt the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, 
interest and estate of the grantor in and to the pre-
mises therein described and all rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date of 
such conveyance. 1953 
57-1-14. Form of mortgage - Effect. 
A mortgage of land may be substantially in the 
following form: 
I MORTGAGE 
J (here insert name), mortgagor, of 
(insert place of residence), hereby mo tgafes to 
^_^_ (insert name), mortgagee, of (insert 
place of residence), for the sum of dollars, 
the following described tract of land in 
_^___ County, Utah, to wit. (here describe the 
premises). 
This mortgage is given to secure the following 
indebtedness (here state amount and form of inde-
btedness, maturity, rate of interest, by and to whom 
payable and where). 
The mortgagor agrees to pay all taxes and asses-
smehts on said premises, and the sum of 
dollars attorneys' fee in case of foreclosure. 
Witness the hand of said mortgagor this 
dv* to* , \9 
S i^ch mortgage when executed as required by law 
shal( have the effect of a conveyance of the land 
therein described, together with all the rights, priv-
ileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the 
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal representat-
ives i as security for the payment of the indebtedness 
thereon set forth, with covenants from the mortg-
agor of general warranty of title, and that all taxes 
and assessments levied and assessed upon the land 
described, during the continuance of the mortgage, 
will be paid previous to the day appointed for the 
Code* Co 
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a«it ui sutn ianas tor taxes; and may be foreclosed 
as provided by law upon any default being made in 
any of the conditions thereof as to payment of 
either principal, interest, taxes or assessments. 1953 
57-1-IS. Revocation or termination of power 
executed by persons in armed forces - Merchant 
seamen - Effect of actual notice or knowledge. 
N o agency created by a power of attorney in 
writing given by a principal who is at the time of 
execution, or who, after executing such power of 
attorney, becomes, either: 
(a) A member of the armed forces of the United 
States, or , 
(b) a person serving as a merchant seaman outside 
the limits of the United States, included within the 
forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, or 
(c) a person outside said limits by permission, 
assignment, or direction of any department or offi-
cial of the United States government, in connection 
with any activity pertaining to or connected with the 
prosecution of any war in which the United States is 
then engaged, shall be revoked or terminated by the 
death of the principal as to the agent or other 
person who, without actual knowledge or actual 
notice of the death or [of] principal shall have acted 
or shall act, in good faith, under or in reliance upon 
such power of attorney or agency, and any action so 
taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable 
shaJl be binding on the heirs, devisees, legatees, or 
personal representati ves of the principal. 1953 
57-1-16. Affidavit of lack of notice or knowledge 
- Effect of - Recordation of. 
An affidavit, executed by the attorney in fact or 
agent, setting forth that he has not, or had not at 
the time of doing any act pursuant to the power of 
attorney, received actual knowledge or actual notice 
of the revocation or termination of the power of 
attorney, by death or otherwise, or notice of any 
facts indicating the same, shall, in the absence of 
fraud, be conclusive proof of the nonrevocation or 
nontermination of the power at such time. If the 
exercise of the power requires execution and delivery 
of any instrument which is recoidable under the 
laws of this state, such affidavit (v>hen authenticated 
for record in the manner prescribed by law) shall 
likewise be recordable. 19S3 
57-1-17. Report of "missing" - Effect of as 
notice. 
N o report or listing, either official or otherwise, 
of "missing" or "missing in action," as such words 
are used in military parlance, shall constitute or be 
interpreted as constituting actual knowledge or 
actual notice of the death of such principal or notice 
of any facts indicating the same, nor shall it operate 
to re\ oke the agency. 1953 
57-1-18. Effect of provisions in power. 
This act shall not be construed so as to alter or 
affect any provision for revocation or termination 
contained in such power of attorney. 1953 
57-1-19. Trust deeds - Definitions of terms. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or 
otherwise designated in a trust deed as the person 
for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his succ-
essor in interest. 
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real 
property by a trust deed as security for the perfor-
mance of an obligation. 
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conf-
ormity with this act and conveying real property to 
a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an 
1 4 For ANNOTATIONS, please consul! 
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obligation of the grantor or other person named 
the deed to a beneficiary. 
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to r 
property is conveyed by trust deed, or his success 
in interest. 
(5) "Real property" means any estate or interest 
land, including all buildings, fixtures and impro\ 
ments thereon and all water rights, rights of wa 
easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenement 
hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances ther 
unto belonging, used or enjoyed with said land, < 
any part thereof. 
(6) "Trust property" means the real proper) 
conveyed by the trust deed. 19* 
57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property -
Purposes - Effect. 
Transfers in trust of real property may be mad 
to secure the performance of an obligation of th 
trustor or any other person named in the trust cleei 
to a beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim ii 
and to the trust property acquired by the trustor, o 
his successors in interest, subsequent to the execu 
tion of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee a: 
security for the obligation or obligations for whicr 
the trust property is conveyed in like manner as il 
acquired before execution of the trust deed. w i 
57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds - Qualifications. 
(1) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(a) any member of the Utah State Bar; 
(b) any bank, building and loan association, 
savings and loan association, or insurance company 
authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of 
Utah or the United States; 
(c) any corporation authorized to conduct a 
trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the 
United States; 
(d) any title insurance or abstract company 
authorized to do business in Utah under the laws of 
Utah; 
(e) any agency of the United States government; 
or 
( 0 any association or corporation which is lic-
ensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit 
Administration or its successor. 
This subsection is not applicable to a trustee of a 
trust deed existing prior to the effective date of this 
chapter, nor to any agreement which is supplemental 
to that trust deed. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the 
beneficiary therein, unless the beneficiary is quali-
fied to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(b), (c), (e), 
Or (f). 1^ 85 
57-1-22. Successor trustee - Appointment by 
beneficiary - Effect - Substitution of trustee -
Notice - Recording - Form. 
(1) The beneficiary may appoint a successor 
trustee at any time by filing for record in the office 
of the county, recorder of each county in which the 
trust property or some part thereof is situated, a 
substitution of trustee. From the time the substitu-
tion is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed 
to all the power, duties, authority and title of the 
trustee named in the deed of trust and of any succ-
essor trustee. 
(2) The substitution shall identify the trust deed 
by stating the names of the original parties thereto 
and the date of recordation and the book and page 
where the same is recorded or the entry number, 
shall state the name of the new trustee and shall be 
executed and acknowledged by all of the beneficia-
ries under the trust deed, or their successors in int-
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(3) If not previously recorded, at the time of rec-
ording the notice of default, the successor trustee 
shall file for record the substitution of trustee, and a 
copy thereof shall be sent in the manner provided in 
section 57-1-26 to all persons to whom a copy of 
the notice of default would be required to be mailed 
by section 57-1-26. In addition thereto, a copy 
shall be sent to the pnor trustee by regular mail to 
his last known address. 
(4) A substitution of trustee shall be sufficient if 
made in substantially the following form. 
Substitution of Trustee 
(insert nam* and address of new trustee) 
is hereby appointed successor trustee under the trust 
deed executed b> as trustor, in which 
is named beneficiary and as trustee, and 
filed for record , 19 , and recorded in Book 
, Page , Records of Count), (or filed 
for record , 19 , with recorder's entry No. 
.County), Utah. 
Signature 
1961 
1981 
57-1-23. Sale of trust property - Power of 
trustee - Foreclosure of truM deed. 
A power of sale is hereb> conferred upon the 
trustee which the trustee may exercise and under 
which the fust property may be sold in the manner 
hereinafter provided, after a breach of an obbgation 
for which the trust property is conveyed as security; 
or, at the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed 
ma> be foreclosed in the manner provided by law 
fo? the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. 
The power of sale may be exercised by the trustee 
without express provision therefor in the trust deed. 
57-1-24. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Notice of default. 
' The power of sale herein confen ed upon the 
trustee shall not be exercised until: 
(a) The trustee shall first file for record, in the 
office of the recorder of each count} wherein the 
trust property or some part or parcel thereof is sit-
uated, a notice of default, identifying the trust deed 
by stating the name of the trustor named therein 
and giving the book and page where the same is 
recorded or a description of the trust propert>, and 
containing a statement thai a breach of an obliga-
tion for which the trust property was conveyed as 
security has occurred, and setting forth the nature 
of such breach and of his election to sell or cause to 
be sold such property to satisfy the obligation; 
(b) Not less than three months shall thereafter 
elapse; and 
(c) After the lapse of at least three months the 
trustee shall give notice of sale as provided in this 
act. t%7 
57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale - Description 
of property - Time and place of sale. 
(1) The trustee shall give written notice of the 
time and place of sale particularly describing the 
property to be sold (a) by publication of such 
notice, at least three times, once a week for three 
consecutive weeks, the last publication to be at least 
10 days but not more than 30 days prior to the sale, 
in some newspaper having a general circulation in 
each county in which the property to be sold, or 
some pan thereof, is situ, ted, and (b) by posting 
such notice, at least 20 days before the date of sale» 
in some conspicuous place on the property to be 
sold and also in at least three public places of each 
city or county in which the property to be sold, or 
(p The sale shall be held at the time and place 
desgnated in the notice of sale which shall be 
between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. and 5 o'clock 
p.m. and at the courthouse of the county in which 
the property to be sold, or some part thereof, is 
situated. 
(3) The notice of sale shall be sufficient if made in 
substantially the following form: 
I Notice of Trustee's Sale 
The following described property will be sold at 
public auction to the highest bidder, payable in 
lawful money of the United States at the time of 
sale, at the in , County, Utah, 
on , 19 , at .m. of said day, for the 
puj-pose of foreclosing a trust deed executed by 
and , his wife, as trusto- in favor of 
, covering real property locate at , 
and more particularly described as: 
(Insert description) 
Dated. - 1 9 _ . 
Trustee 
5741-26. Requests for copies of notice of default m ' 
and notice of sale - Mailing by trustee or 
bereficiary - Publication of notice of default. 
(1) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of 
default and of any notice of sale under any trust 
deed may, at any time subsequent to the filing for 
reiord of the trust deed and prior to the filing for 
record of a notice of def< ult thereunder, file for 
reiord in the office of the county recorder of any 
county in which an> part or parcel of the trust 
property is situated, a duly acknowledged request 
for a copy of any such notice of default and notice 
of sale. The request shall set forth the name and 
address of the person or persons requesting copies 
of such notices and shall identify the trust deed by 
stating the names of the original parties thereto, the 
date of filing for record thereof, and the book and 
page where the same is recorded or the recorder's 
entry' number and shall be in substantially the foll-
owing form: 
Request is hereby made that a copy of any notice of 
default and a copy of notice of sale under the trust 
deed filed for record , 19 , and rec-
orded in Book , Page , Records of 
_J County, (or filed for record , 19 , 
with recorder's entry' number , [ ) County 
as trustor, in which 
named as beneficiary and as 
trustee, be mailed to (insert name) at 
Utah, executed by 
is 
.(insert address). 
Signature 
Upon filing for record of such request, the reco-
rder shall index such request in the mortgagor's 
index, mortgagee's index, and abstract record. 
Except as provided in this section the trustee under 
any such deed of trust shall not be required to send 
notice of default or notice of sale to any person not 
filing a request for notice as described herein. 
(2) Not later than 10 days after recordation of 
s^ch notice of default, the trustee or beneficiary 
all mail, by certified or registered mail, with 
stage prepa: . a copy of such r^tice with the 
recording date shown thereon, adc ^ssed to each 
rson whose name and address arc set forth in a 
request therefor which has been recorded prior to 
the filing for record of the notice of default, dire-
cted to the address designated in said request; and at 
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least 20 days before the date of sale, the trustee 
shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with 
postage prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time 
and place of sale, addressed to each person whose 
name and address are set forth in a request therefor 
which has been recorded prior to the filing for 
record of the notice of default, directed to the 
address designated in said request. 
(3) Any trust deed may contain a Tequest that a 
copy of any notice of default and a copy of any 
notice of sale thereunder shall be mailed to any 
person a party thereto at the address of such person 
set forth therein, and a copy of any notice of 
default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to 
each such person at the same time and in the same 
manner required as though a separate request ther-
efor had been filed b> each of such persons as pro-
vided in this section. 
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the 
trust deed and if no request for notice by such 
trustor has been recorded as provided in this 
section, a copy of the notice of default shall be 
published at least three times, once a week for three 
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in each county in which the trust property, or 
some part thereof, is situated, such publication to 
commence not later than 10 days after the filing for 
record of the notice of default. In lieu of such 
publication, a copy of the notice of default may be 
delivered personally to the trustor within such 10 
days or at any time before publication is completed. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for 
record pursuant to this section, nor any statement or 
allegation in any such request, nor any record 
thereof, shall affect the title to trust property OT be 
deemed notice to any person that any person requ-
esting copies of notice of default or of notice of sale 
has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or 
claim upon, the trust property. mi 
57-1-27. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Public auction - Conduct by attorney for trustee 
- Trustor may direct order in which trust 
property sold - Bids - Postponement of sale. 
On the date and at the time and place designated 
in the notice of sale, the trustee or the attorney for 
the trustee shaJl sell the property at public auction 
to the highest bidder. The trustee, or the attorney 
for the trustee may conduct the sale and act at such 
sale as the auctioneer. The trustor, or his successor 
in interest, if present at the sale, may direct the 
order in which the trust property shall be sold when 
such property consists of several known lots or 
parcels which can be sold to advantage separately, 
and the trustee, or the attorney for the trustee, shall 
follow such directions. Any person, including the 
beneficiary or trustee, may bid at the sale. Every bid 
is considered an irrevocable offer, and if the purc-
haser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for the 
property sold to him at the sale, the trustee, or the 
attorney for the trustee, may again sell the property 
at any time to the highest bidder. The party refusing 
to pay the bid price is liable for any loss occasioned 
thereby, including interest, costs, and trustee's and 
reasonable attorney's fees. The trustee or the atto-
rney for the trustee may thereafter reject any other 
bid of such person. 
The person conducting the sale may, for any 
cause he considers expedient, postpone the sale up 
to a period not to exceed 72 hours. Notice of such 
postponement shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last 
appointed for the sale. No other notice of the pos-
16 
tponed sale need be given unless the sale is postp-
oned for longer than 72 hours beyond the date 
designated in the notice of sale. In the event of i 
longer postponement, the sale shall be cancelled anc 
renoticed as provided for herein in the same mannei 
as the original notice of sale is required to be given. 
57-1-28. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Payment of bid - Trustee's deed delivered to 
purchaser - Recitals - Effect. 
(1) The purchaser at the sale shall pay the price 
bid as directed by the trustee and upon receipt of 
payment, the trustee shall execute and deliver his 
deed to such purchaser. The trustee's deed may 
contain recitals of compliance with the requirements 
of Sections 57-1-19 through 57-1-36 relating to 
the exercise of the power of sale and sale of the 
property described therein, including recitals conc-
erning any mailing, personal delivery, and publica-
tion of the notice of default, any mailing and the 
publication and posting of the notice of sale, and 
the conduct of sale. These recitals constitute prima-
facie evidence of such compliance and are conclusive 
evidence in favor of bona fide purchasers and enc-
umbrancers for value and without notice. 
(2) The trustee's deed shall operate to convey to 
the purchaser, without right of redemption, the 
trustee's title and all right, title, interest, and claim 
of the trustor and his successors in interest and of 
all persons claiming by, through, or under them, in 
and to the property sold, including ail such right, 
title, interest, and claim in and to such property 
acquired by the trustor or his successors in interest 
subsequent to the execution of the trust deed. ins 
57-1-29. Proceeds of trustee's sale -
Disposition. 
The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the 
trustee's sale, first, to the costs and expenses of 
exercising the power of sale and of the sale, inclu-
ding the payment of the trustee's and attorney's 
fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount 
which may be provided for in the trust deed, 
second, to payment of the obligation secured by the 
trust dtedt and the balance, if any, to the person or 
persons legally entitled thereto, or the trustee, in his 
discretion, may deposit the balance of such r3roceed!s 
with the county clerk of the county in which the sale 
took' place. Upon depositing such balance, the 
trustee shall be discharged from all further respon-
sibility therefor and the county clerk shall deposit 
the same with the county treasurer subject to the 
order of the district court of said county. . iwi 
57-1-30. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Corporate stock evidencing water rights given to 
secure trust deed. 
Shares of corporate stock evidencing water rights 
used, intended to be used, or suitable for use on the 
trust property and which are hypothecated to secure 
an obligation secured by a trust deed may be sold 
with the trust property, or any part thereof, at the 
trustee's sale in the manner provided in this act. w i 
57-1-31. Trust deeds - Default in performance 
of obligations secured - Reinstatement -
Cancellation of recorded notice of default. 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum 
of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior 
to the maturity date fixed in such obligation, 
become due or been declared due by reason of * 
breach or default in the performance of any oblig-
ation secured by the trust deed, including a default 
in the payment of interest or of any installment o. 
principal, or by reason of failure of the trustor to 
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advances made by the beneficiary in accordance 
with terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, 
the trustor or his successor in interest in the trust 
property or any part thereof or any other person 
having a subordinate hen or encumbrance of record 
thereon or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust 
deed, at any time within three months of the filing 
for record of notice of default under such trust 
deed, if the power of sale is to be exercised, may 
pay to the beneficiary or his successor in interest the 
entire amount then due under the terms of such 
trust deed (including costs and expenses actually 
incurred in enforcing the terms of such obligation, 
or trust deed, and the trustee's and attorneys fees 
actually incurred) other than such portion of the 
principal as would not then be due had no default 
occurred, and thereby cure the default theretofore 
existing and, thereupon, all proceedings theretofore 
had or instituted shall be dismissed or discontinued 
and the obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated 
and shall be and remain in force and effect the same 
as if no such acceleration had occurred 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed rei-
nstated in the manner provided in Subsection (1), 
the beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of 
any person having an interest in the trust propert), 
execute and debver to him a request to the trustee to 
execute, acknowledge, and delner a cancellation of 
the recorded notice of default under such trust deed, 
and any beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assi-
gnee, who, for a period of 30 days after such 
demand, refuses to request the trustee to execute 
and deliver such cancellation is liable to the person 
entitled to such request for all damages resulting 
from such refusal A release and reconveyance given 
by the trustee or beneficiary, or both, or the exec-
ution of a trustee's deed constitutes a cancellation 
of a notice of default. Otherwise, a cancellation of a 
recorded notice of default under a trust deed is, 
when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded and is 
sufficient if made and executed by the trustee m 
substantially the following form 
Cancellation of Notice of Default 
The undersigned hereby cancels the notice cf 
default filed for record , 19__, and recorded m 
Book , Page__, Records of County, (or filed 
of record , 19_, with recorder's entry No , 
__County), Utah, which notice of default refers to 
the trust deed executed by as trustor, in which 
is named as beneficiary and as trustee, 
and filed for record , 19 , and recorded in 
Book , Page , Records of County, (or 
filed of record , 19 , with recorder's entry 
No , County), Utah 
(legal description) 
Signature of Trustee 
lfS5 
57-1-32. Silt of trust properly by trustee -
Action to recover balance due upon obligation for 
which trust deed was given as security -
Collection of costs and tttomey's fees. 
At any time within three months after any sale of 
propert) under a trust deed, as heremabow prov-
ided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust 
deed was given as secunt), and in such action the 
complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured b> such trust deed, 
the amount for which such property was sold, and 
the fair market value thereof at the date of sale 
sold The court md> not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the inde 
btedness with interest, costs, and expense* of sale, 
including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the 
fair market value of the propert) as of the date of 
the sale In anv action brought under this section, 
the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bnn 
ging an action under this section ms 
57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured b) 
trust deed - Reconveyance of trust propert). 
W hen the obligation secured b; an) trust deed has 
been iatisfied, the trustee shall, upon wrm°n request 
by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust propert) The 
reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as 
"the person or persons entitled thereto " The bene-
ficiari under such trust deed shall dehver to the 
trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and 
the note or other evidence of the obligation so sati-
sfied An) beneficiary under such trust deed who 
refusis to request a reconvc)ance from the trustee 
for a[ period of thirt) da)s after written demand 
therefor is made by the trustor or his successor in 
interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor 
in mierest, as the case may be for double damage 
resulting from such refusal, or such trustor or hn 
successor in interest ma) bring an action against the 
beneficiar) and trustee to compel a reconveyance of 
the trust propert) and in such action the judgment 
of the coi t shall be that the t ustee recon\e> the 
trust propert) and that the benefician pay to the 
trustor, or his successor in interest, as th case ma\ 
be, the costs of suit including a reasonable atto-
rney's fee and all damage resulting from the 
refus ! of the beneficiary to jquest a recon\c>ance 
as hei einabove provided i96t 
57-lJ34. Sale of trust property by trustee -
Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of 
actions. 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed 
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a tru^ t deed 
as provided b) Uv, for,the foreclosure of mortgages 
on real propeny shall be commenced, wjihm the 
penid prescribed b) law for the commencement of 
an Action on the obligation secured by the trust 
deed i96i 
57-l[35. Trust deeds - Transfer of debts secured 
by - Transfer of security. 
Tre transfer of an\ debt secured by a ULct deed 
shal operate as a transfer of the secunt) therefor 
57-1^36. Trust deeds - Instruments entitled to be 
recorded - Assignment of a beneficis1 inkiest 
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment 
of a beneficial interest under a trust deed notice of 
default, trustee's de^d, reconveyance of the trust 
property and an) instrument by which any trust 
deed is subordinated or waived as to priority, when 
acknowledged as provided b) law, shall be entitled 
to be recorded, and shall, from the time of filing the 
samje with the recorder for record, impart notice of 
the contents thereof to all persons, including subs-
equent purchasers and encumbrancers for value, 
except that the recording of an assignment of a 
benbficial interest in the trust deed shall not in itself 
be deemed notice of such assignment to the trustor, 
his heirs or personal representative ,^ so as to inval-
idate any payment made by them, or any of them, 
to the person holding the note, bond or other inst-
rument evidencing the obligation b) the trust deed 
1961 
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Chapter 2. Acknowledgements 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances 
57-2-2. Who authorized 10 take acknowledgments 
57 2-3 Acknowledgment by deputy. 
57-2-4 Takmg acknowledgments of persons with Lnited 
States armed force* 
57-2-5 Certificate of acknowledgment 
57-2-6 Part\ must be known or identified 
57-2-7 Form of certificate of acknowledgment 
57-2-8 When grantor unknown to officer 
57-2-9 When executed by attorney in fact. 
57-2-10 Proof of execution - How made 
57-2-11 Witness must be known or identified. 
57-2-12 W hat must be proven 
57-2-13 form of certificate 
57-2-14 When subscribing witness dead - Proof of 
handwnnng 
57-2-15 V, hat evidence required 
57-2-16 Subpoena to subscribing witness 
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt - Ptoof aliunde 
57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving 
conveyances. 
hverv conveyance in writing whereby any real 
estate s conveved or ma\ be affected shall be ack-
nowledged or proved and certified m the manner 
hereinafter provided W3 
57-2-2. Who authorized to take 
acknowledgments. 
The proof or acknowledgment of every convey-
ance whereby anv real estate is conveyed or may be 
affected shall be taken by some one of the following 
officers 
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, 
b> a judge or clerk or a cou t having a seal, or a 
notarv public, county clerk or county recorder 
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state 
and within any state or termor) of the Ut ted 
States by a judge or clerk or any court of the 
United State, or of any state or termor) , having a 
seal, or by a notary public, or b) a commissioner 
appointed bv the governor of this state for that 
purpose 
(3) if acknowledged or proved without the United 
States, by a judge cr clerk of any court o f an) state, 
kingdom or empire having a seal, or any notary 
public therein, or any ambassador, minister, com-
missioner or consul of the United States appointed 
to reside therein 1953 
57-2-3. Acknowledgment b> deputv. 
When any of the officers above mentioned are 
authorized bv law to appoint a deputv, such ackn 
owledgnent or proof may be taken b) an) such 
deputy in the name of his principal i*S3 
57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with 
United States armed forces. 
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments 
in the manner and form and as otherwise authorized 
bv this chapter
 % an\ person serving in or with the 
armed forces of the United States ma) acknowledge 
the same wherever located before an) commissioned 
officer in the active service of the armed forces of 
the United States with the rank of second lieutenant 
or higher in the Arm) or Marine Corps, or ensign 
or higher in the Navy or United States Coast Guard 
fhe instrument sha'l not be rendered invalid b) the 
failure to state therein the place of execution or 
acknowledgment No authentication of the officer's 
certificate of acknowledgment shall be required, but 
the officer taking the acknowledgment shall endorse 
18 
thereon or attach thereto a certificate substantially 
in the following form 
On this day of 19 , before me , 
the undersigned officer, personally appeared , 
known to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be serving 
in or with the armed forces of the United States and 
to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged that he 
executed the, same fot the purposes the*, cm conta-
ined And the undersigned does further certify that 
he is at the date of this certificate a commissioned 
officer o f the rank stated below anc' is in the acttvc 
service of the armed forces of the United States 
Signature of Officer 
Rank of Of ficer and 
Command to Which 
Attached 
1*53 
57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment. 
Every officer who shall take the proof or ackno-
wledgment of any conveyance affecting any real 
estate shah make a certificate thereof, and cause 
such certificate to be endorsed on or annexed to 
such conveyance Such certificate shall be 
(1) When made by any judge or clerk, under the 
hand of such judge or clerk, anJ the seal of the 
court 
(2) When made by anv other officer, under the 
hand and official seal of such officer I9$3 
57-2-6. Party must be known or identified. 
No acknowledgment of any conveyance whereby 
any real estaie is conveyed or may be affected shall 
be taken unless the person offering to make such 
acknowledgment shall be personally known to the 
officer taking the same to be the person whose name 
is subscribed to such conveyance as a party thereto, 
or shall be proved to be such by the oath or affir-
mation of a credible witness personally known to 
the officer taking the acknowledgment iso 
57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment. 
A certificate of acknowledgment to any instru-
ment in writing affecting the title to any real prop-
erty in this state mav be substantially in the follo-
wing form* 
Stare of Utah, Countv of 
On the day of , 19 , personally appe-
ared before me , the signer of the above ins-
trument, who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same 
The cert ficate of acknowledgment of an instru-
ment executed by a corporation must be substanti-
ally in the following form 
State of Utah, County of 
On the day of , 19 , personally appe-
ared before me , who being by me duly 
sworn (or affirmed), did say that he is the president 
(or other officer or agent, as the case may be) of 
(naming the corporation), and that said instrument 
was signed in behalf of said corporation bv autho-
rity of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its boaid of 
directors, as the case mav be), and said 
acknowledged to me that said corporation executed 
the same i«53 
57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer. 
When the grantor is unknown to the officer 
taking the acknowledgment, the certificate shall be 
substantially in the following form, to wit 
State of Utah, County 
Code • Co 
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_ • !9__ , personally 
_, satisfactorily proved to 
me to be the signer o f the above instrument b> the 
oath of , a competent and credible witness 
for that purpose, by me duly sworn, and he, the 
said acknowledged that he executed the 
same 
Such certificate when properly executed by an 
officer authorized t o take acknov* ledgments t o ms 
truments in writing affecting the title to real prop-
erty m this state, and attached to a conveyance in 
writing, shall be a sufficient acknowledgment and 
certificate thai such conveyance was executed a< 
required b> law. i*si 
57-2-9. When executed by attorney in fact. 
The certificate o f acknowledgment of an instru-
ment executed by an attorney in fact must be subs-
tantially in the followi ig form 
State of Utah, Count> of 
On the day of , 19 , personally appe-
ared before mc , who, being b> mc duly 
sworn (or affirmed) did say that he is the attorney 
in fact of (naming the grantor), and that 
said instrument was signed in behalf of said grantor 
by authority, and said acknowledged to me 
that he as such attorney in fact executed the same 
57-2-10 Proof of execution • How made. 
The proof of the execution of any conveyance 
whereby real estate is conveyed or may be affected 
shall be 
(1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if 
there is one or, 
(2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, 
or cannot be had, by evidence o f the handwriting o f 
the party, and pf a subscribing witness, if there is 
one, given by a credible witness to each signaturc 
57-2-11. Witness must be known or identified. 
N o proof by a subscribing witness shall be taVen 
unless such witness shall be personally known to the 
officer taking the proof to be the person whose 
name is subscribed to the conveyance as a witness 
thereto, or shall be proved to be such by the oath or 
affirmation of a credible witness personally known 
to such officer IWJ 
57-2-12. What must be proven 
N o certificate o f such proof shall be made unless 
such subscribing witness shall prove that the person 
whose name is subscribed thereto as a party is the 
person described in, and who executed, the same, 
that such person executed the conveyance, and that 
such person subscribed his name thereto as a witness 
thereof at the request of the make of such instru 
ment. 1953 
57-2-13 Form of certificate. 
The certificate of such proof shall be substantially 
in the following form, to w it 
State of Utah, County o f 
On this day o f , 19__, before me pers-
onally appeared , personally k n o * n to me (or 
satisfactorily proved to me by the oath of , a 
competent and credible witness for that purpose, by 
me duly sworn) to be the same person whose name 
is subscribed to the above instrument as a witness 
thereto, who , being by me duly sworn, deposed and 
said that he resides in , county of , 
and state o f Utah, that he was present and saw 
» personally known to him to be the signer of 
the above instrument as a party thereto, sign and 
deliver the same, and heard him acknowledge that 
h« executed the same, and that he, the deponent, 
thereupon signed his name as a subscribing witness 
»S3 
Code#Co 
thereto at the request of sa id . 
57-2J14. When subscribing witness dead - Proof 
of handwriting 
N o proof by evidence of the handwriting of a 
party, or of the subscribing witness or witnesses, 
shall 
shall) 
such 
be taken unless the officer takinr the same 
be satisfied that all the subscribing witnesses to 
conveyance are dead, out of the junsd.ction, or 
cannpt be had to prove the executior thereof 
57-2 
1951 
15. What evidence required 
N 6 certificate of any such proof shall be made 
unless a competent and credible witres* shall state 
on oath or affirmation that he personal knew the 
person whose name is subscribed therei .s a party, 
well knows his signature, stating his mc rs of kno-
wledge, and believes the name of the pari/ subscr-
ibed [thereto as a party was subscribed by <' ch 
person, nor unless a competent and credible witr ss 
shaU in like manner state that he personally ki cw 
the person whose name is subscribed to such conv-
eyance as a witness, wel knows his signature, 
stating his means of knowledge and believes the 
name subscribed thereto as a witness was thereto 
subscribed by such person 1953 
57-2-16. Subpoena to subscribing witness 
Upon the application of any grantee in anv con-
veyance required bv law to be recorded or of anv 
person claiming under such grantee verified under 
the oath of the applicant, that anv witness to such 
conveyance residing in the county where such appl 
ication is made refuses to appear and testifv touc 
hing the execution thereof, and thai such convey-
ance cannot be proved without his evidence, any 
officer authorized to take the acknowled°ment or 
proof of such conveyance may issue a subpoena 
requiring such witness to appear before such officer 
and testify touching the execution thereof 1953 
57-2-17. Disobedience - Contempt - Proof 
aliunde. 
Every person who , being served with a subpoena, 
shall without reasonable cause refuse or neglect to 
appear, or, appearing, shall refuse to answer upon 
oath touching the matters aforesaid shan be liab'e 
to the partv injured for such damages as mav be 
sustained by him on account of such neglect o r 
refusal, and may also be dealt with fo r contempt as 
provided by law, but no person shall be reqjared to 
attena who resides out of the countv in which the 
proof is to I e taken, nor unless his reasonable exp 
enses shall have first beer tendered to him prov 
ided, ihat if it shaJl appear to the satisfact on to the 
officer so authorized to take such acknov ledement 
that such subscribing witness p 1 posely conceals 
himself, or keeps out of the way, so that he cannot 
be served with a subpoena or taken on attachment 
after the use of due diligence to that end, or in ca<e 
of his continued failure or refusal to testifv for the 
space of one hour after his appearance sha have 
been compelled by process, then said convevance or 
other instrument mav be proved and admtted to 
record in the same manner as if such subscribing 
witness thereto were dead 19^ 3 
Chapter 3. Recording Conve\ances 
57-3-1 j Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of 
execution a prerequisite 
S*»-3-2 
affected by chance in interest rate 
57-3-3 
57-3-4 
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iable instruments and assignments of accounts rec-
eivable, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
which could have been asserted against an assignor 
at the time of or before notice of such assignment, 
may be asserted against his assignee, to the extent 
that such claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim does 
not exceed recovery upon the claim of the assignee. 
(k) Claim in Excess of Court's Jurisdiction. 
Where any counterclaim or cross-claim or third-
party claim is filed in an action in a city court or 
justice's court, and due to its limited jurisdiction, 
such court does not have the power to grant the 
relief sought thereby, it shall suspend all proceedings 
in the entire action and certify the same and tran-
smit all papers therein to the district court of the 
county in which such inferior court is maintained, 
upon the payment by the party filing such counter-
claim, cross-claim or third-party claim of the fees 
required for certifying the record on appeal from 
such court and for docketing the same in the district 
court. The fees herein required to be paid, shall be 
deposited with the clerk of the inferior court at the 
time of filing such counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. For failure so to do, the court 
may, upon motion of the adverse party, after 
notice, strike such counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. 
In any action so certified to the district court, 
when any responsive pleading is required or permi-
tted or a motion is allowed under these Rules, the 
time in which such responsive pleading or motion 
shall be made shall commence to run from the time 
notice of the filing of the cause in the district court 
shall be served on the party making such responsive 
pleading or motion. 
RULE 14. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE 
(«) Whca Defendant May Bring in Third Party, 
(b) When PlalnUff M»y Bring in Third Party. 
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. 
At any time after commencement of the action a 
defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a 
summons and complaint to be served upon a person 
not a party to the action who is or may be liable to 
him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against 
him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain 
leave to make the service if he files the third-party 
complaint not later than ten days after he serves his 
original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on 
motion upon notice to all parties to the action. The 
person served with the summons and third-party 
complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defe-
ndant, shall make his defenses to the third-party 
plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his 
counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and 
cross-claims against other third-party defendants 
as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant 
may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which 
the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiff's 
claim. The third-party defendant may also assert 
any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter 
of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party 
plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against 
the third-party defendant arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff, 
and the third-party defendant thereupon shall 
assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his 
counterclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 
13. A third-party defendant may proceed under 
this rule against any person not a party to the action 
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the 
claim made in the action against the third-party 
defendant. 
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. 
When a counterclaim is asserted against a plain-
tiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in 
under circumstances which under this rule would 
entitle a defendant to do so. 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL 
PLEADINGS 
(a) Amendments. 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. 
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter 
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if the pleading is one to which no respo-
nsive pleading is permitted and the action has not 
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so 
amend it at any time within twenty days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response 
to an amended pleading within the time remaining 
for response to the original pleading or within ten 
days after service of the amended pleading, which-
ever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders, 
(b) Amendments to Conform to the Evidence. 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried 
by express or implied consent of the parties, they 
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the 
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If 
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground 
that it is not within the issues made by the plead-
ings, the court may allow the pleadings to be 
amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court 
shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the 
objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be 
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental Pleadings. 
Upon motion of a party the court may," upon 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, 
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting 
forth transactions or occurrences or events which 
have happened since the date of the pleading sought 
to be supplemented. Permission may be granted 
even though the original pleading is defective in its 
statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the 
court deems it advisable that the adverse party plead 
to the supplemental pleading, it shall so order, spt" 
cifying the time therefor. 
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RULE 16. PRETRIAL PROCEDURE; 
FORMULATING ISSUES 
In any action, the court may in its discretion 
direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before 
it for a conference to consider 
(1) The simplification of the issues; 
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to 
the pleadings; 
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact 
and of documents which will avoid unnecessary 
proof; 
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witn-
esses; 
(5) Such other matters as may aid in the disposi-
tion of the action. 
The court shall make an order which recites the 
action taken at the conference, the amendments 
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made 
by the parties as to any of the matters considered, 
and which limits the issues for trial to those not 
disposed of by admissions or agreements of counsel; 
and such order when entered controls the subseq-
uent course of the action, unless modified at the 
trial to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its 
discretion may establish by rule a pretrial calendar 
on which actions may be placed for consideration as 
above provided. 
PART IV. Parties. 
Rule 17. Parties Plaintiff and Defendant. 
Rule 18. Joinder of Claims and Remedies. 
Roto 19. Necessary Joinder of Parties. 
Rule 21. Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties. 
Rule 22. Interpleader. 
Rule 23. Class Actions. 
Rule 23.1. Derivative Actions by Shareholders. 
Rule 24. Intervention. 
Rule 25. Substitution of Parties. 
RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANT 
(a) Real Party in Interest. 
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. 
(c) Guardian Ad Utem; How Appointed. 
(d) Associates May be Sued b> Common Name. 
(e) Action Against a Nonresident doing Business in this 
State. 
(a) Real Party in Interest. 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the* real party in interest. An executor, administr-
ator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a 
party with whom or in whose name a contract has 
been made for the benefit of another, or a party 
authorized by statute may sue in his own name 
without joining with him the party for whose benefit 
the action is brought; and when a statute so prov-
ides, an action for the use or benefit of another 
shaft be brought in the name of the State of \)tah. 
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is 
not prosecuted in the name of the real party in int-
erest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the 
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real 
Party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real 
party in interest. 
(b) Infants or Incompetent Persons. 
When an infant or an insane or incompetent 
Person is a party, he must appear either by his 
jSieoCo 
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general guardian, or by a guardian ad litem appoi-
n t in the particular case by the court in which the 
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be 
appointed [in any case when it is deemed by the 
cojurt in which the action or proceeding is prosec-
uted, expedient to represent the infant, insane or 
mc
kompeten|t person in the action or proceeding, 
notwithstanding he may have a general guardian and 
m£y have appeared by him. In an action in rem it 
$nall not be necessary to appoint a guardian ad 
|jtem for any unknown party who might be an 
infant or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian Ad Litem; How Appointed. 
When a guardian ad litem is appointed by a 
court, he must be appointed as follows: 
(1) When the infant is plaintiff, upon the applic-
ation of the infant, if he is of the age of fourteen 
y ^ s , or if kinder that age, upon the application of 
a Relative or friend of the infant. 
(2) When the infant is defendant, upon the appl-
ication of the infant if he is of the age of fourteen 
years and applies within twenty days after the 
scfvice of the summons, or if under that age or if he 
neglects so to apply, then upon the application of a 
rcjative or friend of the infant, or of an> other 
p^rty to the action. 
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this 
st^te, the plaintiff upon motion therefor, shall be 
entitled to an order designating some suitable person 
to o* guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, 
urjless the defendant or some one in his behalf 
vyjthin twenty days after service of notice of such 
5Vjch infant. Service of such notice ma> be made 
upon the general or testamentary guardian of such 
defendant, if he has one in this state; if not, such 
notice, together with the summons in the action, 
sjtall be served in the manner provided for publica-
tion of summons upon such infant, if over fourteen 
y^ars of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, b> 
Sljch service on the person with whom such infant 
re$ides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident 
infant defendant shall have twenty days after his 
appointment in which to plead to the action. 
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a 
p^rty to an action or proceeding, upon the applica-
tion of a relative or friend of such insane or inco-
mpetent person, or of any other party to the action 
0 f proceeding. 
(J) Associates May be Sued by Common Name. 
When two or more persons associated in any 
business either as a joint-stock company, a partn-
ership or other association, not a corporation, tra-
nsact such business under a common name, whether 
it comprises the names of such associates or not, 
ifrcy may be sued by such common name; and any 
judgment obtained against the defendant in such 
^ e shall bind Ithe ioint property of all the associ-
ates in the samp manner as if all had been named 
defendants and had been sued upon their joint lia-
bility. 
(e> Action Against a Nonresident doing Business in 
this State. I 
When a nonresident person is associated in and 
conducts business within the State of Utah in one or 
more places in nis own name or a common trade 
name, and said business is conducted under the 
supervision of a manager, superintendent, or agent, 
$aid person may be sued in his own name in any 
action arising out of the conduct of said business. 
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the officer is notary public or justice of the peace is held to be sufficient without 
its repetition after his signature.8 
Strict technical accuracy in gning the title of the city or county is not 
essential; for example, in an acknowledgment before the mayor of "Kansas in 
the county aforesaid,'' the quoted words were held sufficient for the "Citv of 
K a n s a s " 9 Where a certificate recited that the notary was of one county 
and he signed himself as of another, it was held not fatal.10 
§ 55. Title and residence of person taking acknowledgment. 
A statement of the official position or authority of the officer taking an 
acknowledgment is not essential to the \alidit\ of the certificate where the 
description is not required by statute;11 but the statutory requirements mav 
be such as to render fatally defecthe a certificate which does not describe 
the person taking the acknowledgment as an officer of any kind nor describe 
his official character.12 Howe\er, the title of the office of the person granting 
the certificate need not appear more than once.13 
It is not essential to the validity of the certificate that it state the officer's 
place of residence.14 
Where the statute authorizes acknowledgment before judges or officers of 
courts of record, there seems to be some difference of opinion as to whether 
such a judge or officer must state in his certificate the fact that his court is 
a court of record.15 Under a statute providing that instruments may be 
8. Colby v McOmber, 71 Iowa 469, 32 NW 
459 
Annotation: 29 ALR 973 
9. Hubbard v SworTord Bros Dry Goods Co. 
209 Mo 495, 108 SW 15. 
10. Merchants' Bank v Harrison, 39 Mo 
433, Texas Osage Co-op Rovalty Pool v 
James (Tex Civ App) 129 S\ \2d 327. 
Annotation: 25 ALR2d 1146, §27 . 
In Roberts v Robinson, 49 Neb 717, 68 
NW 1035, it was held that where a deed was 
actually acknowledged before a notary in the 
county in which he resided, it would not be 
so invalidated that it would not comey a 
legal title and be entitled to admission in 
evidence by the fact that the caption of 
the certificate named another county and the 
notary in the body of the certificate sub-
scribed himself as an officer "qualified for and 
residing in said county." 
1 1 . Manbeck Motor Sales Co v Garside 208 
Iowa 656, 226 NW 9 Blake v Hollandsworth, 
71 W Va 387, 76 SE 814 
Annotation: 29 ALR 967, 25 ALR2d 1144, 
§2o 
12. Johnston v Haines, 2 Ohio 55. 
Annotation: 29 ALR 968, s. 25 ALR2d 
1144, § 26 
A statutory requirement that a certificate 
of acknowledgment set forth "the title of the 
court or person before whom the acknow\ecce-
ment was made" was mandatory in form. Re 
Meakins (DC Iowa) 25 F2d 305. 
A certificate in proper form except that 
the only disclosure by the ofheer of his official 
484 
capacity was the signature, "G H Maxev 
Clerk, by G M Walker, Deputy," was he d 
to be insufficient, the court taking the \i*»\ 
that the official character of the officer wno 
made the certificate should be shown in t 
either in the bodv or appended to the s w 
nature, and that the word "clerk'* appencea 
to the signature in this case was not sjffic e**t 
for that purpose Gulf C & S F R Co v 
Carter, 5 Tex Civ App 675, 24 SW 1083 
The U'niform Acknowledgment Act requ re? 
the certifying officer to give the title of ^ s 
office Uniform Acknowledgment Act § C 
13. Summer v Mitchell, 29 Fla 179, 10 c^ 
562, Lake Erie & \ \ R Co v Whitham, 15J 
111 514, 40 NE 1014 
Annotation: 29 ALR 969. 
14. Griffin v Cathn, 25 Wash 474, 65 P 7^5 
Annotation: 29 ALR 974, s. 25 ALR:d 
1146, § 2 8 . 
15 . Pierce v Hakes, 23 Pa 231 (statement i r t 
required) 
Annotation: 29 ALR 979, s. 25 ALR--
1147, § 3 2 . 
In Hurst v Leckie, 97 Va 550, 34 SE 4< \ 
it was held that where the statute spent 
"a commissioner in chancery of a court | ^ 
record" as one of the officers authorize.! 
t ike acknowledgments a certificate the <"* ^ 
tion of which was "State of Virginia, I
 r 
of Buena \ i s t a " and in which the o\ 
described himself as a "commissioner in c i J
 % 
eery for the city aforesaid," and whicn x^ 
signed with the name of the officer folio^1 
by the words "Commissioner in Cham l 
contained a sufficient description of the c*iw ** 
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of record or an officer holding 
erk under the seal of the court 
acknowledged in another state before a court 
the seal of such a court, a certificate by a cl 
has been held invalid where nothing showed that the court was one of record or 
that the clerk was the holder of its seal.16 
Inasmuch as officers habitually and customarily use abbreviations of their 
titles, or initial letters only, the courts recognize this fact and hold such 
abbreviations or initials sufficient to describe the officer.17 
8 56. Errors in the designation of office or tjtle. 
Merely technical or clerical inaccuracies in the official title of the one issu-
ing the certificate are not usually considered fatal defects.18 Nor, in itself, 
does the fact that the title of the officer as gi^en in a certificate from another 
jurisdiction varies somewhat from the title of the corresponding officer in the 
local jurisdiction or from the title as given in the statutory list of officers 
entitled to take acknowledgments render the certificate invalid.19 
In cases where the officer taking an acknowledgment held more than one 
office and signed or described himself in both capacities, the defect has gen-
erally been held not to be fatal.20 Where the possession of the one office 
necessarily entails the holding of the other office also, there seems to be little 
question but that a signature in either capacity is sufficient.1 
§ 57. Expiration of commission of officer. 
If the commission of the officer by whom an acknowledgment was taken was 
in full force and effect at that time, the fact that he does not certify when 
his term will expire does not destroy the effectiveness of the instrument to 
which he certifies.2 But if the commission has expired prior to the date of 
the acknowledgment, it is, of course, ineffective.* 
character of the person who took the ac-
knowledgment. 
16. Fogg v Holcomb, 64 Iowa 621, 21 NW 
17. Harris v Zeuch, 103 Fla 183, 137 So 135; 
Solomon v Dunlap-Huckabee Auto Co. 174 
9 a 782, 164 SE 185; McCreary v Coggeshall, 
?4 SC 42, 53 SE 978. 
Annotation: 29 ALR 976, s. 25 ALR2d 
H47, §30 . 
18. Hubbard v SwofTord Bros. Dry Goods Co. 
2 "9 Mo 495, 108 SW 15. 
Annotation: 29 ALR 977, 978, s. 25 ALR 
^ 1 1 4 7 , 1 3 1 . 
In McClure v McClurg, 53 Mo 173, a 
'
t r i i ,?^ a t t n e grantor appeared before the 
f^t" of the Greene Circuit Court, in-
' '*d of before "the court," was held not to 
"a'idatc a certificate 
&*!<! • e !^c. ° ^ c e r " a Justice of the peace, 
r* , *1Rr?s *"s name as such, the certificate 
"* ; .°V v l t . i a t e d b>' the fact that in the body 
\;.t
 r>
 ls
 called a notary* public. Atlantic 
U
'*io CC 5 W a g n c r ' 2 4 °hi° C C N S 2 7 5 , 4 4 
''••.frd t l^Cat?iS k y o n c designating himself "spe-
-^'kiirn " l l ly,> * i a v e k ° e n held sufficient, the 
"I h,„, o n "special'' being surplusage. 
; ^ " P * o n v Johnson, 84 Tex 548, 19 SW 
19. Stooksberry v Hickman, 183 Tenn 560, 
194SW2d344. 
Annotation: 29 ALR 978. 
20. Summer v Mitchell. 29 Fla 179, 10 So 
562; Wilson v Braden, 56 W Va 372, 49 SE 
409. [ 
Annotation: 29 ALR 974, s. 25 ALR2d 
1146, § 29. 
1. Butler v Dunagan, 19 Tex 559. 
Annotation: 29 ALR 975. 
In Owen v Baker, 101 Mo 407, 14 SW 175, 
it was held that where the clerk of the cir-
cuit court was by statute also recorder, a cer-
tificate of acknowledgment of a sheriffs dtc6 
granted by him will not be invalid because 
he signed it as recorder, where it was his 
office o^  clerk of the circuit court which 
gave hiifa authority to take acknowledgments. 
2. Kaiisas City & S. E. R. Co. v Kansas 
City &JS. W. R. Co. 129 Mo 62, 31 SW 
451. | 
Annotation: 29 ALR 980, s. 25 ALR2d 
1147, § 33. 
An acknowledgment otherwise regular and 
valid is not rendered void by reason of the 
failure t>f a notary to follow a statute re-
quiring him to write under his official signa-
ture the! date of the expiration of his com-
mission, j where the requirement is contained 
TILED IS' "' r-v<^ .>rnc£ 
HftrN 2 56 PH fB6 
BY l£J)'Mi\LdniC) 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation,, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
et al., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Glenn M. Acomb, Chief Deputy County Recorder for Salt Lake County, be 
first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says as follows: 
1. That I am Chief Deputy Recorder for Salt Lake County and a licensed 
attorney in the State of Utah and as such make this Affidavit. 
2. That since the 1985 amendments to the Utah mechanic's lien law, which 
deleted the requirement of a verification in notices of lien, it has been the policy of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder that mechanic's notices of lien are not required to be 
acknowledged nor notarized in order to be accepted for recordation in the land records. 
3. That when lien claimants inquire of the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
personnel, they have been instructed to tell them that notices of lien need not be 
verified nor notarized in order to be accepted for recordation in the land records. 
4. That based upon my own knowledge and experience, the vast majority 
of the notices of mechanic's liens that are filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office are prepared on commercially printed forms. 
Robert F. Babcock (#0158) 
Darrel J. Bostwick (#4543) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
GLENN M. ACOMB 
Civil No. C84-1644 
Judge Judith M. Billings 
7d 
DATED this _ / day of May, 1986. 
3L 
Glenn M. Acomb 
Chief Deputy Recorder, Salt Lake 
County 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / ^ day pf May, 1986, 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission expires: 
- r _ e - ^ C ? Residing a t ; ^ V / , T ~ ^ f f t f ^ ^ y 7 
Robert F. Babcoek (#0158) 
Darrel J. Bostwick (#4543) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
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W THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROJECTS UNLIMITED, INC., 
a Utah corporation,, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRADSHAW DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ! 
INC., a Utah corporation; 
et al., ! 
Defendants. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
: FRANK NELSON 
: Civil No. C84-1644 
: Judge Judith M. Billings 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Frank Nelson, of Gem Printing, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. That I am an employee of Gem Printing and as such make this Affidavit. 
2. That Gem Printing is a major supplier of Notice of Lien forms in the 
State of Utah. 
3. That the Notice of Lien form attached hereto as attachment "A" is a 
true and correct copy of Gem Printings Notice of Lien form. • 
4. That Gem prints and distributes more than 4,000 Notice of Lien forms 
during a one year period. 
DATED this ts/ day of May, 1986. 
/ 
/ 
_ ^ - - . - ^ ' - ? - i 
Frank Nelson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
"'? y '^> 
<•'/ 
,r-, 
day of May, 1986. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission expires: 
Residing: <' s-c''. C^/C y< County 
NOTICE OF LIEN 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Notice is hereby given that the undersigned-
doing business as and residing at 
County of State of Utah, hereby claim.... 
and intend to hold and claim a lien upon that certain land and premises, owned and reputed to be 
owned by and 
situate, lying and being in , County of 
State of Utah, described as follows, to wit: 
to secure the payment of the sum of Dollars, 
owing to the undersigned for 
in, on and about the . on said land. 
Thatl 
ployed by) 
 the said indebtedness accrued and the undersigned furnished said materials to (or was em-
(EriN according to tbt fact) 
..who was the 
aforesaid, under a contract made between the said-
_owner and the reputed owner of said premises as 
^and the undersigned 
on the day of , 19 , by the terms of which the undersigned did agree 
to 
and the said.. 
did agree to pay the undersigned therefor as follows, to wit :.. 
_and under which said contract the under-
signed did the first on the day of 
and did the last on the 
day of and on and between said last mentioned 
days, did amounting 
to the sum of Dollars, 
which was the reasonable value thereof, and on which the following payments have been made to wit: 
leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of.. 
Dollars after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which 
demand the undersigned hold... and claim a lien by virtue of the provisions of Chapter 1, of Tillc 
88, of the Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of 
. being first duly sworn, says that he is 
-Claimant— in the foregoing Notice of Lien; 
that he has heard read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true of his 
own knowledge. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this. .•<? " ^ » £ ? .day tAJZl±^l ...19 ^ c-
--'V /-U':^-r:,~ 
Notary Public. 
^ • 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby ce r t i f y tha t jS- t rue and correct -eepy of the 
f o r e g o i n g MflWfrnmriiiTn i'n V,iippr>Ti^rffif . - T i ^ J 3 T ^ Mri+i'nn \ rs 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this 2- / day of ^ c I - , 
Mr. Jon C. Heaton 
Mr. James A. Boevers 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
Third Floor Mony Plaza 
424 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3-1-PROJUNLM.BRF 
